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Chronic homelessness has severe implications for health disparities. Black Americans are 
four times as likely and Hispanic Americans are two times more likely to experience 
homelessness compared to white Americans (Fusaro, Levy, and Shaefer 2018). Homelessness 
contributes to high rates of chronic disease, adverse behavioral health outcomes, increased 
mortality, and lower rates of educational and job attainment over the life course (Fazel, Geddes, 
and Kushel 2014). Longer durations of homelessness are associated with high mortality rates, 
adverse behavioral health outcomes and chronic medical conditions; moreover, persons 
experiencing chronic homelessness are more likely to remain homeless as length of 
homelessness increases (Henwood, Byrne, and Scriber 2015; S. Kertesz et al. 2016). 
Homelessness and chronic-homelessness hit large metropolitan areas especially hard over the 
past two decades (Bishop et al. 2017a). Unsheltered homelessness, which is primarily long-term 
homelessness, is increasing again for the first time in ten years (Bishop et al. 2017a).  
Most research on homelessness focuses on empirical research identifying best practices 
for solutions to chronic homelessness. However, there is a wide gap in the literature investigating 
the political processes shaping the processes leading to the development of these best practices. 
This dissertation seeks to understand the political decision-making processes influencing 
adoption of best-practice solutions to reduce chronic homelessness.  
Homelessness is a unique case of a health issue that is governed by an almost entirely 
decentralized system – both historically and today (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). The history 
of devolution and decentralization in homelessness governance makes it a unique policy space 
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where various actors work in different ways to establish different types of policies that all 
attempt to manage homelessness to different ends.  
This dissertation argues that homelessness policy, specifically policies seeking solutions 
to long-term or chronic homelessness, are governed in four separate and distinct policy arenas: 
the state, local government, economic elites, and homeless service providers. The separation and 
conflict between these structural interests in policy goals and policy processes result in increased 
challenges to establishing and implementing effective solutions to end chronic homelessness. 
Challenges include limited state-level support such as financial resources and/or administrative 
burdens due to misaligned policy goals; inequity in political participation that may exclude at-
risk populations; and, finally, limited involvement by municipal governments in many cases, 
which may constrain homeless programming by limiting resources and policymaking authority.  
This research finds that structural changes incentivizing re-centralization of homelessness 
governance in conjunction with increased municipal policy capacity may be required to promote 
coordination across the different policy spaces to overcome collective action problems and 







Chapter 1: America’s Homelessness Crisis 
 
Homelessness is a Public Health Problem 
Homelessness is a public health problem. From rising housing costs, to discriminatory 
lending and leasing, natural disasters and mental illness, homelessness has many different causes 
and many similar effects: serious adverse consequences for physical and mental health, quality of 
life and educational and work attainment. In the public health and medical communities, there is 
a resounding call to promote a culture of health across communities and ‘health in all’ policies. 
Yet, the national conversation around health reform centers around healthcare, including health 
insurance and medical care. Often conspicuously absent from these debates are factors 
influencing population health across the life course.  
Homelessness, at its core, is a threat to population health and health equity. Nearly a 
decade after the great recession, homelessness rates are once again increasing across the United 
States (Bishop et al. 2017a). Homelessness affects over 3.5 million young Americans annually 
(Chapin Hall University of Chicago 2018), of which 1.3 million are children (United States 
Interagency Council on Homelessness 2018). This is more than the number of Americans who 
suffer annually from opioid related substance use disorders (National Institute on Drug Abuse 
2018), and more than the number of Americans who die in car accidents annually (Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety and Highway Loss Data Institute 2018). Black Americans are 4 
times as likely and Hispanic Americans are 2 times more likely to experience homelessness 
compared to white Americans (Grant et al. 2013). Among children, homelessness contributes to 
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higher rates developmental, academic, and behavioral problems (United States Interagency 
Council on Homelessness 2018). Downstream across the life course, homelessness contributes to 
high rates of chronic disease, adverse behavioral health outcomes, increased mortality, lower 
rates of educational and job attainment (Fusaro, Levy, and Shaefer 2018). Ultimately, 
homelessness worsens health disparities for already vulnerable low-income and minority 
populations. If health policy truly seeks to improve population health and reduce health 
disparities, addressing homelessness must be a priority.  
Cities are the face of the homeless epidemic. If you have traveled to San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, Washington D.C., or almost any major metropolitan area in the U.S. in recent years, 
you almost certainly encountered homelessness. With increasing visibility, homelessness paints a 
stark image of inequality in modern America. In Los Angeles, over 35,000 individuals are 
experiencing homelessness (Cowan 2019). Rates of unsheltered homelessness, or long-term 
homelessness, increased by over 40 percent in recent years in Los Angeles alone (Cowan 2019). 
Simultaneously, mortality rates of individuals experiencing long-term homelessness in cities 
across the U.S. are increasing dramatically (Gorman and Rowan 2019). What are municipalities 
doing to respond to this crisis? This book seeks to measure and explain local responses to 
homelessness or local homeless policy decision-making, as the main outcome of interest, 
focusing on municipal management of long-term or chronic homelessness.   
Homeless Policy Governance in the U.S. 
There are many different approaches to managing public health crises. The most common 
approach leverages governmental intervention. Anyone who works in public health will tell you 
that county level public health departments are a critical part of public health infrastructure for 
both prevention and disaster response. In the context of disasters themselves, natural or health, 
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disaster governance protocol, stemming from federated of powers outlined in Article 10 of the 
constitution, emphasizes the role of local governments as first responders in such crisis followed 
by support from states and the federal government (Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) n.d.).  
Yet in homeless policy, the systems governing homelessness and designing and 
delivering homeless policy in the United States typically do not include local governments 
(Jarpe, Mosely, and Smith 2018). The majority of homeless governance systems in the United 
States are overseen and directed by nonprofit organizations. Previous research has shown that 
only forty percent of homeless governance systems in the U.S. are a part of municipal 
government (Jarpe, Mosely, and Smith 2018). The primarily non-profit, non-governmental 
systems governing homelessness in the United States are known as Continuums of Care (CoC). 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) definition of the Continuum of 
Care (CoC) is: “Continuum of Care and Continuum means the group organized to carry out the 
responsibilities required under this part and that is composed of representatives of organizations, 
including nonprofit homeless providers, victim service providers, faith-based organizations, 
governments, businesses, advocates, public housing agencies, school districts, social service 
providers, mental health agencies, hospitals, universities, affordable housing developers, law 
enforcement, organizations that serve homeless and formerly homeless veterans, and homeless 
and formerly homeless persons to the extent these groups are represented within the geographic 
area and are available to participate”(Housing and Urban Development 2017). More generally, 
the CoC, or the national system for preventing and addressing homelessness in the United States 
is a network of mainly non-governmental community organizations, organized at the municipal 
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level that distribute funding and oversee local and regional homeless policy programming and 
service distribution. 
Goals of this Dissertation  
This dissertation seeks to explain local homeless policy decision-making as the main 
outcome of interest. Within this decision-making, why is local government generally absent from 
homeless policy? When considering local responses to homelessness, this dissertation seeks to 
understand the types of municipalities that may establish formal involvement in homeless 
governance and overall when and why municipal governments may or may not choose to become 
formally involved in homeless policy governance. The historic and contemporary absence of 
municipal government in homeless policy governance may have implications for homeless 
policy decision-making and implementation by virtue of the power of local governments to levy 
both financial, institutional and human resources to accomplish policy tasks. The choice to fully 
decentralize homeless policy governance in many cases begs the question of the effect of this 
decentralization on the outcome of interest, homeless policy decision-making, or successful 
responses to managing homelessness and chronic homelessness.    
There are many reasons why municipal governments may choose to engage in homeless 
policy governance or not. Homeless policy decision-making is a policy space that has been 
shaped substantially by the ways persons experiencing homelessness and chronic homelessness 
have been socially constructed by political decision-makers. The ways that persons experiencing 
chronic homelessness are perceived may interact with the dynamics of political privilege 
stemming from variation in economic power across stakeholder groups. The variation in 
economic power may also include policy capacity stemming from resources available to 
effectively inform and implement supportive housing policy. This interaction may further inform 
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the types of policies pursued by different groups, including more or less participation by local 
governments in response to perceptions about the causes of chronic homelessness, and local 
government’s ability to act based on policy capacity available and ability to integrate that policy 
capacity into local decision-making structures as a product of political, participatory ability.  
Thus, the independent variables of interest I am examining to understand their influence 
on adoption of local supportive housing policies or local homeless policy decision-making are: 
factors related to the social construction of homelessness (including race/ethnicity, religiosity, 
and immigration policy); and the role of political institutions and economic factors (including 
degrees of local government fragmentation, municipal GDP, and the organization and wealth of 
stakeholder interests associated with homeless policy and programming such as nonprofit health 
organizations and revenue per-capita, and local tourism revenue). I argue that homeless policy 
politics has important theoretical implications for our contemporary understandings of 
decentralization in public health governance and the politics of historically marginalized 
populations. This dissertation investigates the influence of social construction and the political 
economy on the mechanisms of homeless policy decision-making in the context of 
decentralization and local governance in cities across the United States.  
To measure local involvement in homeless governance, this research focuses on the 
adoption of supportive housing policies by municipalities across the United States as the 
dependent variable. Nearly four decades of research has demonstrated that permanent supportive 
housing, specifically Housing First which provides housing without behavioral prerequisites to 
housing access, is the most effective way to successfully end chronic homelessness, permanently 
(M. M. Brown et al. 2016; Evans, Collins, and Anderson 2016; Greenwood, Stefancic, and 
Tsemberis 2013; Henwood, Byrne, and Scriber 2015; Kirst et al. 2014; Stanhope and Dunn 
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2011). Permanent supportive housing provides simultaneous access to both housing and 
supportive medical and behavioral health services for persons experiencing chronic 
homelessness. Providing housing allows individuals to feel safe, and access basic needs like 
sleep, food and water, promoting an environment where individuals can subsequently, 
successfully address chronic medical and behavioral health conditions (S. G. Kertesz et al. 
2016). Housing first has been the only approach to chronic homelessness that has led to 
successful, long-term housing stability (M. M. Brown et al. 2016; Leff et al. 2009; Palepu et al. 
2013). 
 Since 2015, the CoCs have been required to move towards adopting supportive housing 
with a housing first approach as their primary means to addressing homelessness (Goodloe 
2015). At the same time, the CoCs are also now required to take steps to reduce criminalization 
of, or punitive law enforcement responses to, individuals experiencing chronic homelessness 
(Tars 2015). Both regulatory changes involve primary components of urban governance, 
including policing and incarceration, and zoning and building permitting (for permanent 
supportive housing units as well as transitional shelter facilities in the interim of PSH). To 
facilitate coordination and success of these and other CoC policies, the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development has begun encouraging coordination between CoCs and 
municipal governments, although this process is still voluntary (U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research 2018). Thus, measuring 
municipal governmental involvement in supportive housing policy provides an indication of the 
relative coordination between municipal governments and CoCs in CoC designated tasks.  
 The limitations of CoC authority compared to municipal government and efforts by HUD 
to encourage coordination between CoCs and local governments in homeless policy would seem 
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to presume that municipal governance of homeless policy would therefore lead to more 
successful policy design and implementation, or more successful homeless policy governance 
overall. This is the final goal of this research. In a policy space that has historically and 
contemporarily remains fully decentralized in most cases, does recentralization with a formal 
role for local government lead to policy success? Or are there other factors that may interfere 
with effective homeless policy governance, beyond challenges associated with delegation?   
The History of U.S. Homeless Policy 
In order to understand the current state of homeless policy in the U.S., and why the 
majority of Continuums of Care (CoCs) are not a part of local government, we must examine the 
history of U.S. homeless policy. Homelessness policy in the United States is an amalgamation of 
governmental decentralization and community choices. Homelessness has always been a 
problem, but a problem that was never really addressed by government until the mid-late 20th 
century (Grob 1994). It was, instead, a history of familial responsibility and community-based 
organizations seeking to manage an undesirable issue (Grob 1994; Jones 2015; National 
Coalition for the Homeless 2006). The current policy space reflects this history.  
There is one federal policy that specifically addresses homelessness. This is the 
McKinney Vento Act, now known as the HEARTH Act, as amended in 2009 (United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d.). McKinney was passed in 1987 under the 
Reagan Administration. The legislation was purposefully structured to prioritize municipal or 
community authority in allocating federal funding, as a way to diminish federal involvement in 
homelessness and reduce governmental authority (Jones 2015).  
The McKinney Act established the main network of service provision and funding 
distribution for homeless policies. This network is known as the Continuum of Care (CoC). The 
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CoC is a national network of historically non-governmental community organizations that 
distribute funding and oversee local and regional homeless policy programming and service 
distribution. Not all homeless service providers belong to the CoCs, but the CoCs receive and 
manage federal homeless funding to distribute to local actors. Today, the CoCs, in conjunction 
with municipal governments, develop and implement homeless policies. In 2015 the Obama 
Administration announced a new requirement for the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) funding for homeless services. All entities receiving funding for 
homelessness programs must apply evidence-based practices including permanent-supportive 
housing emphasizing Housing First for chronically-homeless persons (Goodloe 2015). Entities 
must also move away from punitive or criminalization approaches or face a financial penalty 
(Bauman et al. 2017).  These policy changes did not come into effect until the 2016 funding 
applications. Thus, there is not yet enough data to empirically measure the effect of the 2015 
federal regulatory change on municipal policy outcomes.  
This 2015 change attempts to increase federal oversight of this historically and 
strategically decentralized process. The institutional relationships governing homelessness that 
developed since the 1980’s enshrine decentralized authority and non-governmental partnerships. 
This path dependence in homeless policy service provision is critical to understanding homeless 
policy governance and evaluating the key political and intergovernmental factors that may shape 
municipal policy choices.  
Methodological Approach 
 To understand why municipalities may choose such different approaches to address 
homelessness, this dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach. I started by creating a novel, 
national dataset measuring the homeless policies adopted by municipalities and other factors 
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known to affect municipal policy outcomes such as GDP, the size of the homeless population, 
and municipal ideology. To document the policy outcomes, I reviewed 473 city and county 
websites and 243 municipal policies. I subsequently analyzed trends among the cities in policy 
adoption, and factors associated with differential policy adoption. In order to further understand 
city policy choices, I strategically selected municipalities most representative of the types of 
cities that commonly adopt different policies. These cities included San Francisco California, 
Atlanta Georgia, and Shreveport Louisiana. In these cities I conducted in-depth case studies to 
explain policy decision-making. In total, I conducted 49 in-depth interviews, and analyzed over 
200 primary policy documents across the three cities to understand the decision-making 
processes and factors influencing those processes in each case.  
Explaining municipal policy outcomes is a relatively overlooked area in political science 
and public health policy analysis. Most often, researchers focus on state-level policy analysis, or 
the effects of federal decision-making on state-level choices. As a result, there is very limited 
data on municipal policy outcomes, particularly in research focusing on social services policy or 
welfare. Homelessness falls into this category. I applied a mixed methods explanatory sequential 
design utilizing novel data to define the scope of the problem and subsequently interrogate 
explanations of divergent policy approaches.  
 I am focusing on examining the effects of intergovernmental relations and social 
construction on these policy outcomes. Mixed-methods research adapts to data-constrained 
scenarios, providing researchers multiple avenues to examine a research question, gather data 
and apply inference strategies. In the case of a mixed-methods explanatory sequential design, 
this strategy begins with a quantitative approach, and ends with a qualitative approach that is 
informed by the findings from the quantitative analysis. The key aspect of this design is that it is 
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meant to be used in scenarios with data constraints or little previously existing research. To adapt 
to these limitations, the approach uses an initial exploratory quantitative component to gain 
critical information about the scope of the issue, and relevant trends in the data. These 
descriptive data and predictive trends may shed light on the explanatory mechanisms later on 
when a causal inference strategy can be applied or may at least inform next steps and future 
research. This approach may be especially relevant in policy analysis, where the dependent 
variable or outcomes of interest present more measurement challenges, and natural experiments 
may not readily exist to control for policy adoption.  
The next phase in the MMESD approach addresses these issues. The quantitative stage is 
followed by explanatory qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis allows researchers to gain 
more depth in their analyses, to more completely understand the explanatory mechanisms at 
work, compared to variable-based approaches which may over-simplify some mechanisms. 
Qualitative analysis is also particularly effective in policy and politics research, where causal 
mechanisms are very complex and interwoven, and quantitative analysis may face data 
limitations or be too reductionist to outline a complete picture of the causal processes at work.    
Summary of the Findings 
This dissertation argues that homelessness policy, specifically policies seeking solutions 
is a very fragmented and disjointed policy space as a result of decades of decentralization. 
Chronic-homelessness is governed in four separate and distinct policy spaces, or structural 
interests (Alford 1975): the state, local government, elites, and homeless service providers or the 
Continuum of Care. The separation and conflict between these governing approaches result in 
increased challenges to establishing and implementing effective policy solutions to end chronic 
homelessness. Challenges include limited state-level support including financial resources and/or 
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administrative burdens stemming from misaligned policy goals between state policies and CoC 
programming or the needs of persons experiencing homelessness on the ground; inequity in 
political participation that may exclude at-risk populations or bias participation in favor of 
economic elites; and, finally, limited involvement by municipal governments in many cases. 
When municipal governments remain absent from homeless governance, CoCs may be limited in 
their ability to carry-out policies and programming as a result of constraints on funding, 
coordination with local government to coordinate other necessary services such as behavioral 
healthcare, Medicaid administration, policing and incarceration, and actually zoning for or 
constructing supportive housing units themselves.   
This research finds that structural changes incentivizing re-centralization of homelessness 
governance may be required to promote interaction and coordination across the independent 
policy approaches to overcome collective action problems and develop and implement effective 
solutions to long-term homelessness. However, a persistent problem that may require solutions 
beyond integration of the CoC and municipal government are protections of minority group and 
policy target populations in homeless policy debates. Across all cases in the research, homeless 
policy decision-making typically excludes persons who are at-risk of, currently, or formerly 
homeless. This bias in policy decision-making may promote implementation challenges by 
skewing processes in favor of elite preferences who generally oppose permanent supportive 
housing and may lead to policy adoption that does not successfully address the causes of chronic 
homelessness. 
After reviewing the existing policy landscape and explaining policy variation, this 
dissertation recommends actionable steps for stakeholders and governments to improve policy 
decision-making and design to promote adoption of evidence-based policies across sectors. 
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These recommendations include directly incentivizing coordination between local governments 
and CoCs; allow Medicaid to pay for housing and utilize Medicaid 1115 waivers to increase 
direct coordination between state policies and local homeless policy governance; and finally, 
increase oversight in CoC planning processes in order to facilitate equitable participation in 
homeless policy debates across all demographics and including individuals who will be affected 
by homeless policies.  
Plan for the Dissertation 
This section summarizes each chapter, and then reviews the history of homeless policy in 
the United States to provide relevant background on the questions at hand.  
Chapter 2 reviews the theories related to homeless policy decision making. Homeless 
policy has a long history of expanded governing authority for local governments and 
communities in homeless policy. In order to understand policy outcomes in homelessness 
governance, we must draw from the theories of urban politics and intergovernmental relations 
that have been developed to explain social policy. Within these theories I highlight components 
that are useful in explaining local decision-making in homelessness policy. This chapter also 
explores theories of social construction and the political economy to further inform our 
understanding of the mechanisms influencing homeless policy decision-making in the context of 
decentralization and local governance. This chapter argues that homelessness politics have 
important theoretical considerations for our contemporary understandings of decentralization in 
public health governance and the politics of historically marginalized populations.  
Chapter 3 uses a unique national dataset to examine national variation in municipal 
responses to chronic homelessness. The goals of this chapter are to 1. identify the prevalence of 
municipal-level supportive housing policies among municipalities affected by homelessness in 
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the United States, and 2. identify and examine the factors associated with the presence of a 
municipal-level supportive housing policy. The results demonstrate that most municipalities 
facing homelessness challenges do not have municipal-level supportive housing policies. Only 
forty-percent of the municipalities surveyed had a municipal-level policy. The municipalities 
with supportive housing policies tend to be more liberal, have fewer but better funded nonprofit 
health organizations, lower rates of municipal governmental fragmentation, and are located in 
states without Medicaid Expansion. Overall, the results demonstrate relatively limited 
involvement by municipal governments in supportive housing policy efforts. This takeaway is 
very important, because limited coordination between municipalities and the CoC perpetuate 
service gaps, and may lead to ineffective policy development and implementation (Jarpe, 
Mosley, and Smith 2018). 
Chapter 4 outlines the case selection from the national data set and analyses in Chapter 3, 
to choose municipal cases most representative of the different types of cities associated with each 
outcome of interest – the presence of a municipal level supportive housing policy or not. There 
was more heterogeneity in the types of cities that may have a municipal level supportive housing 
policy. To represent this heterogeneity, two city-cases were chosen for in-depth case study 
analysis. These cases are San Francisco and Atlanta. Atlanta has the same characteristics as San 
Francisco, controlling for all independent variables except three - Medicaid expansion, municipal 
fragmentation, and percent black. Controlling for the majority of conditions while stratifying 
across a few enhances our ability to select on independent variables of interest and compare the 
effects of this stratification between cases on municipal supportive housing policy 
development. Shreveport, Louisiana was chosen as the case most representative of municipalities 
without a municipal level supportive housing policy. The cities without a municipal supportive 
 
 14 
housing policy are more homogenous. With less variation, only one case was selected. 
Shreveport was selected because it aligned with nearly all of the city-types present in the 
outcome set, representing nearly 60% of the sample in the most common city-type.  
Chapter 4 then discusses the qualitative methods employed across the case studies. 
Qualitative case studies are a useful approach to enhance understanding of policy decision-
making processes because they provide inherent flexibility to use all relevant data and present it 
in a variety of ways (Anckar 2008). Applying rigorously selected cases and in-depth qualitative 
analyses enhance quantitative findings by further examining the complex relationships and 
temporality of multiple factors affecting policy decision-making (Anckar 2008). In each case, I 
collected two types of qualitative data: interviews, and textual document data. Interviews and 
document analysis add contextual grounding of the complicated relationships between the 
multiple factors at work and help tease a part political decision-making processes leading to the 
outcome with a greater level of detail (Collier 2011). 
Chapter 5 presents the case study results from Atlanta. Atlanta is a municipality with a 
supportive housing policy at the local government level. Chapter 5 focuses on explaining why 
Atlanta adopted a municipal level supportive housing policy, and also considers the influence of 
other factors, including the political economy, social construction, and intergovernmental 
relations on the success of supportive housing policy in Atlanta. The results demonstrate that 
Atlanta’s adoption of a municipal supportive housing policy stemmed from sufficient investment 
in policy capacity, political mobilization, and ultimately institutional restructuring by the CoC 
that pushed Atlanta to move from investment in supportive housing for establishing a formal, 
governmental role for the CoC and supportive housing policy. Atlanta has also made strides 
towards not only addressing supportive housing, but directly addressing punitive responses to 
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homelessness, and the cyclical relationship between chronic homelessness and incarceration. In 
2017 Atlanta established a Pre-Arrest Diversion pilot project to reduce quality of life arrests 
(QOL), by diverting any arrest for quality of life reasons (e.g. sleeping outside, eating outside, 
urinating in public) out of jail, and into social services (as the primary group affected by QOL 
arrests are people experiencing chronic homelessness [2].  
Despite this success, homeless policy in Atlanta still faces significant challenges in policy 
implementation and decision-making. These challenges primarily include: 1. Jurisdictional 
boundaries affecting service delivery and responsibility; 2. Economic elites and policing; and 3. 
Funding, and ongoing relationships between state and federal entities. These ongoing challenges 
threaten effective policy implementation and may have the unintended effect of policy feedbacks 
that prevent supportive housing policy of working effectively to its intended goals [3].  
Chapter 6 presents the case study results from Shreveport. Shreveport is a case where the 
Continuum of Care (CoC) remains very separate from municipal government. In homeless policy 
decision-making and in practice, Shreveport’s local government and the CoC are very separate, 
especially when compared to the integration seen in Atlanta and San Francisco. This separation, 
in policy design and practice, was the most prominent theme in the qualitative analyses. The 
CoC in Shreveport has strong policy capacity and despite of limited municipal involvement has 
made great strides in reducing homelessness in Shreveport. Yet in the face of this success, the 
lack of local government involvement presents barriers to supportive housing policy design and 
implementation for the CoC by limiting their authority and the resources available to pursue and 
execute homeless policy. Shreveport also experiences strong, and separate informal policy 
efforts from elites that engender barriers to supportive housing policy. Elite efforts exist outside 
of local government decision-making and CoC activity, unofficially governing the activity of 
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individuals experiencing chronic homelessness through policing. This alternative policy space 
conflicts with supportive housing policy goals and exemplifies coordination challenges for the 
CoC as a result of decentralization. Finally, misalignment between local needs and state level 
policies promote more implementation challenges stemming from administrative burdens and 
funding constraints.  
Chapter 7 presents the case study results from San Francisco. San Francisco is an 
exemplar of the importance of stakeholder compositions, the political economy, and recognizing 
and addressing implementation problems in public health policy. San Francisco’s CoC is 
integrated into municipal government, and the city had a housing first policy since the mid-1990s 
(Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing and City and County of San Francisco 
2019). San Francisco has an impressive amount of policy capacity expertise, municipal fiscal 
resources and intergovernmental support to address homelessness that should have positioned it 
at the forefront of the supportive housing movement in the United States. Yet substantial changes 
to San Francisco’s political economy paired with the policy histories of limited governmental 
involvement in homeless policy in the United States (Jones 2015) created the perfect storm of 
implementation problems. San Francisco relies primarily (San Francisco Budget and Legislative 
Analyst’s Office 2016, 17) on municipal funding for homelessness programming with limited 
state level support and exists in a political economy where elites dominate decision-making and 
stagnate municipal programming efforts. As a result, San Francisco has now become known for 
its devastating, and public, homelessness crisis. San Francisco is a case that may increasingly 







Chapter 2: Homeless Politics in the United States: Theories of the Ungoverned and 
Unwanted 
 
Public health as a discipline studies issues influenced by local politics and policies that 
are primarily implemented, and in many cases governed, by county level public health 
departments. Yet the world of public health policy tends to focus on the politics and policies at 
the state and federal level. Obscuring the role of local politics and in designing and 
implementing public health policies inaccurately portrays the functioning of public health 
systems and can lead to incorrect or incomplete assumptions about the effects of health politics 
on public health outcomes. Homelessness is no exception. Homelessness is a policy space with a 
long history of expanded governing authority for local governments and communities. In order 
to understand policy outcomes in homelessness governance, we must draw from the theories of 
urban politics and intergovernmental relations that have been developed to explain social policy. 
Within these theories I highlight components that are useful in explaining local decision-making 
in homelessness policy.  
Homeless policy decision-making is a policy space that has also been shaped by social 
constructions of persons experiencing homelessness and the dynamics of political privilege 
stemming from variation in economic power across stakeholder groups. I explore the theories of 
social construction and the political economy to further inform our understanding of the 
mechanisms influencing homeless policy decision-making in the context of decentralization and 
local governance. Overall, I argue that homelessness politics has important theoretical 
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considerations for our contemporary understandings of decentralization in public health 
governance and the politics of historically marginalized populations.  
2. Intergovernmental Relations and Local Politics in Public Health and Homeless Policy
 Most public health literature does not examine the role of local governments. The 
literature is mainly restricted to discussions of community health. The political structure, and 
foremost the importance of local governments in designing and implementing many public 
health services is almost entirely absent from public health rhetoric. Discussions are usually 
directed to the relationship between local and state public health agencies, with local public 
health agencies seen as responsive to state wishes. In reality, a large division of public health 
depends on local decision-making. And in the case of chronic homelessness, states are typically 
bypassed, and most decision-making governing the direction of homeless governance takes place 
directly between cities and the federal government.  
Constitutionality and Intergovernmental Relations 
  Most public health and political science literature exploring public policy decision-
making concerns state and federal units. There is limited academic work on federal-local 
relations (Davidson 2007). This is perhaps because cities are not recognized as legitimate, 
independent entities under the constitution (Bowers 2015, 11). The Constitution describes only 
two levels of government: the federal government and the states (Ross and Levine 2001a). The 
Constitution prescribes any governmental authority given to cities must be conferred to the local 
government by the state (Ross and Levine 2001a). An Iowa Supreme Court ruling in 1868 
preserved the dependent status of cities (J. F. Dillon 1911). The ruling, known as Dillon’s Rule, 
labeled cities as ‘creatures of the state’, possessing only those powers delegated to them by the 
states. The presiding judge, Judge Dillon, described cities as ‘municipal corporations’, whose 
 
 19 
governance powers may be brought forth, amended, or destroyed by state government as it sees 
fit (J. F. Dillon 1911). Dillon’s rule also established the concept of preemption. Preemption is the 
rule denoting state precedence over local governments in policymaking (Berman 1997). States 
can supersede local actions and deny local government authority. In public health policy, 
preemption has played an important role in shaping state public health policy, from gun control 
to tobacco control (Berman 1997). Today, Dillon’s rule remains the dominant doctrine of 
municipal law, shaping authority granted to cities and the way that cities’ roles are perceived in 
intergovernmental relations (Ross and Levine 2001a).  
 Yet, this narrow conception of federalism obscures a key piece of public-policy decision-
making relations. Cities play a large role in establishing and implementing public policies that 
substantially effect local economics and population health (Davidson 2007, 960; Sellers 2002). 
Furthermore, federal-local relations have played a significant role in establishing municipal 
priorities, policies, and initiatives (Davidson 2007; Elazar n.d.). In many policy cases cities are 
not dependent on states, and often have more power as political actors and strong relationships 
with the federal government (Davidson 2007; Miller 2002; Shipan n.d.). The federalism 
literature and history describes the current state of intergovernmental relations as much more of 
an amalgamation of authority, rather than a clear-cut hierarchy determining roles and 
responsibilities (Ross and Levine 2001b). As interpretations and statutes of federalism evolved, 
cities preserved and acquired a great deal of discretion to determine the shape and effects of 
federal programs in their jurisdiction (Ross and Levine 2001b).  
 Cooperative federalism, or ‘marble cake’ federalism, first emerged under Roosevelt 
during the Great Depression and the New Deal, establishing cooperation between national and 
subnational governments to deal with domestic policy problems (Glendening and Reeves 1984). 
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Local agencies and officials, as opposed to states, were charged with implementing the new 
federally funded social programs (Ross and Levine 2001b). This was a sharp contrast from ‘old-
style’ federalism, or the Constitutional interpretation as discussed above that focused on 
Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution regarding which powers belong to which level 
of government, focusing on the relationship between the states and the federal government (Ross 
and Levine 2001b; D. Wright 2001). The role of cities in implementing federal policy initiatives 
grew from the New Deal, and expanded under World War II through the 1960’s under Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society (Ross and Levine 2001b). The programs fostered strong federal-city 
connections, increasing the prominence of cities in the intergovernmental system (Walker 1995). 
These relationships resulted in direct federalism, a system based on federal-city relationships that 
circumvented states (Ross and Levine 2001b; Walker 1995). Direct federalism and strong city 
prominence continued through the 1970’s. This relationship changed in the 1980’s, when 
funding for federal social programs was cut substantially (Bluestone 1982; Johnson 1991; 
Weicher 1984). The federal government devolved authority and responsibility for social 
programs to cities, and markedly limited federal financial support (Conlan 1998). Despite this 
shift the long precedence through the twentieth century for direct federalism, during which many 
core U.S. health policies and programs were established, highlights the importance of evaluating 
the effects of intergovernmental relations on public health policy outcomes, as opposed to 
focusing solely on Constitutional federalism (Glendening and Reeves 1984; Walker 1995). 
Neoliberalism and the Submerged State 
 Neoliberalism was a political platform pushed most notably in the 1980’s by Reagan in 
the U.S. and Thatcher in the U.K which forever shaped the U.S. welfare state (Cole 2006; K. 
Jacobs and Manzi 2013; Johnson 1991; C. M. Lamb and Twombly 1993). Neoliberalism is 
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defined by a platform of governmental decentralization coupled with promoting private business 
partnerships with local governments as a means of further decentralizing responsibility (K. 
Jacobs and Manzi 2013).  
The decentralization of responsibility to non-governmental actors in the 1980s was a 
strategic move by conservative actors. There were two primary goals of decentralization. The 
first, was to align with traditional conservative notions of government by reducing the size of 
government and therefore leaving more room for private business growth.(Soss, Fording, and 
Schram 2011) Yet the second goal, less often discussed, was the primary impetus for 
decentralization and specifically the growth of the delegated state. That was the goal to undercut 
and demobilize liberal stakeholder coalitions that arose from the social rights movements – 
women’s rights, racial/ethnic minority rights, healthcare, the elderly, disability rights. The social 
rights movements had successfully coalesced around these issues to establish major legislation 
and expansion of government services and programming, including Medicare and Medicaid, the 
Voting Rights Act, Roe v. Wade, etc. Conservatives were increasingly threatened. In response to 
major liberal successes, conservative actors found a way to demobilize liberal actors by cutting 
social service programming and therefore shifting interest group coalitions away from activism 
to into direct service providers roles in order to fill the social service gap.(Soss, Fording, and 
Schram 2011) As a result, conservative actors were able to diminish liberal activist coalitions, 
maintain some sort of private social service provision, while promoting the illusion that the 
government is not involved.(Diiulio 2012; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011) 
The decentralization of responsibility and the increasing absence of federal funding for 
social services under Reagan, led to the development of the ‘submerged’ or ‘delegated’ state as a 
primary mechanism for delivering housing and supportive medical and behavioral health 
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services for the homeless, and many other welfare programs (Dreier 2007; K. Jacobs and Manzi 
2013; C. M. Lamb and Twombly 1993). The emerging delegated state marked an important 
change in intergovernmental relations, where cities – and not just city governments but 
specifically local non-governmental actors – came to play vital roles in designing and delivering 
social policy, including homelessness policy and programming.(Diiulio 2012; Skocpol et al. 
2000) 
 The delegated state is defined as a set of ‘invisible’, or indirect mechanisms guiding 
governmental activities and programs for the public through non-governmental organizations, 
such as private for profit and non-profit organizations (Hackett 2016). These invisible 
mechanisms include governments incentivizing private activity or delivery of certain social 
services by giving subsidies or benefits to the private organizations via tax subsidies, rebates and 
credits (Hackett 2016; Mettler 2016; Zelinsky 1993). An example of the submerged state at work 
is providing private companies with tax-breaks and subsidies to provide low-income 
housing(Hackett 2016; Willison 2017a). Governments are then indirectly paying for public 
programs, without actually delivering the programs themselves.  
 This strategic federal decentralization enshrined the precedence for cities, specifically 
cities as communities in their partnerships with local private organizations, as the primary entities 
responsible for designing and delivering housing and supportive behavioral and health services 
to the homeless (Johnson 1991). In homelessness policy, this took the form of establishing 
designated federal funding for homelessness to be awarded to municipally concentrated groups 
of non-governmental actors, or the Continuum of Care.  
One challenge with incentivizing submerged state activity is that it unintentionally 
created a new constituency of stakeholders. This new constituency takes the form of persons who 
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receive services from delegated state actors and persons who are employed in the delegated state 
as community-based organization, workers. This makes reining in submerged state spending or 
re-centralization very challenging, as this new host of constituents rely on the submerged state 
for social service delivery, and delegated state actors rely on its existence for their livelihoods. 
Therefore, the growth of the submerged state, while promoting the importance of cities as key 
decision-makers, is described as actually undermining local governmental authority for 
delivering these services, due to this new policy conflict between local governments and 
competing private sector interests (Cole 2006; Kemp 2007, 113; Letelier S. 2005; D. S. Reed 
2014; Thompson and Elling 1999).  
In effect, the policy histories of delegating responsibility for homelessness to locally 
organized non-governmental actors created strong incentives to limit municipal governmental 
involvement. Non-governmental organizations have been providing services to mitigate 
homelessness since the 1980’s, formally organized as the Continuums of Care since the 
1990’s.(US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012) These organizations have a 
desire to persist to serve their communities and remain as employers for many social service 
providers.(Diiulio 2012) With well-organized stakeholder coalitions and service provider 
networks for homelessness programming, local governments face limited incentives to step into 
homelessness governance. To date, local governments are only involved in about 40% of the 
CoCs across the United States.(Jarpe, Mosely, and Smith 2018) Many local governments face 
revenue constraints and budget shortfalls that further disincentivize participation in additional 
governing activities. Overall, neoliberalism and the resulting decentralization of homelessness 
governance has led to a persistent separation between municipal governments and the 
Continuums of Care.  
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Neoliberalism and the Political Economy  
 This section considers how increased policy conflict resulting from neoliberalism and 
submerged state growth brought new challenges for local homelessness policy design and 
implementation. This literature provides insight into understanding persisting local authority in 
the case of homeless policy by examining what actors have authority, how that authority is 
distributed affects decision-making by determining who can and cannot participate in policy-
making and how economic interests interact with authority and plurality in participation.  
 Although the growth of the delegated state increased the separation of municipal 
government and delegated state authority in U.S. homeless policy, there are other instances 
where the growth of the delegated state may alleviate intergovernmental conflict. In cases where 
there are high levels of policy conflict between levels of government, or within one level of 
government, the submerged state can and historically has filled important service gaps. 
Submerged state actors, for example non-profit organizations delivering medical services, 
housing and other basic needs services, are critical participants in homeless programming and 
may fill these service needs during times of government conflict or service reduction.(Willison 
2017a) As discussed, the entire federal system governing homeless service delivery relies on 
participation from submerged state actors. The paradox of these submerged state actors is that 
their services are voluntary. Providing programming and service delivery is not mandated, 
although actors receive federal funding and incentives for doing the work.  
Starting in 1995, if local actors want to receive federal funding to address homelessness, 
they must have established a Continuum of Care (as the organization that will receive federal 
funding, design programming and distribute the funding to other local actors to deliver 
services).(US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012) Yet, local action to 
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mitigate homelessness is not mandated by the federal government. This is completely voluntary. 
Further, although the federal government has established more rules governing how federal 
funding must be used by CoCs, the CoCs have primary authority to decide how they use funding, 
what to prioritize, and how to implement homelessness programming.(Jarpe, Mosely, and Smith 
2018) This strong deference to the delegated state in homelessness policy is a benefit when 
governments may otherwise be absent, but a cost when the voluntary nature of homeless policy 
may lead to effective or ineffective heterogeneity in design and delivery of services.  
Beyond local variation in the establishment and delivery of services, the deference to the 
delegated state becomes voluntary by means of authority. Complete delegation of homelessness 
governance to non-governmental actors generates a policy space where regulations governing the 
CoC may not implemented as a result of the limited to no authority CoC actors have over any 
municipal services, or other private or nongovernmental actors, in order to effectively coordinate 
policy implementation. CoCs in this space can only ask and hope for buy-in from critical actors. 
In cases where actors governing housing resources, zoning and building permitting, police 
activity and even county or parish level health insurance enrollment choose not to participate, 
homelessness policy and programming may fail or stagnate with serious consequences for 
persons experiencing homelessness and local economies.(Willison 2017b) Without any real 
governing authority for the majority of CoCs in the U.S., homelessness policy under the 
delegated state remains voluntary. In public health, a similar scenario would be delegating 
vaccine policy to locally organized groups of community-based organizations.  
 How decision-making authority is dispersed between governmental and non-
governmental actors also has to do a lot with the need for policy capacity and the potential for 
policy conflict. Policy capacity is the part of government that turns ideas into workable, well 
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designed policies able to succeed in their designated context (S. Greer et al. 2016; Page 2006). 
Policy capacity relies on governments consulting or positioning policy experts to design policies 
tailored to work in the designated context and for desired outcome(s). Naturally, many of these 
actors are members of the delegated state. Policy capacity matters in homeless policy because 
public authorities may not understand all of the consequences of various homelessness strategies, 
and therefore be unable to make policy decisions that deliver the intended policy goals 
(Lieberherr, Maarse, and Jeurissen 2016). However, for policies to be successful and achieve to 
the desired goals, the policy must also be aligned with available resources(S. Greer et al. 2016, 
39–40). Aligning policies with available resources becomes increasingly challenging in complex 
and contentious political environments. Decentralization may make resource allocation among 
non-governmental actors more challenging, as delegated state actors may have more difficulty 
acquiring and retaining funding than governmental actors.(Mettler 2016; Weir and Schirmer 
2018)  
However, policy capacity may also conflict with political interests. Policy makers rely on 
external expertise to design policy, and regulatory expertise is strongly correlated with adopting 
evidence-based policies (S. Greer et al. 2016, 40) (Bruff 2010; Fischer 2009). Yet, increasing 
policy capacity does not guarantee improved policy design or implementation, due to potential 
conflict in policy preferences between embedded experts, politicians and other stakeholders 
(Gailmard and Patty 2007). This may lead to two outcomes. Politicians may recognize expertise, 
especially if it aligns with their own policy preferences, but may face opposition from other 
constituent groups.(Huber and Shipan 2002) If politicians do not agree with expertise and/or are 
not aligned with their policy preferences, they may seek to reduce, or decentralize policy 
capacity or delay policy implementation. In homeless policy today, this conflict is very apparent. 
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Local governments in many cases have adopted both punitive policing strategies and evidence-
based supportive housing policies, (Nacgourney 2016; Smith 2016) in response to competing 
interests. Policy conflict stemming from policy capacity may result in a further separation of 
municipal government and the Continuums of Care. If the CoCs have relatively strong policy 
capacity but no role in municipal government and elected officials’ preferences conflict with 
CoC initiatives, municipalities may be further disincentivized to participate in homeless policy 
and may be directly incentivized to utilize competing policies in the form of policing. 
 Fragmentation is a unique issue that may unintentionally introduce more policy conflict 
into municipal policy debates. Municipal fragmentation affects the ability of different 
stakeholders to participate in political decision-making, and also affects the ability for actors to 
successfully coordinate policy approaches or even develop coordinated approaches in the first 
place. Fragmentation refers to the number of municipal governments in a county area.(Berry 
2009; Goodman n.d.) Municipal incorporation was a popular phenomenon in the 20th century, 
where pockets of economic elites would establish their own local governments in an attempt to 
evade city property taxes and have more concentrated control over public goods like schools and 
libraries.(Hogen-Esch 2011) However, such incorporation often maintained relationships with 
the primary municipality for services such as water, garbage disposal, and police and fire 
services.(Hogen-Esch 2011; Peterson 1981; Ross and Levine 2001b) The results of 
fragmentation were an increasing and further disjuncture of centralized municipal services and 
decision-making. In the case of homeless policies, which are often intergovernmental policies 
pursued by city and county governments and require buy in and action from multiple 
departments across municipal services, increased municipal fragmentation may act as a barrier to 
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establishing supportive housing policy approaches by preventing necessary policy coordination 
and concentrating relevant stakeholder power in certain jurisdictions over others.  
 Finally, actors’ ability to participate in political debates and decision-making is affected 
by the political institutional structures in place. Whether or not local stakeholders participate in 
politics matters because their participation affects the policy decision-making process, which 
affects the outcome of interest – what homeless policies cities pursue.(Lillvis and Greer 2016) 
Elite stakeholders’ political participation may be restricted or enhanced depending on electoral 
system rules.(R. Mickey 2008, 11) Even economic elites, such as real estate companies, may not 
necessarily be able to translate their economic power into political power depending on the 
political institutional structures that allow for greater or less public participation.(R. W. Mickey 
2008) This works both ways – either pushing towards supportive housing or away depending on 
the preferences of the participating actors. However, in more pluralistic electoral systems, 
economic power generally translates into political influence.(Einstein, Palmer, and Glick 2018; 
R. Mickey 2015; Trounstine 2008) In homeless policy, elites are typically opposed to supportive 
housing initiatives, regardless of ideology.(Kim 2000; Piat 2000) Therefore, degrees of plurality 
in debates over homeless policy may matter significantly for homeless policy outcomes. For 
example, in municipalities with more pluralistic systems, economic elites may obscure minority 
groups’ preferences including persons at-risk of, formerly, or who are currently homeless, the 
majority of whom are racial/ethnic minorities. Thus, the preferences of political-economic elites 
matter greatly in these systems in terms of the outcomes for city decision-making.   
3. Social Construction – When Punitive Responses Conflict with Public Health 
 Extensive research has examined the effects of criminalization on health outcomes, 
economic outcomes and political indicators, and other research has documented, described and 
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defined criminalization of ethnic minority groups in other policy areas. There is little research 
considering the politics of criminalization or the political challenges associated with reforming 
ineffective criminalization policies. Furthermore, there is even less research analyzing effects of 
the political institutional relationship and the federated division of authority on local political 
decision-making related to criminalization of at-risk groups. There is also a greater need for 
understanding and grounding of how social constructions of target populations, play into the 
greater political decision-making environment and intergovernmental relations. This research 
will expand this literature by exploring the political processes involved in criminalization, the 
relationship between social construction and criminalization, and the effects of historically 
institutionalized criminalization on current political decision-making to better understand 
municipal homeless policy outcomes.  
The social construction of a target population refers to, “the recognition of the shared 
characteristics that distinguish a target population as socially meaningful, and the attribution of 
specific, valence-oriented values, symbols, and images to the characteristics” (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993a). Social constructions are stereotypes of certain populations of people created by 
socialization, politics, culture, history, etc. Social construction can be positive, or negative. 
Positive constructions include impressions such as “deserving,” “well-meaning,” “intelligent”, 
etc. Negative constructions often include “violent”, “undeserving”, “criminal” and “lazy” 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993a).  
Schneider and Ingram’s theory of the social construction of target populations contends 
that social constructions influence policy agenda setting, selection of policy tools, and the 
rationales that legitimize policy choices (Schneider and Ingram 1993a). Schneider and Ingram 
see social construction as implicit biases that become engrained in policy by affecting the way 
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certain policy-makers and constituents are oriented to different groups. The theory made a great 
contribution to political science because it offered an additional explanation for why some 
groups are prioritized more than others in social policy. Thus, this theory proposes that in such 
contexts in this case, at-risk populations may be criminalized based on stereotypes and 
misconceptions, as a means of solving a problem in the eyes of wider society (Clifford and 
Piston 2016; Perez, Leifman, and Estrada 2003; Sisco 2016). However, much of this literature 
lacks an overarching or synthesized explanation of how social constructions work in conjunction 
with other political structures, incentives, and tools, to explain policy decision-making more 
completely. This work seeks to integrate these ideas to generate a more complete theory about 
the interaction between social construction and existing political structures.  
History of Criminalization 
Criminalization as a social policy approach occurred across various contexts throughout 
the history of the U.S. and continues today. People who are chronically homeless, individuals 
who are significantly more likely to be homeless as a result of an untreated mental health or 
substance use disorder, have historically been associated with criminal deviancy, derangement, 
and violence.(Brescia 2015; Cooper 2013; Mulvey and White 2013; Perez, Leifman, and Estrada 
2003; Saks 2013) The first waves of homeless persons in the U.S. were primarily single men, 
known colloquially as ‘tramps’ and ‘thieves’ in the late 19th century.(Grob 1994) The connection 
to mental health was not suggested until the growth of psychiatry in the turn of the century, 
though the etiology of psychosis was not understood for much longer.(Grob 1994) Such 
conceptions of derangement erupted in the early 20th century with the rise of psychiatry, the 
growth of psychiatric institutions or ‘insane asylums’, and insanity in media.(Eisenberg 1988) 
These notions persisted after deinstitutionalization in the 1960’s as myths ascended asserting the 
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majority of the homeless as psychotic, or deranged alcoholics and drug abusers.(Grob 1994; 
Jones 2015)  
Most of the literature evaluating criminalization focuses on two aspects. First, 
criminalization came to social policy through social construction and stigmatization. Here, a 
moral weight is associated with certain perceived individual or group characteristics, which serve 
to rationalize punitive responses to such characteristics. Second, criminalization is often utilized 
as a purposeful political or economic tool. Criminalization here leverages social constructions of 
targeted populations to achieve desired economic or political ends.  
Moral Criminalization – Deviancy and Disenfranchisement 
 Empirical evidence shows homelessness results from structural problems at a societal 
level. This includes insufficient income and lack of affordable housing, domestic violence, 
unemployment, poverty, mental illness and the lack of critical services, and substance abuse and 
the lack of needed services.(National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2015; United 
States Interagency Council on Homelessness 2015, n.d.) These factors include the converging 
relationship between individual and structural factors. Despite this knowledge, social policy 
debates persist about the roots of homelessness as a consequence of socially constructed notions 
of individual failures and choices.(Cronley 2010)  
In the U.S., two main paradigms shape the debate about the causes of homelessness. The 
two main interpretations of the causes of homelessness are 1) individual and 2) structural 
interpretations. Individual interpretations suggest homelessness is a product of personal deficits, 
such as substance abuse, lack of personal motivation, and social isolation. Structural 
interpretations uphold that homelessness results from systemic factors including lack of 
affordable housing, employment opportunities, and lack of necessary medical and behavioral 
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health services, aligning with empirical evidence outlining the primary causes of 
homelessness.(Cronley 2010) Political science research has found that elected policy makers 
more often attribute causes of homelessness to the individual paradigm.(Clifford and Piston 
2016; J. D. Wright, Rubin, and Devine 1998) Elected policy-makers may be more likely to 
adhere to this paradigm as a result of the interaction between social construction and limited 
policy area expertise, as well as pressure from private industries and coalitions of elites who 
most often oppose structural solutions to homelessness. Elected officials’ limited policy area 
expertise may be worse in the majority of cases with no municipal government involvement in 
CoC activity. This offers a partial explanation for criminalization policy choices.  
 This literature leaves open the possibility that city choices to criminalize may be the first 
choice of many municipalities. Criminalizing homelessness may be perfectly rational in 
individual city contexts because people experiencing homelessness are perceived as criminal, 
deviant, or a nuisance, as a result of norms and social construction. Therefore, criminalization 
becomes the natural choice, and the alternative option to provide housing and supportive health 
services seems irrational.  
Criminalization as a Political or Economic Tool 
 We now turn to an alternative literature about the use of social constructions. These 
theories examine how policy-makers and economic elites leverage negative social constructions 
of target populations to achieve a desired political or economic end. These theories face 
explanatory gaps in that they do not offer an explanation for the origin of the negative social 
construction. Rather, they focus on the downstream effects of elites’ use of the negative social 
construction, explaining why elites leveraged these stereotypes, and the effects of this [use] on 
targeted populations and the proliferation of such constructions. In comparison to Schneider and 
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Ingram, social construction in policy decision-making here explicitly shapes decision-making, 
rather than implicitly. This literature is also particularly useful because it focuses on the 
purposeful interactions of social construction and the political economy, as social construction 
became a successful tool for elites to achieve their goals.  
 One prominent case in this literature is the preservation of segregation and restriction of 
civil rights for Black Americans in southern democratic states through the 1960’s. These 
authoritarian enclaves, as political scientist Robert Mickey refers to the states, leveraged 
constructions of Black Americans as, ‘separate but equal’, as the desired southern American 
ideal (R. Mickey 2015). The construction became more than just a stereotype about the 
deservedness of Black Americans. ‘Separate but equal’ became the platform from which 
southern democrats argued to preserve unfree and unequal conditions for people of color in an 
effort to protect white elites’ own political capital.(R. Mickey 2008, 11) The constructions, in 
conjunction with contextually specific political institutional arrangements and elite economic 
control, protected and extended the desired segregated civic arrangements and in turn the 
political power of the authoritarian enclaves until the 1970’s.(Lublin 2004; R. Mickey 2008; R. 
W. Mickey 2008)  
 A second, commonly studied phenomenon of the interaction between social construction 
and political economies is the varied utilization of social constructions by urban regimes during 
the early and mid 20th century in American cities.(Bridges 1999; Trounstine 2008) Urban 
political monopolies, including machines and reform movements, subjugated the available 
political resources of different groups in order to maintain political and economic power in cities. 
Such political resources included economic resources and social capital in the form of mobilized 
voters. Urban reform movements explicitly utilized social constructions of immigrants, poor, and 
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minority populations to justify political decision-making in order to concentrate political and 
economic power and resources, with wealthy party elites (Trounstine 2008). Informed by the 
eugenics movement in early 20th century, reform movements in the American Southwest justified 
limiting the political and civil rights of poor, ethnic minority groups (Bridges 1999, 8). The 
reforms framed their decisions to restrict civil rights as the best choice for society, describing 
ethnic immigrant constituents as ‘inhuman’, and that restricting who may participate in civil 
society would help establish ‘efficient government’ (Bridges 1999). The economic and political 
benefits reaped by the monopolies were the distributed to the core supporting contingencies, 
white middle and upper class voters (Trounstine 2008, 60). The reform movements directly 
enlisted social constructions as a platform to legitimize their decision-making.  
 Urban machines, as opposed to reform movements, concentrated their efforts to preserve 
the monopoly on further incentivizing support from their core voting contingent, white, wealthy 
elites (Bridges 1999; Trounstine 2008). Machines used less direct social constructionism, merely 
favoring one group over another rather than explicitly legitimizing this choice with social 
construction. This indirect constructionism affecting policy outcomes supports Schneider and 
Ingram’s theory that the way social construction affects policy-making may be more implicit. 
This literature expands on and progresses the theories of social construction to examine different 
ways that it may be used, both directly and indirectly, to affect local policies.  
 As discussed above, elected officials may be more likely to adhere to negative social 
constructions or the individual paradigm as an explanation for homelessness as a result of 
pressure from elites who typically oppose structural solutions to homelessness and therefore buy-
into negative social constructions of homelessness. As a result, municipal elected officials today 
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may strategically employ negative social constructions of homelessness to disincentivize 
supportive housing efforts and retain political support from elite coalitions.   
4. Fragmented and Competing Policy Processes  
The literatures on intergovernmental relations, the political economy, and social 
construction are useful in explaining local decision-making in homelessness policy. What these 
theories tell us, overall, are: 1) There is a long history of municipal governance in social policy 
in the U.S.; 2) Homeless policy has remained separate from this history of municipal governance 
and has instead had a long history of governance through fully delegated systems to non-
governmental actors which may inhibit policy implementation; 3) The political power of 
economic elites may obscure minority group or at-risk target population preferences in highly 
pluralistic municipal systems; 4) Negative social constructions of homelessness are often 
enlisted by elites and elected officials as a rationale for continued delegation of homeless 
governance and to justify acute, punitive responses to homelessness compared to long-term 
solutions addressing the causes of homelessness.  
In summary, municipalities and the governing system for homelessness remain very 
separate. Within these structures, there are additional, separations of preferences for governing 
homelessness between elites and elected officials, and the bureaucrats or non-governmental 
experts in the CoC. The former, prefer punitive responses they are able to implement via 
policing, and the latter may be unable to successfully implement their preferences for permanent 
structural solutions depending on degrees of decentralization and subsequently municipal 
authority. Preferences for permanent solutions to homelessness may be further obscured 
depending on elite political privilege and municipal system plurality. 
 Based on these theoretical implications, I propose a theory of fragmented and competing 
policy processes in U.S. homelessness governance. The result of this crowded and uncoordinated 
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policy space are direct challenges to developing and implementing supportive housing policies. 
Supportive housing policies with a housing first approach have shown to be the most successful 
approach to ending chronic homelessness without relapse.(S. G. Kertesz et al. 2016; Kirst et al. 
2015; Stanhope and Dunn 2011) If municipalities are unable to successfully implement 
supportive housing as a result of these governance challenges, they may continue to face 
increasing rates of chronic homelessness, in what is becoming a crisis in many major 
metropolitan areas across the United States.  
Competing Policy Processes and Structural Interests 
I argue that there are four competing approaches to chronic homelessness existing in the 
form of four competing structural interests (Alford 1975) and play out in the form of very 
divergent policy mechanisms: both decision-making and implementation. I define these 
according to Alford’s definition as identifiable and independent stakeholder compositions each 
with their own independent and in many ways competing political processes including: decision-
making processes, policy goals, and implementation strategies. Each policy process differs 
across each characteristic from stakeholder compositions to implementation strategies. Yet, each 
interest lives and enacts policy within the same municipal environment, simultaneously 
attempting to address the same policy problem: chronic homelessness. Each policy approach is 
characterized as not just independent political actors but independent political actors all with 
their own, different policy decision-making mechanisms producing different policy goals and 
outcomes (as a result of similarly diverging policy implementation). I argue that in homelessness 
politics the policy space is so crowded and fragmented as a result of a historic default to 
‘submerged state’ or ‘delegated state’ actors, that there are multiple separate and concurrent 
approaches to homelessness, or very distinct and separate mechanisms of homeless governance 
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organized at the local level. This research identifies four types of concurrent homeless policy 
approaches: 1) the Continuums of Care (CoC); 2) municipal government; 3) elites; and 4) the 
state.  
CoC governance typically exists as a structure of locally organized non-governmental, 
community-based organizations.(Jarpe, Mosely, and Smith 2018) As outlined in federal 
legislation, the CoC is the formal governing structure for homelessness in the United States. The 
CoCs compete for federal funding to address homelessness in their local area. Actors within each 
CoC are responsible for designing and delivering homelessness services. Most CoCs do so by 
holding regular meetings to coordinate with other health and social service providers in their 
local area in order to coordinate resources, prioritize needs, and implement programming across 
the various providers, many of whom are also non-governmental organizations.  
In order to receive federal funding, the CoCs must comply with federal regulatory 
guidelines as their policy goals. Most recently, CoCs must address chronic homelessness by 
adopting evidence-based strategies including permanent supportive housing (PSH) and 
ultimately housing first,(Shantae Goodloe 2016) along with taking strides to reduce punitive 
responses to homelessness and chronic homelessness.(Tars 2015) CoC’s are also required to 
move towards implementing a system of ‘coordinated entry’, where persons who are 
experiencing homelessness in the CoC’s local area must be ranked according to a vulnerability 
index, prioritizing access to housing for individuals who are typically chronically homeless and 
have been on the streets for many years, with many co-occurring health problems.(U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d.) Finally, the CoCs are required to begin 
establishing a Homelessness Management Information System (HMIS). HMIS is meant to be 
utilized by all service providers within the CoC network, in order to create accessible lists of 
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persons experiencing homelessness, and track service utilization and available resources to assist 
with coordinated entry.(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d.) As described, 
CoC governance may face inherent challenges to successfully establishing its policy goals as a 
result of typically limited to no local governmental authority. If the CoC does have municipal 
governmental authority, it may still face barriers as a result of direct conflict with other 
governance approaches.  
 Municipal government as a homeless governance approach historically has no designated 
role in homelessness policy. As mentioned this is still true today, with over 60% of CoCs 
working without involvement from municipal government.(Jarpe, Mosely, and Smith 2018) 
Municipal government’s role in homeless governance is stratified across various outcomes. 1) 
Limited to no role in homelessness policy decision-making and implementationi with no formal 
policy goals; 2) Direct role in homeless policy decision-making and implementation typically in 
the form of a municipal regulatory role where policy goals align with the CoC (as a result of 
federal funding requirements); 3) Indirect and informal policy involvement through policing in 
response to elite requests to address homeless behaviors and visibility. The three types of 
governance pursued by municipal governments in homeless policy directly affect CoC policy 
goals and policy effectiveness by controlling municipal resources, governing authority, and 
coordination across related government departments and services. 
 Elite approaches to homelessness are characterized by informal strategies of 
homelessness governance. Mentioned above, elite efforts intersect with the municipal initiatives 
by virtue of its implementation strategies. The informal strategies utilized by elites are most 
 
i In many cases municipalities may have one ‘representative’ from municipal government that attends CoC meetings 
but does not establish a formal role for municipal government in homeless policy in terms of local government 
resources or responsibilities.  
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often enacted through pressure on elected officials, or municipal law enforcement. As the 
literature describes, elite strategies generally align with the individual paradigm of causes of 
homelessness, where elites attempt to pursue acute solutions to undesirable behaviors associated 
with homelessness or the visibility of homelessness in desirable areas. Strategies requested by 
elites are often implemented by law enforcement, who respond to these requests by relocating 
individuals experiencing chronic homelessness, remove or destroy belongings and/or 
encampments, issue citations, or arrest individuals. If a municipality has a designated role for the 
CoC or formal approach to homelessness, elites may pressure elected officials to move away 
from long-term, permanent supportive housing efforts and prioritize shorter-term solutions. 
Elites, through informal means of governance, deliver acute responses to homelessness that 
directly conflict with the concurrent mechanisms and goals of supportive housing policy.  
 The final process speaks to the role of state governments in shaping local policy 
outcomes. As the literature discussed, local governments have historically had a direct 
relationship with the federal government for the design and provision of many social services. 
With respect to homeless policy, both local and state governments were omitted, with the federal 
government strategically decentralizing homeless policy governance to non-governmental actors. 
Despite this strong decentralization and historic absence of state governments in this policy 
space, state governments administer many related resources that may influence local decision-
making in homeless policy. The primary case of related resources is Medicaid and Medicaid 
expansion, which offers substantial funding for supportive medical services that are necessary 
for supportive housing implementation. However, Medicaid is administered in different ways, 
through either states or county level health departments. In this vein, degrees of alignment 
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between state level Medicaid policy goals and administrative procedures, and local supportive 
housing policy implementation, may affect local policy outcomes.  
 The three cases that are examined in this dissertation are stratified across the various 
governing approaches as shown below.  
Table 1: Homeless Policy Governing Approaches 









































































The existence of four, competing policy approaches to homelessness in communities 
across the U.S. creates a fragmented and crowded policy space that promotes collective action 
problems and may promote barriers to permanent supportive housing solutions and ending 
chronic homelessness. This outcome is not desirable for any group. This dissertation will 
empirically examine the implications of these separate policy approaches in order to enhance 
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explanations of decision-making in local homeless policy. Homelessness politics has important 
theoretical considerations for our understandings of decentralization in public health governance 
and the politics of historically marginalized populations. Empirically evaluating homeless policy 
outcomes across these distinct and concurrent governing approaches will enhance the existing 
literature by promoting our understanding of the mechanisms and effects of completely 


















 This chapter examines the national variation in municipal responses to chronic 
homelessness. Specifically, the goals of this chapter are to 1. identify the prevalence of 
municipal-level supportive housing policies among municipalities affected by homelessness in 
the United States, and 2. identify and examine the factors associated with the presence of a 
municipal-level supportive housing policy.  
 These goals are critical for a number of reasons. First, the existence of a municipal level 
supportive housing policy presents evidence of coordination between the Continuum of Care and 
the municipal governments in supportive housing policy processes/efforts. The Continuum of 
Care (CoC), the national system for preventing and addressing homelessness, is a network of 
mainly non-governmental community organizations, organized at the municipal level that 
distribute funding and oversee local and regional homeless policy programming and service 
distribution (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). Previous research has shown that most CoC’s tend 
not to coordinate with municipal level governments (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018), which 
creates gaps in service delivery, and implementation challenges. In response, the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has incentivized coordination across the 
CoCs and municipal governments, arguing that to deliver effective programming, there needs to 
be buy-in across these two sectors (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office 
of Policy Development and Research 2018). From a public health perspective, the presence of 
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municipal-level supportive housing policies is also an indication of evidence-based policy 
adoption to effectively address chronic homelessness in urban areas.  
 Second, most research on chronic homelessness focuses on identifying strategies that 
most effectively reduce chronic homelessness and improve health outcomes. This is very 
important research. However, to date, there has been almost no research on the political 
predictors (or other social or economic predictors) of the adoption of these evidence-based 
policies. Research has shown that the number of supportive housing units is not correlated with 
homelessness prevalence (T. Byrne et al. 2014). This would suggest that other factors, such as 
political predictors of policy adoption and implementation, might be affecting supportive 
housing policy. This research intends to fill that gap. This is the first research evaluating the 
association between political and social factors, and supportive housing policy in municipalities. 
Due to data limitations, this research does not evaluate temporality. However, identifying the 
factors associated with supportive housing policy presence in municipalities is a first step in 
understanding why supportive housing policies may or may not get implemented, as well as the 
types of places that may be more or less likely to adopt supportive housing policy approaches.  
 Our results showed that most municipalities facing homelessness challenges do not have 
supportive housing policies. Of the municipalities in the dataset, only forty-percent had a 
municipal-level supportive housing policy. These municipalities tend to be more liberal, have 
fewer but better funded nonprofit health organizations, lower rates of municipal governmental 
fragmentation, and are located in states without Medicaid Expansion, in short in (relatively) 
liberal municipalities in Republican states.   
This research has important policy implications. The Trump administration enacted cuts 
to Community Development Block Grant funding, which is often used to fund municipal 
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homeless programming, as well as cuts to federal rental assistance for low-income 
families.(Dewey, Jan, and Stein 2018; Mazzara 2018) This reduction in policy capacity 
decreases municipal capacity to address and prevent homelessness. Cuts to federal rental 
assistance present an imminent risk of increased homelessness among families and 
children.(Mazzara 2018) However, preserving funding for Medicaid Expansion and increasing 
rates of Medicaid Expansion may provide more resources for supportive housing services and 
healthcare among homeless persons, even without municipal adoption of supportive housing 
policy. Maintaining federal funding for supportive housing and evidence-based programming is 
critical for protecting existing programming and may encourage municipalities to overcome 
coordination barriers or at least support the efforts of nongovernmental actors. Overall, this 
research finds that the low-rate of supportive housing policies among municipalities overall may 
lead to a lack of preparedness among municipal governments to address homelessness, in 
general. Addressing the homelessness crisis and the threat of rising rates of homelessness thus 
fall on the CoC, i.e. primarily nongovernmental actors.  
Data and Methods  
To conduct this research, a novel and comprehensive cross-sectional dataset was 
developed to document and measure municipal supportive housing policy choices and key 
political factors associated with these choices. Before discussing the dataset, it is important to 
define ‘municipality’ as measured, here. Municipalities, broadly, refer to units of local 
government including cities and or counties based on the use of the definition. This research 
purposefully does not choose between cities and counties in this quantitative analysis, but instead 
identifies the unit of analysis as local government jurisdictions existing within the local CoC. 
Thus, the majority of cities in the United States also align with a county government. So, a CoC 
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located in one major U.S. city may be aligned with the city and/or county government (e.g. Los 
Angeles City and Los Angeles County). Since no data currently exists on CoC governance 
structures, and since CoCs are an amalgamation of various health delivery systems and actors in 
a metropolitan area, we cannot delineate between city or county governments as the main 
governmental partner for CoCs. Thus, as will be discussed more below, this research assumes 
that either cities or counties or both may participate in CoC governance (if municipal 
government does participate in CoC governance), and therefore supportive housing policy data is 
collected from cities and counties organized around the local CoC (e.g. Los Angeles City and 
Los Angeles County). 
The dataset is comprised of 232 municipalities of 354 municipal CoCs from the HUD 
2016 CoC database in order to control for cities directly receiving federal homeless funding. 
Municipal-level supportive housing policies were then retrieved from Municode, and city and 
county websites. To collect municipal homeless policy outcomes, a total of 464 city and county 
websites were reviewed (the total number of governmental websites for all cities and counties 
associated with the 232 CoCs in the dataset), with 243 municipal policies identified. Political and 
economic factors and control data were primarily collected from HUD Point in Time counts, 
HUD Housing Inventory Counts, and US Census data. The dataset is described in more detail 
below.  
Sample Selection 
This research is interested in municipal-level policy change since municipalities play a 
key role in developing, funding and implementing CoC policies and programming. 
Municipalities were chosen based on their inclusion in the HUD 2016 Point in Time (PIT) count 
survey, therefore selecting municipalities with a CoC that are receiving federal funding for 
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homelessness solutions.(United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 2017) To 
receive federal funding, CoCs are required to use language describing their commitment to 
promoting evidence-based policies, which may or may not reflect actual change on the ground. 
Therefore, measuring CoC “policy” change may be less valid and may not reflect true policy 
change or implementation. Further, to design and implement supportive housing policies, 
municipalities have more political leverage, and potentially more resources available to them 
compared to the CoCs. From zoning to building permitting for shelters or housing units, to 
coordinating police responses to homelessness, county-level health and behavioral health 
programming, to public works for city street clean-up programs (which engage directly with 
homeless encampments), municipalities hold very high stakes in and control resources and 
implementation in homelessness policy and programming. As such, measuring municipal policy 
may more accurately capture street-level policy, as well as leverage for policy change.  
Finally, using municipal policy as the outcome illustrates the role municipal governments 
play in homeless policy compared to the non-governmental organizations as designed in the CoC 
structure. HUD has recently advocated for greater participation by municipalities in CoC 
activities, to deliver more effective homeless policy and reduce homelessness (U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development n.d.; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Office of Policy Development and Research 2018). Other research has shown that municipal 
governments tend to be absent from CoC governance (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). Research 
from 2018 by Jarpe and colleagues measured coordination between CoCs and municipal 
governments by surveying the CoCs. This dissertation will build on this work and measure the 
relative integration, or lack thereof, between the CoCs and municipal governments, by measuring 
participation in supportive-housing policy from the municipal government side.  
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In total, there were 402 COC’s in the U.S. in 2016. This dataset includes all major city 
CoC’s (48) and 60% of all other CoCs, including small city and county CoCs. Forty-eight 
regional, state and U.S. territory CoC’s were dropped, because these CoCs are not aligned with 
specific municipalities and therefore cannot be used to evaluate municipal policy preferences. 
Additionally, 124 small city and county CoCs were dropped due to a lack of municipal level 
data, including fiscal, population demographics, and political institutions. 208 CoCs in the 
dataset are contiguous with single county borders. For 24 CoCs covering more than one county, 
the largest county and aligning city was used as the unit of analysis. The final dataset includes 
232 municipal Continuums of Care, or 66 percent of all CoCs in the United States.  
Outcome Variable: Supportive Housing Policy 
Municipal supportive housing policies were collected from a search of city and county 
government websites, and Municode. A municipal policy was coded as ‘supportive housing’ if a 
locality has one or more of the following: municipal plan(s), guidelines, regulations and or 
statutes establishing supportive housing, permanent supportive housing, and or Housing-First as 
a main component of the local government’s homelessness response.  
Independent Variables 
There were three categories of independent variables: political institutions, social 
construction, and control variables. Political institutions include who may participate, and the 
way actors coordinate with each other and participate in political decision-making processes 
influencing municipal adoption of supportive housing policy. These comprise measures of 
municipal fragmentation, municipal governmental structure (mayor vs. mayor-council), 
ideology, and various interest group presence such as non-profit healthcare providers, and 
tourism. Political institutions matter in understanding what factors may influence decision-
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making towards or away from municipal participation in supportive housing policy. Social 
construction variables are related to perceptions of the target population (chronically homeless 
persons), which may shape what policies actors pursue and therefore promote or dissuade 
preferences towards supportive housing policy. These include population measures of 
race/ethnicity, former confederacy, sanctuary city status, and religiosity. Control variables 
pertain to infrastructure, existing resources and need, and include measures of the homeless 
population, municipal financial indicators, weather, and a dummy variable included for state 
effects.  
The complete list of variables and their source is shown in Table 2 and described in detail 
below. This first part of the analysis uses a larger number of variables to gain a picture of which 
combinations of factors are most strongly associated with municipal-level supportive housing 
policy, and which of these combinations is also the most representative, i.e. occurs most often, 
across the sample. This step is important because this is pioneering research. To begin mapping 
this understudied policy landscape, this minimization (C. C. Ragin 2014) method allows us to 
identify which factors are predictive of the policy outcome. Building on the combinations of 
variables that are most predictive and most representative across the sample, a secondary 
analysis will further test the strength of the associations of the identified variables with the 
outcome of interest, municipal-level supportive housing policy. This process will be discussed 
more in Methods below and in the Appendix.  
Table 2: Independent Variables 
Political Institutions Social Construction Controls 
Total Municipal 
Fragmentation Percent White 
Municipal Statistical Area 
(MSA) GDP 
Municipal Institutional 
Structure Percent Black MSA Population 
Medicaid Expansion Percent Latino Total Unsheltered Chronically Homeless 
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State Level Supportive 
Housing Policy Sanctuary City Status Total Chronically Homeless 
City Policy Conservatism Former Confederacy Total Year-Round Permanent Supportive Housing Beds 
Number of Nonprofit Health 
Organizations Southern City 




Religiosity (Church Going 
Population) CoC Type – City Level 
Percentage of Prisoners in 
Private Prisons  State-level Dummy Variable 
Tourism   
 
Institutions 
As discussed in the Chapter 2, municipal governmental fragmentation may affect policy 
outcomes by hindering policy coordination or action across multiple governments. The measure 
of the total number of governments per county area was collected from the 2010 U.S. Census 
data, the most recent data (United States Census Bureau 2012a, 2012b). However, it is not 
expected that more county governments have been added since 2010, as most county 
governmental fragmentation occurred in the 20th century and has not expanded recently (Berry 
2009; Goodman n.d.; Hogen-Esch 2011).  
Municipal governmental structure may affect policy outcomes by influencing which 
actors may participate in political decision-making and how (R. W. Mickey 2008). This measure 
is broken into types of municipal governments moving from more unilateral governance 
structures to more pluralistic structures (Mayor-Council, Council-Manager, Commission, Town 
Meeting, Representative Town Meeting). This measure is collected from the International 
City/County Management Association (International City/County Management Association 
2011). Currently, the data for municipal government structure is incomplete, with about 60% of 
the sample covered. However, including this important measure of political participation will 
still indicate how political institutions may influence policy outcomes.  
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Ideology is known to be a strong factor in predicting and explaining social policy 
choices, where increased conservatism is associated with lower provision of social services 
(Grogan, Jones, and Pacheco 2017; Grossman and Hopkins 2016; Soss, Fording, and Schram 
2011; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Warshaw and Tausanovitch 2015). This research uses 
Warshaw and Tausanovitch’s measure of city policy conservatism, estimating the public’s policy 
conservatism by surveying policy ideal points (Warshaw and Tausanovitch 2015).  
Because of the history of decentralization in homeless policy, measures of the level of 
non-governmental activity (or here the CoC) is a critical component to understanding factors 
associated with homeless policy outcomes. A greater number of non-governmental actors in the 
policy space may reflect lower governmental involvement in homeless policy or greater 
decentralization. To assess how the size of the CoC is associated with homeless policy choices, a 
measure of the average number of non-profit healthcare providers per 10,000 people by 
municipal statistical area (MSA) was collected from the Urban Institute (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics 2018). The degree to which these non-governmental actors are financed may 
also affect policy outcomes. If non-profits are better resourced, they may be more effective in 
shifting policy capacity to support evidence-based municipal policy adoption, and alternatively, 
better financed actors may indicate greater municipal support for local policy capacity. Thus, a 
measure of the non-profit organizations per capita revenue by municipal statistical area was also 
included (National Center for Charitable Statistics 2018).  
Although the history of U.S. homeless policy focuses on local-federal relationships, 
municipalities are creatures of the state (Ross and Levine 2001b), and states have a long history 
of coordinating health policy. The existence of a state-level supportive housing policy may 
indicate better intergovernmental coordination across multiple levels of government to support 
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municipal level strategies (Lee and McGuire 2017). State-level supportive housing policies were 
collected from a review of state government websites and Lexis-Nexis. States were coded using 
a binary measure of having a supportive housing policy or not, 1/0, coded as having a 
supportive-housing policy if the state had either a state plan, guideline, regulation or statute 
establishing permanent supportive housing or Housing-First as a main component of the state 
government’s response to homelessness (Lee and McGuire 2017).  
We hypothesized that the Medicaid expansion would be a key independent variable 
because it may provide greater state-level resources to support local-level homelessness 
programming. The Medicaid expansion improved access to healthcare services for single adults, 
the primary population comprising chronically homeless persons (Cassidy 2016). Medicaid 
dollars can also be used to pay for supportive housing services, although Medicaid itself cannot 
pay for housing or rent (Cassidy 2016; HHS 2014). The presence of state Medicaid Expansion 
was collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2018). A binary measure for Medicaid Expansion was used, 1/0 if a state expanded 
or did not expand Medicaid.  
Two additional variables may be particularly relevant to supportive housing policy. 
Entrenched interests or interest groups, based on their degrees of organization, participatory 
networks, and wealth, are able to influence political decision-making to their intended ends or 
preferences (Heaney 2006; Strach 2015). First, there is a direct relationship between chronic 
homelessness and incarceration, which means that the private carceral state has an incentive to 
retain and re-incarcerate inmates (Greenberg and Rosenheck 2008; Hawthorne et al. 2012; H. R. 
Lamb and Weinberger 2005; Segal, Frasso, and Sisti 2018). Thus, the percentage of prisoners in 
private prisons can act as a proxy for the presence a lobbying interest in supporting policies in 
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conflict with supportive housing, or punitive policies. This data comes from the U.S. Department 
of Justice and is used in lieu of recent data on private jails, which is not available (United States 
Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs 2011).  
Second is tourism. Tourism may be especially relevant as an entrenched interest when it 
comes to policies targeting chronically homeless persons because homelessness rates are high in 
areas with large tourism economies. Due to conflicting policy goals – e.g. addressing homeless 
behaviors or quickly managing homelessness compared to addressing causes of long-term 
homelessness – tourism industries may support punitive policies over supportive housing 
(Nacgourney 2016). This data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,  using measures of 
GDP by MSA for “Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services” as a 
measure of tourism revenue by MSA (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2017).   
Social Construction Variables 
Social construction of homelessness and homelessness among ethnic minorities may bias 
residents against homeless persons, potentially reducing support for policies seeking to provide 
services for persons experiencing homelessness. However, demographic information about this 
population is difficult to access. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
collects demographic data during point in time (PIT) homeless counts conducted by the CoCs 
(Bishop et al. 2017b). This includes racial and ethnic data, as reported in the Annual Homeless 
Assessment Report to Congress. Currently, however, racial and ethnic demographic data is not 
available in the publicly available HUD PIT datasets, although other demographic information is 
publicized such as age categories. As an alternative, municipal population demographics from 
U.S. Census estimates are used as a proxy for the demographics of the municipal homeless 
population (United States Census Bureau 2017). However, using municipal demographic 
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statistics may actually underestimate the effects of race on city policy choices, as ethnic 
minorities face greater risks of homelessness than whites as a product of historic wealth 
distributions and racial resentment (Bishop et al. 2017a; Henwood et al. 2013). 
Sanctuary City status is used as another indicator of social construction towards ethnic 
minority group members. For instance, Sanctuary City status may be protective to minority 
group members, signaling more support for policies that protect racial/ethnic minority group 
members. Although Sanctuary Cities refer specifically to immigration status, the high rates of 
homelessness among minority groups, and the overlap in social service needs among persons 
experiencing homelessness and other low-income groups may increase policy support for 
supportive housing in a case of support for a tangential policy, such as Sanctuary City status. 
Sanctuary City status is collected from the U.S. Immigrations and Custom Enforcement (U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 2017), and measured as a binary indicator, yes/no, for 
2017 Sanctuary City status. 
There are two state-level indicators that may have important implications for at-risk or 
historically marginalized populations, which comprise the majority of individuals experiencing 
homelessness and chronic homelessness. These two indicators are whether a state is a former 
part of the confederacy (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2019), and whether or not a 
state is “southern” (U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration 
2010). Given the policy histories of racial/ethnic marginalization, exploitation and 
criminalizationii of racial/ethnic minority group members and black Americans in particular, in 
 
ii Criminalization of minority group members may also be related to supportive housing policy decision-making. As 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, there is a long policy history of the criminalization of homelessness, which continues 
today, in part due to the social construction of persons experiencing chronic homelessness. While municipalities are 
incentivized to pursue supportive housing through federal regulation, they are also incentivized to move away from 
the default of criminalization. Therefore, cities with stronger histories of criminalization of out-group members may 
opt-away from supportive housing in favor of the status quo of criminalization, as a product of path dependence and 
social construction of out-group members.  
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former confederate and southern states (Acharya et al. 2015; R. W. Mickey 2008), it is 
reasonable to assume that these histories may play a role in shaping policies addressing chronic 
homelessness given the higher risk of homelessness faced by racial/ethnic minority group 
members. For example, southern or former confederate cities may purposefully opt away from 
supportive housing policies in line with policy histories of marginalization of impoverished, 
racial/ethnic minority groups. 
Finally, religiosity intersects with ideology, as well as notions of race/ethnicity, and 
deservedness (Weir and Schirmer 2018). Therefore, religiosity, as measured by the rate of the 
churchgoing population, of a municipal population may be indicative of support towards, or 
away from municipal supportive housing policy, based on the degree to which religiosity is 
associated with conservative ideology or animus towards outgroup members, or not. As with the 
other social construction variables, religiosity is important here because of the ways in which it 
may guide political support for or participation in municipal supportive housing debates. 
Religiosity is measured MSA and is collected from the Association of Religion Data Archives 
(Association of Religion Data Archives 2010).  
Control Variables 
Control variables include municipal GDP, population, and population demographics, and 
homeless statistics.  Municipal wealth is associated with greater provision of social services (De 
Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2015; Peterson 1981), which is in part related to its population, 
affecting the potential tax base. But population may also affect the degree of public participation. 
Larger cities may inherently have more public participation, which may lead to greater policy 
conflict or pressure against evidence-based policies due to NIMBYISM or other stakeholder 
preferences (Kim 2000; Kraft and Clary 1991; Rydin and Pennington 2010). MSA population 
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and GDP were collected from U.S. Census data estimates (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2017; 
United States Census Bureau 2017).  
Homeless statistics include the total number of chronically homeless individuals in a 
county and the total number of supportive housing beds in a county area. Numbers of chronically 
homeless persons by municipality, the most visible homeless population, are included from HUD 
Point In Time data (United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 2017). 
Higher numbers of visibly homeless persons may require cities to be more responsive to 
homelessness. The total number of supportive housing beds by MSA from HUD Housing 
Inventory Count data is also included as a proxy measure for supportive housing implementation 
(United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 2017). Total number of 
supportive housing beds may or may not be associated with supportive housing policy presence 
because of the many barriers that exist in allocating space for supportive housing or building new 
construction beyond municipal support.  
Finally, the places with the highest rates of homelessness are concentrated along the 
coasts. Many of these places are in warmer latitudes. This analysis includes mean winter 
temperature to control for potential geographic variation in rates of homelessness. Mean winter 
temperature by state is drawn from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association 
(National Centers for Environmental Information and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration 2017).  
A state level dummy variable was included to control for differences across the states and 




 This study applies two approaches to estimate political predictors of municipal supportive 
housing policy. The first is a set-theoretic approach using Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (FsQCA) (C. C. Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2006), to understand the types of cities, or 
characteristics of cities that are most commonly associated with supportive housing policy. 
FsQCA measures the representation of the common types of cities across the dataset; if certain 
types of cities are more associated with a supportive housing policy, how common is this kind of 
city within the dataset? For example, are city characteristics that are associated with supportive 
housing very uncommon? Or are some groupings of characteristics that are associated with 
supportive housing more common? FsQCA also estimates the strength of the association of types 
of cities with the outcome of interest (C. C. Ragin 2014). Measuring the strength of the 
association is important because it allows us to identify city types that are very predictive of 
supportive housing policy (rather than less predictive) and to also understand how common these 
types of cities actually are. Overall, FsQCA adds value by looking at how different variables are 
associated in a particular type of city-case rather than measuring average effects across all city 
cases in the dataset.  
 These procedures conducted by FsQCA imitate case-oriented comparative methods but 
allow for multiple comparisons of groupings through computer algorithms, i.e. a form of 
minimization. The end-goal of systematic minimization is to represent the different combinations 
of conditions that produce a specific outcome (C. C. Ragin 2014). Compared to logistic 
regression, which prioritizes average effects or associations across a sample, FsQCA allows 
researchers to examine the heterogeneity within cases that all have the same outcome. Looking at 
this heterogeneity is useful, if researchers want to understand different types of cases that may 
end up with a certain outcome. Another way of thinking about this is that it is useful to 
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understand not only what cases have in common, but how they are different. Understanding this 
heterogeneity allows for more nuanced understanding of the different relationships between 
factors associated a certain outcome. Focusing on mean effects alone may obscure this 
heterogeneity, and therefore ignore important mechanisms or characteristics influencing an 
outcome.  
 With a binary outcome variable, logistic regression is then used as the second approach to 
understand the association of key individual variables with the outcomes.(Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2004) Logistic regression analysis is useful in this context, because instead of 
highlighting heterogeneity among the sample and the associations with the outcome of interest, 
logistic regression analyzes mean associations of variables across the sample with the outcome 
of interest. Using logistic regression in tandem with FSQCA allows researchers to obtain a 
broad, and narrow, view of the factors associated with an outcome of interest. Thus, comparing 
the results of the two approaches enhances the validity and reliability of the findings.  
Descriptive Results 
Table 3: Descriptive Results – Municipal Homeless Policies 
N Cases Dependent Variable Description 
94 Supportive Housing  
Supportive housing addresses chronic homelessness by treating socioeconomic 
and physiological causes of homelessness by simultaneously providing housing 
and medical services. Includes Housing First, but not exclusively.  
138 No Supportive Housing Municipalities found not to have some form of a supportive housing policy. 
232 Total All municipalities in the sample 
 
Shown in Table 3, 94 municipalities within the sample had a supportive housing policy in 
2017, which is 40%. Regarding municipalities without supportive housing policies, this finding 
indicates that the responsibility for homeless programming may fall primarily on the CoC, or 
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non-governmental actors. This finding aligns with previous research, showing that 38% of CoCs 
in 2014 had a relationship with municipal actors. This finding supports previous work 
demonstrating the separate nature of the CoCs and municipal governments. 
Table 4: Characteristics of Municipalities Without Municipal Supportive Housing Policy 
 
Model 1: High concentration of nonprofit health organizations; low rate of chronic 
homelessness, large municipal population, low rate of persons identifying as black or Latino; 
high rate of municipal fragmentation; high city policy conservatism; not a sanctuary city (.35, 
.97) 
 Parsimonious Solution: High concentration of nonprofit health organizations; high 
rate of municipal fragmentation; high city policy conservatism (.43, .95) 
  
Model 2: Low rate of chronic homelessness; large municipal population; low rate of persons 
identifying as black or Latino; high rate of municipal fragmentation; high city policy 
conservatism; low winter temperature; low rate of prisoners in private prisons (.46, .95) 
 Parsimonious Solution: High rate of municipal fragmentation; high city policy 
conservatism; low winter temperature (.48, .94) 
  
Model 3: Low concentration of nonprofit health organizations; low rate of chronic 
homelessness; large municipal population; low rate of persons identifying as black or Latino; 
high rate of municipal fragmentation; high city policy conservatism; (.59, .90) 
 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of Municipalities With Municipal Supportive Housing Policy 
 
Model 1: Low concentration of nonprofit health organizations; low nonprofit health 
organization revenue; high rate of chronic homelessness; large municipal population; low rate 
of persons identifying as black or Latino; low city policy conservatism; high winter 
temperature; located in a state with Medicaid Expansion (.28, .98) 
 
Model 2: Low concentration of nonprofit health organizations; high rate of chronic 
homelessness; large municipal population; low rate of persons identifying as black or Latino; 
high rate of municipal fragmentation; low city policy conservatism; high winter temperature; 
located in a state with Medicaid Expansion (.26, .99) 
 
Model 3: Large municipal population; low rate of persons identifying as black or Latino; low 
rate of municipal fragmentation; low city policy conservatism; low winter temperature; low 
rate of prisoners in private prisons (.31, .99) 
 Parsimonious Solution 1: High rate of persons identifying as black; low rate of 
municipal fragmentation; low city policy conservatism (.27, .92) 
Parsimonious Solution 2: Low rate of municipal fragmentation; low city policy 




Model 4: High rate of chronic homelessness; large municipal population; low rate of persons 
identifying as black or Latino; low rate of municipal fragmentation; low city policy 
conservatism; high winter temperature; located in a state with Medicaid Expansion; low rate of 
prisoners in private prisons (.27, .99) 
Notes: The first numeric measure A, of (A, B), represents coverage, or the proportion of cases within the outcome 
set (outcome here is municipal supportive housing policy or not) that fits the listed grouping of characteristics. 
Proportion measured on a 0-1 scale, with cut-off threshold for high or low levels of .5. Second value B, represents 
consistency, or how consistently the grouping of characteristics listed predicts the outcome, across the entire sample. 
B measured on 0-1 scale. Both outcome sets predictive by >=.9, FSQCA selection cut-off set to .9. The results above 
are the most predictive and most common, combinations of variables identified through the minimization procedure 
for the outcome sets. Based on the minimization method, variables that reduced consistency and/or coverage were 
dropped from the models. 
 
 
The results from the set-theoretic analysis are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The set theoretic 
approach sorts through combinations of the selected variables to show us results revealing the 
different types of cities within the outcome set (supportive housing policy, or not) that both occur 
most frequently in the outcome set and accurately predict the outcome. Tables 3 and 4 report the 
top outcomes (most common and most predictive) that were deduced from the minimization 
procedure. Parsimonious solutions are also included. These are further minimizations within 
city-types that may be more predictive of the larger combination of characteristics, as a result of 
the inherent tradeoff between: coverage and consistency, and the number of parameters.  
There are a few important findings from this analysis. First, for understanding 
municipalities with supportive housing policy, the types of municipalities that are most common 
and most predictive of supportive housing policy represent at least one quarter of the 
municipalities in the outcome set. For set-theoretic analyses this proportion is reasonable given 
the heterogeneity among municipalities. However, the type representation among municipalities 
without supportive housing policy is over one half of the outcome set (across all of the most 
common and most predictive models). This disparity suggests that there may be more 
heterogeneity among cities that adopt supportive housing policies, or that the analysis could be 
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strengthened by including other variables to account for currently unobserved heterogeneity 
among these municipalities.  
Overall, the set theory results tell an important story about the types of municipalities that 
employ a supportive housing policy compared to those that do not. Municipalities with a 
supportive housing policy are more likely to be in states with Medicaid Expansion, have high 
rates of chronic homelessness, a large municipal population, lower rates of nonprofit health 
organizations, yet higher revenue for existing nonprofit health organizations, and higher mean 
winter temperatures. These municipalities are more likely to have lower populations of Black 
and Latino residents, lower city conservatism, less municipal governmental fragmentation, and 
lower rates of nonprofit healthcare organizations. For municipalities without supportive housing 
policies, the majority are places with high rates of municipal governmental fragmentation, higher 
city conservatism, and large population sizes. Most municipalities without supportive housing 
have fewer chronically homeless persons, and like municipalities with supportive housing, also 
have lower rates of ethnic minorities, and fewer nonprofit health organizations.  
Cities without Supportive Housing  
Based on these results, the most consistent city-types with the highest coverage in the 
outcome set do not present an unexpected picture. Regarding political institutions, cities without 
supportive housing are more likely to be cities with greater municipal fragmentation. Municipal 
fragmentation is particularly predictive of cities without supportive housing in the presence of 
greater conservatism and a higher rate of non-profit healthcare providers, (shown in Model 1, 
and Model 1 Parsimonious). A higher proportion of non-profit healthcare providers and 
conservative ideology fits with conceptions of neoliberalism, and the traditional mechanisms for 
providing homeless services which were historically based on neoliberal principles and a 
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devolution to non-governmental actors. Thus, more conservative cities may be more likely to 
adhere to neoliberal principles, retaining high levels of non-profit service delivery. Municipal 
fragmentation may interact with this, making any interest in moving towards a municipal 
supportive housing policy less likely due to decentralized policy promulgation processes.  
Alternatively, as shown in Model 3, there may be an overall lack of investment in social 
services by conservative municipalities, leading to an overall lower concentration of non-profit 
healthcare organizations among cities without supportive housing. Further, lower rates of 
chronic-homelessness paired with conservative ideology, may promote limited investment in 
social services when the salience of homelessness aligns with conservative ideals of welfare 
systems. An absence of existing networks of social service organizations may also have the 
inverse effect on the adoption of supportive housing policies, if the absence of such a network 
prevents coalition building by groups that might have a greater interest in promoting supportive 
housing solutions.  
Cities with Supportive Housing Policies  
 
Supportive Housing policy presence is most associated with large MSAs, with lower 
municipal government fragmentation, lower rates of city policy conservatism (more liberal), 
higher rates of chronic homelessness and overall homelessness, Medicaid expansion, lower rates 
of nonprofit health organizations with higher revenue for existing nonprofit health organizations, 
Sanctuary City status, lower rates of prisoners in private prisons, and generally lower percentage 
of the population identifying as Black or Latino; however, some cities may have a higher 
percentage of persons identifying as Black.  
Overall, these trends may not be surprising. Regarding institutional resources, Medicaid 
expansion was predictive of supportive housing policy presence across most city-types. States 
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may make more resources available if there are a high number of cities in need, and policy 
preferences align.   
The low concentration of nonprofit health organizations shown in Models 1 and 2, as a 
measure of decentralization or of the CoC, does align theoretically. If cities are engaged in 
supportive housing policy, this may translate into greater centralization, or coordination of 
services through municipal government compared to non-governmental community actors. 
Therefore, we may see lower rates of nonprofit health organizations overall in cities with these 
policies. We may also potentially see lower non-profit revenue as an effect of greater 
centralization in cities with supportive housing policy.  
Not surprisingly, liberal cities are more predictive of supportive housing policy. 
Regarding institutional structures, lower municipal government fragmentation is commonly 
predictive of supportive housing policies. Lower municipal fragmentation may work in similar 
ways as cities without supportive housing, where more streamlined governmental structures 
might make policy adoption easier. This may be indicative of greater ability to coordinate 
between CoCs and local government, in order to establish a municipal-level supportive housing 
policy. Lower fragmentation appears to be predictive conditional on low city policy 
conservatism, as shown in Model 3, Parsimonious 1 and 2. This also aligns with traditional 
ideological notions of centralization or decentralization of welfare state activities (Pierson 1995).  
Higher percentage of persons identifying as Black, and low winter temperature also seem 
to work (separately) in conjunction with low municipal fragmentation and low city policy 
conservatism to be predictive of supportive housing policy (Model 3, Parsimonious 1 and 2). 
This may be a product of lower municipal fragmentation and liberal ideology across most cases, 
here highlighting heterogeneity across some cases with divergent characteristics of colder winter 
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temperatures or cities with higher rates of minority group members, that also adopt supportive 
housing policies (in cities that are both liberal and less fragmented).  
The percentage of prisoners in private prisons acts as a proxy for the presence of private 
prisons as a lobbying interest in favor of other competing policies (such as punitive policies). 
Lower rates of private prisons shown here in Model 3 and 4 may work in the favor of supportive 
housing policy; however, as this study is cross-sectional, this hypothesis could not be tested.  
The overall lower rates of minority populations in the most commonly predictive city-
types may not be an accurate reflection of the relative percentage of people in racial minority 
groups in these cities compared to other cities. Cities with supportive housing tend to be more 
diverse on average, but that average diversity is around twenty percent Black or Latino. Twenty 
percent, though on average a higher percentage of ethnic minority group members, would still be 
coded as an overall ‘lower’ rate of ethnic minority group members based on set-membership. 
Although the role of race/ethnicity may not be accurately captured in the pathway analysis, the 
effects of race/ethnicity will be evaluated in the qualitative phase of the study.  
 Logistic Regression Results – Average Trends  
 
The results from the logistic regression appear in Table 6. This model measures the 
associations of the independent variables of interest with the outcome, the presence of a 
municipal supportive housing policy. The logistic regression model includes the control 
variablesiii, a state-level dummy variable to control for state-level effects, plus the variables from 
the main-city types in the set-theoretic analysis that had the highest representation in the city-
types across the outcome set: Medicaid expansion, total municipal fragmentation, number of 
nonprofit health organizations, nonprofit health organization revenue, percent of private 
 
iii All control variables were included except for total number of unsheltered chronically homeless (overlap with total 
chronically homeless) and CoC type (overlap with MSA size/population) in order to account for power.  
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prisoners, city policy conservatism, winter temperature, municipal GDP, population, percent 
black, percent Latino, sanctuary city status, total permanent supportive housing beds, and total 
chronically homeless.  
For sensitivity analysis, the variables that fell out of the set-theoretic analyses were also 
run individually along with the main logit model (state level supportive housing policy, tourism, 
CoC types, etc). These variables were not significant. Total Permanent Supportive Housing beds 
was also included in the regression even though it was not predictive in the set-theoretic analysis, 
as an important, alternative measure of supportive housing policy support.  
Table 6: Logistic Regression Results on Supportive Housing Policy Presence 
Independent Variable  Coefficient      Odds Ratio  
    
Medicaid Expansion* -1.093 
 
.335 
    
Total Municipal Fragmentation -0.009  
    
Number of Nonprofit Health Organizations -0.331* .718 
    
Nonprofit Health Organization Revenue 0.007* 1.007 
   
Percent Private Prisoners 6.085  
    
City Policy Conservatism -4.071*** .017 
    
Winter Temperature 0.982  
    
GDP  -0.001  
    
Population  -0.005  
    
Percent Black -0.017  
    
Percent Latino 0.035*  
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Sanctuary City 2.189*** 8.928 
    
Total Permanent Supportive Housing Beds -0.000  
    
Total Chronically Homeless 0.003  
    
Odds Ratios only show for statistically significant results. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < 
.001. Pseudo R2 >= .3154   
 
The results of the logistic regression mostly align with the results from the set-theory 
analysis in terms of the associations between intergovernmental relations and municipal policy 
outcomes. Total municipal governmental fragmentation is negatively associated with municipal 
supportive housing policy. This follows the expected direction– a greater number of municipal 
governments may make coordination of services difficult, acting as a barrier to supportive 
housing adoption. This result also aligns with the set-theory analysis, where municipalities 
without supportive housing policies are more likely to have higher municipal governmental 
fragmentation. However, the negative association in the logit analysis is small and not 
statistically significant. Although the analyses are cross-sectional, we can assume that the 
directionality holds for this result, since most governmental fragmentation occurred in the mid-
20th century, and supportive housing policies did not take off until the late 20th Century and early 
21st century.  
The measures of nonprofit activity also align with the set-theoretic results for supportive 
housing. The number of nonprofit health organizations within a municipality is negatively and 
significantly associated with municipal supportive housing policy. Theoretically, this aligns with 
notions of coordination and neoliberalism; greater numbers of nonprofits may create 
coordination challenges, while greater nonprofit presence aligns with the historic conservative 
effort to decentralize homeless policy, which may subvert local government efforts. It is 
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important to note that causality may be bidirectional. A greater number of nonprofits could be 
indicative of conservative trends pushing more resources away from centralized municipal 
efforts. Alternatively, a greater number of nonprofits may be a historic effect that subsequently 
creates challenges to generating a municipal response. Thus, the relationship between nonprofit 
revenue and supportive housing offers different insights. Although nonprofit revenue fell out as a 
predictor among the ideal types, nonprofit health organization revenue is positively and 
statistically significantly associated with municipal supportive housing policy. This result 
suggests greater community or municipal support for nonprofits, which could be indicative of an 
overall greater municipal role in homeless policy. This effect too, however, may also be 
bidirectional. Greater nonprofit revenue may signal a stronger stakeholder response by 
nonprofits, generating support for municipal supportive housing, as opposed to governmental 
initiation.  
The city-types analysis differs from the logit in state-level policy and in the relationships 
with the control variables. Regarding state-level policy, Medicaid expansion runs in the opposite 
direction from the set-theory analysis, showing a negative and significant relationship with 
municipal supportive housing policy. This result is not entirely surprising. The set-theoretic or 
analysis shows the most common type of case across the sample in the outcome set. The ideal-
type of case for supportive housing policy adoption represented just over one quarter of the cases 
in the outcome set. As discussed, this may indicate greater heterogeneity among municipalities 
adopting supportive housing policy. The rest of the sample in the outcome set may be in states 
without Medicaid expansion and with greater heterogeneity among the municipal characteristics 
they share. For example, this may be capturing divergence between state and municipal politics, 
where large cities, in conservative states that oppose Medicaid Expansion, may trend more 
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liberal and be more likely to adopt supportive housing policies (Miami, Austin, Nashville, 
Atlanta…). The association shown here between Medicaid and municipal supportive housing 
policy is important because it also indicates that Medicaid Expansion is not a necessary condition 
for municipal supportive housing adoption, even though it may increase resources to fund 
supportive housing. State-level supportive housing policy, although dropped from the main 
model, was included in a specificity test and was not statistically significantly associated with 
supportive housing policy, although it did show a positive association.  
There are somewhat, mixed results in relation to control variables, where two results 
differ between the set-theory analysis and the logit. Municipal population shows a slightly 
negative but statistically significant association with supportive housing policy. This result may 
be affected by slightly greater heterogeneity in size of municipalities adopting supportive 
housing compared to municipalities that do not. The other result which differs between the two 
analyses is the percent of the population identifying as Latino. Having a higher percentage of 
Latino residents is positively and statistically significantly associated with municipal supportive 
housing policy. This association may be accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. There may be 
a diffusion effect of supportive housing policies across southwest states where there are a higher 
proportion of Latino residents. There may also be an effect here of homeless rates correlating 
with percent Latino, since Latino residents face a greater risk of homelessness compared to white 
counterparts.  
Finally, two variables are strongly, significantly associated with municipal supportive 
housing policy. Both of these results also align with the set-theory results. First, city policy 
conservatism is strongly, negatively and statistically significantly associated with municipal 
supportive housing policy. This result is not surprising. Causality here, too, most-likely runs in 
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both directions. Conservative ideology may foster less support for supportive housing policy. 
Alternatively, conservative preferences fostering institutional barriers to supportive housing – 
such as municipal fragmentation and decentralization – may make any reduced ideological 
opposition to supportive housing, specifically, insufficient to overcome entrenched historical 
challenges.  
Second, Sanctuary Cities have a positive, and significant association with municipal 
supportive housing policy. Sanctuary city status is employed as a proxy measure of the city’s 
perspective of ethnic minority persons as deserving or undeserving of governmental resources 
and protections, which may factor into or align with city policy preferences for chronically 
homeless persons, the majority of whom are ethnic minorities (Bishop et al. 2017b; Fusaro, 
Levy, and Shaefer 2018). Thus, the predictive nature of sanctuary city status in conjunction with 
high rates of homelessness for supportive housing is not surprising. This is also not surprising, 
given the trend in liberal cities adopting Sanctuary City status (Bishop et al. 2017b), and the 
association between liberal ideology and supportive housing policy adoption, as stated.  
What is surprising, is that Sanctuary City status is much more predictive of municipal 
level supportive housing policy than city policy conservatism. Cities that are more ideologically 
conservative are 83% more less likely to have a municipal level supportive housing policy. 
Comparatively, Sanctuary Cities are 8.9 times the odds as likely to have a municipal supportive 
housing policy. The stark difference in these odds ratio findings suggests that there is something 
very different, beyond ideology, that is related to Sanctuary City status that may strongly 
promote municipal level supportive housing policy.  
The relationship between Sanctuary City status and supportive housing policy may be 
bidirectional and may be related to local safety nets. Both municipal level supportive housing 
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policy and Sanctuary City status require by in and resources, at least to some degree, from local 
government actors. Both policies, in effect, may therefore engender greater municipal 
involvement in local safety net resources – whether through coordination, policy expertise, and 
or funding. Therefore, any expansion or relative strength of the existing safety net as signaled by 
either policy may create opportunities for other social welfare policies, relying on similar safety 
net services, to emerge. Alternatively, Sanctuary City status may be a more accurate measure of 
municipal ideology compared to the current measure, potentially capturing important ideological 
heterogeneity possibly related to race or other issues that may not be fully captured in the 
existing measure.   
Summary and Policy Implications  
The results demonstrate that most municipalities facing homelessness challenges do not 
have municipal-level supportive housing policies. Only forty-percent of the municipalities in the 
dataset had a municipal-level policy. The municipalities with supportive housing policies tend to 
be more liberal, have fewer but better funded nonprofit health organizations, lower rates of 
municipal governmental fragmentation, and are located in states without Medicaid Expansion. 
Overall, the results demonstrate relatively limited involvement by municipal governments in 
supportive housing policy efforts. This takeaway is very important, because limited coordination 
between municipalities and the CoC perpetuate service gaps, and may lead to ineffective policy 
development and implementation (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). 
This research has important policy implications and raises important questions about the 
relative separation of municipal governmental responses to chronic homelessness compared to 
the decentralized history of homelessness policy and programming in the United States. The 
most important take-aways are that many foundations of public health and health policy that are 
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touted in other areas of health policy research are not currently applicable in approaches to 
chronic homelessness. This includes state level activities such as Medicaid Expansion, and the 
role of local governments in terms of County Governments as the primary arbiters of public 
health promotion, programming and governance. Medicaid Expansion is negatively associated 
with supportive housing policy, and only arose in two main city-types, with relatively limited 
sample coverage (less than one third of the cities with supportive housing policy). Therefore, 
policy makers urging state-level coordination to address municipal homelessness or advocating 
for Medicaid Expansion resources as a game changer for supportive housing efforts, should 
consider the reality that municipalities may be moving ahead without Medicaid Expansion or 
that Medicaid resources may not be effectively coordinated to spur more municipal policy 
movement. The results across the two analyses demonstrating positive relationships between 
measures of centralization (or a smaller CoC nonprofit base) and municipal supportive housing 
policy, despite low rates of municipal involvement overall, invite a discussion about the role of 
municipal public health, or municipal governments generally in addressing chronic 
homelessness. As it currently stands, managing homelessness, and threats of rising rates of 








Chapter 4: Seeking Deeper Explanations: Case Selection and Qualitative Analysis 
 
 
The results from the national data of municipalities receiving federal funding to address 
homelessness in Chapter 3 demonstrated that the majority of cities do not have a municipal level 
supportive housing policy. This finding aligns with previous literature that indicates that local 
governments are most often not a part of the primary system responsible for governing homeless 
in the United States, the Continuum of Care. The CoC is an organizing structure developed by 
the federal government that consists of locallyiv organized groups of primarily non-governmental 
organizations who compete for federal funding to address homelessness and subsequently design 
and deliver homeless policy and programming.(US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 2012) I use the existence of a municipal supportive housing policy as a proxy for 
greater municipal participation in responses to chronic homelessness, or as an indicator of re-
centralization, where municipalities have more of a role in homeless governance than the 
historical and contemporary alternative of complete delegation to non-governmental actors.  
 Yet, within these broader findings heterogeneity exists within the types of municipalities 
that engage in supportive housing policy compared to those that do notv. Some municipalities 
with supportive housing policies tend to be in states with Medicaid expansion, have high rates of 
chronic homelessness, a large municipal population, lower rates of nonprofit health 
 
iv The majority of CoCs are locally organized (342 out of 402) although there are some ‘statewide’ and ‘regional’ 
CoCs that are typically used to provide services to less dense or less urban areas. 
v See FsQCA results in chapter 3. 
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organizations, yet higher revenue for existing nonprofit health organizations, and higher mean 
winter temperatures. However, the FsQCA analysis exemplified heterogeneity in Medicaid 
expansion, and percent of residents identifying as black, where one of the most common 
groupings of factors in the sample of cities with a municipal supportive housing policy excluded 
Medicaid expansion but included a majority black population.  
For municipalities without supportive housing policies, the most common groupings of 
characteristics illustrate municipalities with high rates of municipal governmental fragmentation, 
higher city conservatism, large population sizes, and low rates of chronic homelessness. The 
analysis demonstrates heterogeneity in the rates of non-profit health organizations per capita. 
The most common groupings of characteristics across municipalities without supportive housing 
policy are consistent across factors listed above with the exception of rates of non-profit health 
organizations, where the cases in the outcome set seem to vary across this characteristic, in 
particular. 
Identifying this variation is important, because it demonstrates that local governments 
may arrive at the same outcome as a result of different factors and processes. It is important to 
identify major trends that may apply to the majority of cases, through the use of average effects. 
Yet, it is equally as important to identify heterogeneity that may help us more completely 
understand the different processes involved in designing and delivering successful municipal 
approaches to homelessness.  
 I can leverage this heterogeneity to create a comparative case study design. Through this 
research design I am able to control for characteristics multiple across cases while also selecting 
on or stratifying by some independent variables in order to study the effects of these divergent 
political processes on local homeless policy outcomes. This method allows us to select cases that 
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maximize the variation in the combination of conditions related to policy-choices. For example, 
a liberal city, in a liberal state that has enacted a punitive approach to homelessness could be one 
case compared with a republican city in a republican state that is working to de-criminalize 
homelessness and enact an inclusive supportive housing policy.  
The comparative case study methodology is an ideal approach for understanding policy 
decision-making because it is imbued with inherent flexibility to use all relevant data and present 
it in a variety of ways. Not only can I select cases that are representative of the existing 
heterogeneity from the national sample to improve generalizability, but I then conduct in-depth 
analyses of the processes at work in each city case, to gain more nuanced understandings of the 
complex processes at work affecting municipal choices to engage in homeless governance at all, 
and subsequently whether or not to establish a municipal level supportive housing policy to 
address chronic homelessness.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the fsQCA software (C. C. Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2006) 
traced the combinations of conditions associated with municipal homeless policy outcomes in the 
larger n sample – the presence of municipal level supportive housing policy, or not. This first 
step informs more precise case selection by maximizing variation across cases based on the 
groupings of variables associated with each case from the quantitative analysis, to identify the 
‘diversity of factors’ stratified across cases within an outcome of interest (C. C. Ragin 2014; C. 
C. Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2006). From there, I am able to control for multiple characteristics 
compared to typical case selection methodologies (Plümper, Troeger, and Neumayer n.d.). I am 
also able to select on both independent variables of interest as well as existing outcomes or 




 FsQCA software identified municipalities that were most representative of the common 
groupings of variables across the outcomes of interest, to facilitate municipal case selection.vi 
FsQCA uses a set-theoretic approach (C. Ragin 2015) to identify cases most representative of 
each outcome type – municipalities with a municipal level homeless policy, or not – based on the 
cases in each outcome set within the sample. The most representative cases can then be further 
stratified by independent variables of interest, to control for factors across cities within an 
outcome set but also select upon independent variables of interest. Overall, one case was selected 
for municipalities without a municipal supportive housing policy, as there was less heterogeneity 
in this outcome set. Two cases were selected for municipalities with, a supportive housing 
policy, in order to select to examine the effects of this heterogeneity on policy decision-making 
and implementation in municipalities with the same outcome.  
Shreveport Louisiana was most representative of municipalities without a municipal level 
homeless policy, but with Medicaid expansion (representing thirty percent of cases without a 
municipal homeless policy). San Francisco was most representative of municipalities in the 
sample with a municipal homeless policy, and with Medicaid Expansion (representing twenty 
five percent of cases with a municipal homeless policy). Atlanta acts as the control case to 
examine the variation in service access and policy conflict in a large municipality with a 
municipal homeless policy, in a state without Medicaid Expansion (representing just over twenty 




vi Set membership to select most representative cases, is determined by minimums. Determining membership across 
two variables takes the minimum of the two scores. Consistency is the sum of the minimum of the membership 
scores for x and y, over the sum of the minimum membership scores for x. Coverage is determined by the sum of the 





Table 7: Case Characteristics 
 
*Atlanta is categorized as having low municipal fragmentation in fsQCA analysis, as a result of having a 
comparatively low number of municipal governments within Fulton County, the county Atlanta primarily resides in. 
I am classifying Atlanta in the case selection as having ‘medium’ fragmentation as a result of the multiple, 
overlapping counties and subsequent municipal governments that make up the metropolitan statistical area of 
Atlanta, but are not counted in the census definition of municipal fragmentation.  
 
Cases Without Municipal Level Supportive Housing Policy 
Three municipalities were consistently present in the major city-types in the proportion of 
the sample absent supportive housing. These cases are Lafayette, Louisiana; Shreveport, 
Louisiana; and Anchorage, Alaska. Lafayette is very close to New Orleans. New Orleans may 
have an undetermined effect on Lafayette decision-making due to homeless policies designed 
after Hurricane Katrina, which may make Lafayette more of an outlying case. Anchorage may 
similarly face unobserved heterogeneity due to the large population of indigenous peoples in 
Alaska and Anchorage. Therefore, Shreveport, Louisiana was selected as the representative case 
for cities without municipal level supportive housing policy.   
Cases With Municipal Supportive Housing Policy 
There were many cases most-consistently representative of the most common city-types 
within the outcome set of municipalities that have a supportive housing policy. Yet, of all of the 
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cases listed, San Francisco occurred in all most representative variations with the exception of 
two. Since San Francisco consistently has a high representation for nearly every variation of the 
common groupings of variables, I selected San Francisco as the most representative case for 
cities with a municipal level supportive housing policy.  
Due to higher rates of heterogeneity in cases with municipal supportive housing policy, I 
am also selecting a second case. Atlanta has the same characteristics as San Francisco, 
controlling for all independent variables except three - Medicaid expansion, municipal 
fragmentation, and percent black. This enhances my ability to select on independent variables of 
interest and compare the effects of this stratification between cases on municipal supportive 
housing policy development. Additionally, Atlanta adopted its supportive housing policy in 
2017. The federal government began mandating CoCs move towards adopting supportive 
housing approaches in 2015 in order to receive federal funding. Selecting a case where a 
supportive housing policy has been adopted after the federal initiative will help to further address 
current limitations of the cross-sectional dataset and examine the effects of federal policy on 
local decision-making in the case analyses.  
Qualitative Analytic Strategy for Comparative Case Studies 
 Qualitative case studies are a useful approach to enhance understanding of policy 
decision-making processes because they provide inherent flexibility to use all relevant data and 
present it in a variety of ways (Anckar 2008). Applying rigorously selected cases and in-depth 
qualitative analyses enhance quantitative findings by further examining the complex 
relationships and temporality of multiple factors affecting policy decision-making (Anckar 
2008). In each case, I collected two types of qualitative data: interviews, and textual document 
data. Interviews and document analysis add contextual grounding of the complicated 
 
 77 
relationships between the multiple factors at work and help tease a part political decision-making 
processes leading to the outcome with a greater level of detail (Collier 2011).  
Interviews 
 I recruited a stratified sample of political actors involved in the policy decision-making 
process in each municipal case. I conducted a total of 49 in-depth interviews across the three 
cases. Appendix C shows the stratification of interviewees by each municipal case. Interviewee 
recruitment focused on the municipal level, with some inclusion of state level bureaucrats who 
were involved in local level initiatives. At the municipal level, there were five main categories of 
interviewees across the three cases: Municipal bureaucrats, community based organizations 
(CBOs) (which includes formal CoC governing organizations when the CoC is fully 
decentralized), elected municipal officials, law enforcement/public safety (includes local police, 
jail, and courts), and healthcare providers.  
The categories of interviewees were identified by outlining the system of actors involved 
in local homeless and supportive housing policy decision-making through relevant municipal 
policy documents. With this information I developed and applied a stratified sampling approach 
to select interviewees in order to reach each category of actors involved in the political processes 
affecting homeless policy outcomes. Interviews were conducted until I established saturation – 
no new additional information was being obtained –  in order to enhance reliability (Fusch and 
Ness 2015). A stratified sampling approach with the goal of saturation is much more effective in 
improving reliability by generating consistency in emergent themes across each group of actors 
(Rubin and Rubin 2011) compared to other approaches. Other methodologies, such as snow-ball 
sampling, risk inconsistency in actor groups, a lack of representation in the interview sample, as 
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well as the rise of narrow explanatory pathways that may not apply to trends of collective 
decision-making.  
A note should be made about recruiting interviewees. I encountered unanticipated 
challenges to recruiting interviewees. Response rates from prospective interviewees was below 
25% across the cases. Many prospective interviewees expressed interest, but ultimately declined 
the request as a result of time constraints. All of the individuals interviewed emphasized 
substantial time constraints overall. Ten interviewees had to leave during the interview for 
another meeting or phone call. The majority of interviewees are both practitioners and policy 
decision-makers. It seems that this dual role may have created time constraints that inhibited 
participation and led to recruitment challenges.  
I conducted interviews in a semi-structured format. A semi-structured format lets the 
researcher explore new ideas during the interview, which can allow the interviewee to be more 
responsive and/or prompt a more genuine dialogue (Frechtling 2002; Rubin and Rubin 2011). 
The semi-structured interview format still utilizes a set of pre-determined themes based on the 
research questions and factors of interest (Rubin and Rubin 2011).vii I queried political actors 
with a series of open-ended questions to engage them in sharing their experiences and 
perspectives on the policy decision-making process including challenges and strategies employed 
or encountered, in the context of the city’s approach to chronic homelessness. To improve 
validity, the interviews were triangulated with official data from policy documents, such as floor 
debate transcripts, or City Council meeting transcripts. 
Text Data 
 
vii The instrument was approved by the University of Michigan Health Sciences IRB. Interviews were not recorded, 
but typed notes were taken during the interviews to record responses. Due to the sensitive nature of interviewing 
political actors, no identifiable information was disseminated, and all interviews were de-identified. 
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 I collected archival documents from multiple sources at the state, local, and federal level 
to provide institutional and social context, and intent behind decision-making. The body of text 
includes work at the state level on relevant policies such as Medicaid expansion and behavioral 
health services. The body of text included over 200 primary policy documents, with at least 50 
policy documents per case. At the federal level, I used the publicly available from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to collect Annual Action Plans from the 
Continuums of Care in each municipal case (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 2019). The majority of texts are local level documents related to local homeless 
policy decision-making, with a focus on addressing chronic homelessness as this is the focus of 
this research. Such documents include mayoral briefs or news releases, city council meeting 
minutes, notices of public comment, municipal supportive housing policies and accompanying 
local regulatory briefs, research, and reports, and finally any available documents from local law 
enforcement related to homelessness and chronic homelessness. In each city case, the documents 
collected range over many years in order to effectively trace the policy histories and debates in 
each case, to understand the factors affecting formal municipal involvement in homeless policy 
and the decision to establish a municipal level supportive housing policy.  
Analytic Approach 
I used process tracing as the primary analytic approach. Process tracing is a systematic 
review of evidence across time, allowing for an analysis of the sequence of events and retrieval 
of key contextual information to divulge a causal mechanism (Bennett 2010). Process tracing 
seeks a historical explanation for the individual case in question. The goal is to document 
whether or not the sequence of events within the case fits those predicted by alternative 
explanations of the case (Bennett 2010). The historical explanation allows for a deeper an 
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understanding of the mechanism involved in the individual case, which helps develop larger 
theories about macrophenomena (Bennett 2009).  
The document coding and interview coding occurred in an iterative process. An initial 
coding protocol in Appendix E was developed based on the quantitative results and the literature. 
I conducted open coding to allow for other, non-pre-determined themes to arise from the data. 
The coding protocol was then updated iteratively in response to themes derived from the process 
tracing analytic approach. I enlisted a secondary coder to for consensus and to enhance the 
validity of the measurements. Dedoose software was used to organize, code, map decision-
making processes and establish inter-coder consensus for all interviews and textual sources. I 
triangulated between the archival documents and the interviews to effectively establish the 
sequence of events and actors involved in political decision-making, validate the mechanisms 
and themes associated with the outcomes of interest.  
Cross Case Analysis 
By teasing out the complex processes involved in policy development, process tracing 
also helps examine the main factors at work and extract themes in order to compare the findings 
across individual cases. Comparing results across variant cases allows researchers to understand 
and theorize how political decision-making is influenced by contextual arrangements in each 
case – such as institutional structures, ideological, economic and social factors, and existing 
lateral policies – in order to better explain and theorize about the relationship between context 
and divergent policy outcomes. Pairing process tracing with the quantitative approach evaluating 
the national scope of municipal involvement in supportive housing policy lets us gain a deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms at work across outcomes and case type in order to better 








Chapter 5: San Francisco: Municipal Governance, Administrative Burdens and State 
Failures, and the Strength of Elites 
 
 
1. What’s happening in San Francisco?  
San Francisco is an exemplar of the importance of the role of stakeholder compositions, the 
political economy, and the importance of recognizing and addressing implementation problems 
in public health policy. San Francisco stands as a case where the unified City and County have 
made significant contributions to addressing chronic homelessness. San Francisco’s Continuum 
of Care (CoC), the governing structures designated by the federal government to design and 
implement homelessness policy, is integrated into municipal government, and the city had a 
housing first policy since the mid-1990s (Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing 
and City and County of San Francisco 2019). San Francisco has an impressive amount of policy 
capacity expertise, municipal fiscal resources and intergovernmental support to address  
homelessness that should have positioned it at the forefront of the supportive housing movement 
in the United States.  
And for a time, it was. Yet substantial changes to San Francisco’s political economy paired 
with the policy histories of limited governmental involvement in homeless policy in the United 
States (Jones 2015) created the perfect storm of implementation problems. San Francisco relies 
primarily (San Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016, 17) on municipal 
funding for homelessness programming with limited state level support and exists in a political 
economy where wealthy residents dominate decision-making and stagnate municipal 
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programming efforts. As a result, San Francisco has now become known for its devastating, and 
public, homelessness crisis. 
Today, San Francisco’s homelessness rate and chronic homelessness rate are increasing. The 
city faces serious shortages of any affordable housing let alone supportive housing (San 
Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016). San Francisco is a case study in 
political participation and implementation. Even when you have the perfect set up, things may 
not go as planned. In San Francisco’s case, continued separation of the state and economic elite 
policy mechanisms and efforts has contributed to the deep implementation challenges by 
generating perpetual policy conflict between these structural interests’ preferences, mechanisms 
and intended policy goals and outcomes. San Francisco is a case that may increasingly apply to 
other major cities in the U.S. facing housing crises. 
1a. Multiple, Competing Approaches to Homelessness in San Francisco 
As mentioned, San Francisco has integrated the Continuum of Care into municipal 
government. This is the same model as Atlanta and is the opposite case of Shreveport. Here, the 
CoC is now a part of San Francisco’s municipal bureaucracy. This has given the CoC greater 
participatory equity in municipal policy debates, ability to coordinate CoC policy activities with 
other city policies and departments related to homelessness such as policing, and the ability for 
the CoC to lobby for and leverage municipal funding resources.  
Despite this integration, the other two policy interests – the state and economic elites – 
remain separate and create tension for the municipal and CoC initiatives as a result of directly 
conflicting or misaligned policy goals. The state of California is identified as separate because it 
designs and delivers policies affecting supportive housing initiatives through different processes 
and to different ends. The state level policy mechanisms are organized primarily around state and 
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federal actors for decision-making purposes, although implementation is beginning to involve 
more local actors (San Francisco Department of Public Health 2017). The state level policy goals 
remain misaligned from local homeless and supportive housing policy goals as the state goals 
focus mostly on medical needs as opposed to pairing housing with medical needs. This leads to 
programming that does not work with or adequately address the reality of chronic homelessness. 
Future integration of the state and local policy decision-making and implementation through 
Medicaid Innovation Waiversviii may help to align the policy mechanisms and goals (San 
Francisco Department of Public Health 2017). 
As the next two case studies will detail, in San Francisco, ‘organized elites’ are notably 
different from organized, economic elites in Atlanta and Shreveport. In San Francisco, compared 
to Atlanta and Shreveport, is that elite interests appear to be comprised of wealthy individuals, or 
independent citizens as opposed corporate interests. Where this description would typically seem 
to include ‘citizens’ as the general public, and perhaps not a minority group of wealthy 
individuals with a concentrated amount of power, San Francisco, as an urban area, stands in 
contrast.  
The definition of ‘elite’ in social sciences is widely used term to describe the rule of a 
minority over the majority of the population (Zannoni 1978). The second distinction of ‘elite’ is 
the existence of criteria to separate the minority from the majority (Zannoni 1978). In San 
Francisco’s case, this distinction is income. As will be discussed in the coming sections, the city 
and county of San Francisco, rather than the Bay area, is an increasingly, economically 
 
viii Whole Person Care is an existing Medicaid Waiver pursued by the city and county of San Francisco to 
specifically target chronic homelessness. WPC seeks to align state and local programming to improve coordination 
and delivery of services to individuals experiencing chronic homelessness. At the time of this research WPC was not 
implemented, so interviewees could not speak to the effects of WPC on the delivery of services to persons 




homogenous city concentrated by wealthy individuals. In the city of San Francisco moderate-
income households (80-120% Area Median Income (AMI)) have declined at double the rate of 
the Bay Area (San Francisco Department of Planning 2018, 30). Simultaneously, since 2000, the 
population of San Francisco residents with income over 200% of the (AMI) has increased by 
nearly 250% (San Francisco Department of Planning 2018, 30). 47% of San Francisco residents 
as of 2015 now earn 120% of AMI or more, with 30% earning over 200% AMI. 60% of 
homeowners in the city of San Francisco are residents earning over 120% AMI. In effect, 
wealthy individuals who comprise a minority of Americans, and a minority of earned incomes in 
San Francisco (Rahaim et al. 2018, 32), now comprise the majority of landowners in San 
Francisco. Therefore, the high concentration of economic power among San Francisco property 
owners distinguishes them as economic elites. This definition matters because of the subsequent 
amount of political power stemming from wealthy property owners in San Francisco. 
Economic elites’ interests directly conflict with the local policy efforts. Elites also exert 
the most tension on local policies to stray from their intended goals. Further, elites place pressure 
on the integration between municipal actors and the CoC. Elites move their influence through 
informal policy processes that direct elite preferences through police activity and elected 
officials. This policy process is very different from both the state and integrated local 
government/CoC policy processes. The goals elites seek are also very different. Elites seek to 
address undesirable behaviors and visibility associated with homelessness as opposed to 
designing evidence-based approaches to address the causes of homelessness and chronic 
homelessness. This direct policy conflict between the structural interests creates a fracturing in 
the policy spaces, where the municipal CoC is attempting to coordinate long term solutions to 
homelessness across city services including policing, and elite preferences often stymy these 
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solutions by demanding short term solutions to behaviors associated with chronic homelessness 
and interfering with existing regulatory policy.  
This chapter will review the history of the change in policy capacity and intergovernmental 
relations in San Francisco. These reforms led to the merging of the CoC and local government 
(and therefore their policy decision-making and implementation mechanisms) and ultimately the 
adoption of a municipal level supportive housing policy that remains as the city’s strong 
bureaucratic response to address chronic homelessness. The chapter will then examine the 
lingering policy conflicts between the city, elites, and the state of California that build barriers to 
implementing supportive housing policy in San Francisco and mitigating the city’s homelessness 
crisis.   
2. How did San Francisco get a Supportive Housing Policy? Shifting Intergovernmental 
Relations and Historic Policy Capacity 
This research finds that political mobilization or policy capacity for homelessness and 
supportive housing is necessary, but not sufficient for adopting a municipal level supportive 
housing policy. Institutional changes may also be required in order to shift perceived 
responsibility for a historically decentralized policy area or incentivize municipal actors to 
participate in a policy space they have historically had no role in. In San Francisco, despite 
substantial growth in municipal investment in housing and supportive services during the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, the city did not establish a formal municipal role governing homelessness 
services until after the state of California mandated reorganization of behavioral health services 
to be governed by counties as opposed to community based, non-governmental actors (San 
Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016, 4). San Francisco acts as an example of 
the important role political institutions play in shaping policy decision-making and policy 
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change. It may not be enough to have motivated political actors, knowledgeable bureaucrats and 
strong funding sources in order to implement a policy. If structural responsibility for certain 
policy programming exists outside of the role of government, or is designated to other actors, 
government may be less incentivized to play a direct role even in cases where policy salience is 
high, the problem stream is strong, and all other resources align (Kingdon 1990).  
In San Francisco, archival and interview analyses identified two main factors influencing San 
Francisco’s to buy in to participate in supportive housing and homelessness policy and formally 
align with the CoC: 1) political mobilization spurring policy capacity development during the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, and 2) institutional restructuring when the state of California restructured the 
organizational responsibility for behavioral health care from local nongovernmental actors to 
counties. Overall, the relationship between the development of strong policy capacity paired with 
structural realignment led to the development of San Francisco’s municipal CoC and municipal 
level supportive housing policy.  
2a. Political mobilization and policy capacity  
Nearly all interviewees, along with archival analyses and extant literature documented 
strong policy capacity and political mobilization around issues related to homelessness in San 
Francisco in the early 1990’s. Understanding the political mobilization related to homelessness 
in San Francisco in the 1980’s through the early 1990’s is important because it documents the 
progress of the relationship between increasing salience of homelessness with simultaneous 
policy capacity development or San Francisco’s increasing role in homelessness responses. This 
research argues that San Francisco’s policy capacity surrounding homelessness was a necessary 
condition for municipal policy adoption, and that ultimately the interaction between strong 
policy capacity and the institutional restructuring allowed for San Francisco to develop a 
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municipal supportive housing policy. Without developing strong policy expertise, restructuring 
the responsibility for behavioral healthcare may not have been a strong enough incentive for San 
Francisco to develop a municipal response to homelessness.  
Interviewees stated that San Francisco one of the first cities to establish supportive 
housing as a priority in the 1990’s. “So the city [San Francisco] was relatively early with Philly 
and NYC very early out of the gate to do harm reduction or HF [housing first] model, jump 
started in late 1990s.”ix As a progressive city with a wealthy tax base and a homelessness 
problem, San Francisco was early out of the gate and very active in addressing homelessness and 
adopting evidence-based strategies to do so (McGarry 2008). San Francisco’s engagement in 
homelessness was related to local ideology and local political capacity surrounding 
homelessness. The political capacity stemmed from a strong advocacy network and strong 
service provider network that put the city in a clear position to address homelessness through a 
social services framework (Blair 2016). Many of these strong provider networks and advocacy 
groups related to healthcare stemmed from development and mobilization during the AIDS 
outbreak in the 1980’s.  
San Francisco was at the epicenter of the AIDS outbreak in the 1980s (H. Byrne 2018). 
San Francisco’s small geographic footprint paired with the strong gay community made the 
epidemic very salient in the community (H. Byrne 2018, Episode 3). As a liberal city that had 
been in the forefront of the civil rights movement, Vietnam protests, and gay rights movement, 
San Francisco was ideologically positioned to tackle the outbreak (Luce 2013). Politicians from 
the 1980s through the 1990s including Mayors Art Agnos and Frank Jordan, were heavily 
involved in mobilizing funding to address the needs of persons affected by the outbreak (Luce 
 
ix Interviewee 1.8 Academic Expert/Healthcare Practitioner  
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2013). Further, as a city with a hub of healthcare organizations and academic healthcare research 
institutions including San Francisco General Hospital and University of California San Francisco 
Hospital (UCSF), the city was also well positioned to generate more policy capacity in issues 
related to health and health services (H. Byrne 2018, Episode 6; Cisneros 2011; Luce 2013).  
What the AIDS outbreak laid the groundwork for in homelessness policy was the 
development of a strong network of advocacy organizations, municipal public health 
infrastructure, and health clinics to treat displaced persons in need of medical care (Luce 2013, 
146; San Francisco History Center 1982). Nearly 40% of persons with HIV/AIDS in San 
Francisco in the late 1980’s were in need of housing (Mor et al. 1993). In response to the AIDS 
outbreak in the 1980s, the number of health clinics and advocacy organizations grew (P S Arno 
1986; Blair 2016; Luce 2013). The City of San Francisco also increased the number of contracts 
with community organizations to provide services related to the AIDS outbreak (Peter S. Arno 
and Hughes 1989; San Francisco History Center 1982). UCSF and San Francisco General 
received increased federal funding from the Ryan White Care Act, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, and the City of San Francisco to invest in the outbreak response and also 
invest in new homeless shelter construction, hospital beds, and behavioral health services (Peter 
S. Arno and Hughes 1989; Blair 2016; Cisneros 2011; Luce 2013; San Francisco History Center 
1982). The Mayor during most of the outbreak, Art Agnos, ushered in a lot of municipal 
investment in homeless shelters intended to transition to permanent housing for displaced and 
chronically homeless individuals (Fagan 2016).  
The city of San Francisco established a municipal level AIDS Office within the San 
Francisco Department of Public Health (San Francisco History Center 1982). Additionally, 
Department of Public Health increased funding to specifically provide services to individuals 
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with HIV or those at risk of AIDS, with specific activities targeted to individuals in this group 
with co-occurring substance use disorders and a focused response targeting the psychiatric needs 
of HIV/AIDS patients (Blair 2016). This led to a direct municipal investment in behavioral 
health services for marginalized individuals with HIV/AIDS (San Francisco History Center 
1982, 3). “So, it [who started homeless policy efforts] was the Department of Public Health  – it 
was the behavioral health providers, and the emergency system providers – so we operate the 
Sanctuary shelter that had been a bath house it opened post AIDS epidemic and the community is 
still thinking that this would be a long term problem.”x 
The archival records and extant literature demonstrate that the AIDs crisis, in particular, 
may have been the critical juncture by which San Francisco established vital policy capacity to 
respond to health crises for highly vulnerable groups. This influx of investment in healthcare, 
social services and behavioral healthcare across the non-profit sector, municipal government and 
healthcare organizations gave San Francisco the ability to address chronic illness when it arose 
as a salient policy issue beyond the HIV/AIDS epidemic. By 1990, (year of Realignment) the 
substantial growth in local policy capacity to respond to the needs of vulnerable populations 
placed San Francisco in a position to respond to other similar issues, such as chronic 
homelessness, and transition to a greater municipal role when the opportunity arose.  
 2b. Realignment 
While San Francisco was adapting to a communicable disease crisis and mobilizing to 
establish sufficient medical and social service capacity to address the epidemic, the state of 
California was moving in a different direction on another very closely related issue: behavioral 
health.  
 




There is a historical relationship between behavioral health and homelessness policy in 
the United States, aside from the relationship between severe mental illness and long-term 
homelessness. When homelessness first arose as a national public policy topic in the 1980’s, 
most researchers and policymakers saw rising rates of homelessness as directly related to 
deinstitutionalization in the 1960’s, or the closing of federal psychiatric institutions by the 
federal Community Mental Health Act (Prioleau 2013).  
Media debates and federal bureaucratic debates (WHSOF Box 3 and Crippen 1987, 4; 
WHSOF Davis n.d., 2) assert that deinstitutionalization was the cause of the 1980’s 
homelessness crisis in cities across the United States (Goldman and Morrissey 1985; Morrissey 
and Goldman 1984; Zlotnick, Zerger, and Wolfe 2013). In response, federal actors in the 1980’s 
frequently highlighted deinstitutionalization as a rationale for or against decentralization of 
behavioral health services and homelessness programming, based on how actors attributed blame 
for the effects of deinstitutionalization (or its perceived relationship to rising rates of 
homelessness). E.g., Republicans cited the failures of communities to effectively respond to 
deinstitutionalization by not creating community coordinated care and therefore promoting the 
homelessness of formerly institutionalized patients (WHORM File and Box 43 1987). 
Democrats, on the other hand, cited the failure of the federal government to not fully 
implement/allocate funds to communities from the Community Mental Health Act (Box 69 
1986), therefore stifling programming and requiring a centralized, federal response to the 
homelessness crisis that they said resulted from deinstitutionalization.  
Resulting from this debate, was the first and only federal law governing homelessness 
policy and programming. This law, the McKinney Vento Act (now the Hearth Act) (United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d.), compromised between the two 
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sides of the deinstitutionalization debate by establishing a federal law and federal regulations for 
homelessness funding and programming, but also established a decentralized network of 
‘community’ homelessness programming and decision-making, known as the federal Continuum 
of Care (CoC) (Davis and Box 3 1987). McKinney Vento set aside funds for homelessness 
programming but ultimately  required cities to come together under the designated CoC 
structure, to apply for federal funding to be used in homelessness programming (Jarpe, Mosely, 
and Smith 2018). This process is completely voluntaryxi, and relies entirely on the CoCs to 
outline their individual needs and priorities, apply for funding, and organize and implement 
homelessness programming, typically without local governmental support (Jarpe, Mosley, and 
Smith 2018).  
California’s entrance into the U.S. debate over the responsibility for persons affected by 
deinstitutionalization, or persons with severe mental illness (independent of homelessness), 
spoke directly to the cleavage between decentralized delivery of behavioral health policy and 
programming or ‘community care’, compared to recentralization or greater governmental 
participation, even if it wasn’t the federal government itself taking responsibility (Snowden, 
Scheffler, and Zhang 2002). Until 1990, California followed federal policy, decentralizing 
responsibility of behavioral health services, policy and programming to nongovernmental actors, 
or ‘regional community networks of care’(Vanneman and Snowden 2015). California had 
followed federal policy based on the notion that community care was the most appropriate 
approach to mental illness, and in the face of persistent concerns over the history of federal 
psychiatric care (Vanneman and Snowden 2015). This decentralized model established 
entrenched groups of non-governmental actors with substantial expertise and capacity to deliver 
 
xi Voluntary in that communities do not have to establish a CoC yet must establish a CoC in order to receive federal 
funding to address homelessness (Housing and Urban Development 2017).  
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behavioral health services and programming (County Behavioral Health Director’s Association 
n.d.; Snowden, Scheffler, and Zhang 2002).  
Yet in 1990, the state of California made the choice to move away from this decentralized 
governance model. Instead of retaining the ‘regional community networks of care’, California 
reallocated authority from the networks of non-governmental actors to counties (County 
Behavioral Health Director’s Association n.d.). This policy change was known as Realignment. 
This shift occurred at the same time that the federal policy was enshrining the model of 
homelessness governance rooted in decentralization and community-based, voluntary 
programming. California chose to shift responsibility for behavioral health services back to the 
county governments in order to improve tax and funding streams and better coordinate and 
standardize care (University of California Los Angeles n.d.).  
For San Francisco and municipalities across California, Realignment meant more 
responsibility for social and medical services serving persons with severe mental illness would 
shift back to municipalities, as opposed to non-governmental actors . As mentioned, in the 
federal debate and as we known today for persons experiencing chronic homelessness, there is 
high overlap in populations targeted for behavioral health services for persons with severe 
mental illness and homelessness programming for persons experiencing chronic homelessness. 
At the time in San Francisco, much of this population included individuals experiencing housing 
insecurity or homelessness after being diagnosed with HIV/AIDS (P S Arno 1986, 1326; City of 
San Francisco Department of Public Health 2000; Mor et al. 1993).  
The governance shift induced by Realignment occurred right after San Francisco had 
already invested heavily in behavioral health infrastructure and policy capacity in response to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis (Blair 2016; Mor et al. 1993). In effect, Realignment was not as challenging for 
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San Francisco as it was for other municipalities across California who faced policy capacity and 
resource constraints, along with pushback from community-based organizations (CBOs) who 
had historically been delivering these services (Mor et al. 1993). San Francisco did receive 
pushback from the CBO community, but experienced a more natural transition as a result of the 
strong political mobilization and investment in behavioral health at the municipal level during 
the AIDS crisis (Blair 2016). “…now the County is the main hub [for behavioral health 
services]; focusing on local system of care rather than decentralized; we have to maintain those 
relationships, we can’t get rid of [the] CBO’s; it’s a partnership...We always have to fashion 
these policies and procedures in conversation with providers.”xii  
As discussed in the previous section, investment in health and social services during the 
AIDS outbreak included strong investment in housing, homeless shelters and behavioral health 
services. Many persons with HIV/AIDS needed housing and supportive services as a result of 
displacement and trauma (Mor et al. 1993). Simultaneously, rates of homelessness were 
increasing in San Francisco as a result of the economic crisis (Fagan 2016). Realignment’s shift 
to delegating full responsibility for behavioral health service governance to San Francisco city 
and county at the peak of the homeless crisis and in the midst of the HIV/AIDS crisis, along with 
the high overlap of needs across the populations (Mor et al. 1993, 197), raised questions about a 
similar, centralized municipal role to directly address homelessness (San Francisco Department 
of Public Health 2006; Vanneman and Snowden 2015). 
 2c. Realignment and Political Mobilization – San Francisco’s Supportive Housing Policy 
 After Realignment and following the AIDS outbreak, San Francisco continued to increase 
municipal level investments in homelessness and supportive housing, aimed at Housing First 
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(San Francisco Department of Public Health 2006). Interviewees emphasized Gavin Newsom’s 
role during this time period, as a Mayor who supported municipal investment in homelessness 
initiatives and Housing First. “Gavin Newsom was very impactful, he actually began walking the 
tenderloin with Department officials…So, he was the one who started Project Homeless Connect 
– that was when the Public Health Director instructed me to transform… [behavioral health 
dual-diagnosis procedures] she said convert that into a homeless outreach team based on 
Mayor’s dictates … then more aggressive housing development started.”xiii Beyond Newsom, 
other actors including T.J Anthony and Mayor Frank Jordan, among others, who introduced 
legislation related to homelessness, furthering political mobilization around the issue.  
 By 1996, San Francisco had reconfigured its Continuum of Care, to establish a 
municipally governed coordinating board for the CoC (Department of Homelessness and 
Supportive Housing and City and County of San Francisco 2019). Interviewees stated that 
Realignment was an important part of developing San Francisco’s municipal approach to chronic 
homelessness. Starting with behavioral health, the city gradually increased investment and 
recentralized responsibility to more effectively coordinate and fund the delivery of behavioral 
health services and supportive housing, along with other social services, to address chronic 
homelessness in the Bay area (San Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016). 
“…[In the ‘90s the Department of Public Health] DPH said well we have lots of people who are 
severely disabled, many [mental health] challenges and need lots of help…housing is healthcare, 
DPH needs to be in the housing business, this was embraced very much the era of Housing First, 
embraced by DPH … we will go into housing development, the supportive housing business”.xiv 
Today, San Francisco has a new municipal Department of Housing and Supportive Services 
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xiv Interviewee 1.11 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/Healthcare Practitioner 
 
 95 
explicitly tasked with ending homelessness in the city. The Department is organized around and 
delivers services through a permanent supportive housing and housing first approach (San 
Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016).  
 3. San Francisco’s Changing Political Economy 
Now that we know why San Francisco has a supportive housing policy, we must 
investigate why San Francisco has a serious homelessness crisis, despite successful 
establishment of this municipal level supportive housing policy? Interview and archival results 
demonstrate that San Francisco currently suffers from an implementation crisis stemming from 
competing policy approaches that often directly contradict local regulatory policies. This 
implementation crisis and competing policy approaches stem in part from increasing 
participatory inequity at the local level as a result of changing local demographics, fueling power 
of elite preferences over other, marginalized groups and policy target populations.  
One of the key takeaways from the research is who participates in San Francisco 
homeless politics matters for policy outcomes. And the who, has changed significantly over the 
past two decades. Most of the research participants reflected on this change, and what this 
change in participation has meant for supportive housing policy and addressing chronic 
homelessness in San Francisco. The next section will discuss the influence of changing 
demographics in San Francisco for homeless and supportive housing policymaking, and 
participatory equity in San Francisco’s political economy. Overall, the increasing homogeneity 
of San Francisco’s population towards wealthy, white elites constrained political participation 
among racial/ethnic minority groups, low income individuals, and individuals who are currently 
homeless, formerly homeless and or at-risk of homelessness. In effect, persons who are most 
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affected by San Francisco’s homeless policies are not involved in policy decision-making 
processes. 
To start, this section considers the ways that San Francisco’s population demographics 
have changed in recent decades to create this new political economy within the city. The 
majority of interviewees discussed the shifting population demographics as a cause for concern 
that they felt introduced majority biases in local decision-making while ultimately catalyzing the 
housing and homelessness crisis, itself. Archival analyses and extant literature support these 
results. 
 3a. Exodus of Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups 
 One of the most common themes across all interviews was the influence of changing 
demographics within San Francisco on policy preferences about homelessness, and ultimately 
policy outcomes. The majority of interviewees, many of whom have worked in San Francisco 
homeless policy or practice for many years, described the simultaneous influx of wealthy, 
primarily white elites, with the exodus of many racial or ethnic minority groups from the city, as 
a key factor shaping rates of homelessness and homelessness debates. “[The] new population of 
people that have moved into San Francisco…a very large portion of people, have... first of all the 
black community left about 10 years ago, when rent went up, now rent has almost tripled almost 
ten-times the amount it was, now it’s a bunch of people from other states that have never 
experienced this type of mental illness or drug addiction or homelessness are up in arms that 
their 5 million dollar house has a homeless person in the eaves-way so you know our new San 
Franciscans are a big problem for our work.”xv  
 
xv Interviewee 1.7 CBO Actor/Homeless Services 
 
 97 
 Until the 2000s, San Francisco was home to the Harlem of the West, known for strong 
icons and landmarks of black culture (Fuller 2016). Yet, this has changed dramatically over time. 
Whereas in 1976 one in seven San Francisco residents was black, today it is one in twenty 
(Fuller 2016; San Francisco Department of Planning 2018). Further, the majority of current black 
San Francisco residents are middle or low-income, many living in public housing (City and 
County of San Francisco n.d., n.d., n.d.; Fuller 2016). Directly associated with the shifting 
economy towards tech, increasing housing and real estate prices drove out black communities 
and businesses, while also losing demand for their businesses in the changing San Francisco 
culture (Hwang 2015). Today, black residents still living in San Francisco struggle to protect 
their livelihoods and communities from tech developers and elite investors following the ongoing 
socioeconomic shift (Kwak 2018). The continually increasing cost of living threatens black 
residents’ quality of life. Many residents face food and housing insecurity and question their 
ability to remain in the city (Whittle et al. 2015). 21% of black residents in San Francisco in 
2018 had been threatened with eviction within the past five years (San Francisco Department of 
Planning 2018, 54). 
 Latino families are facing a similar trend as black Americans in San Francisco. From the 
late nineties through the present San Francisco’s Mission District, a historically Hispanic 
neighborhood, has been heavily gentrified (Mirabal 2009). As a result of increased housing 
prices, tech boom development and limited protections for low or middle-income families in 
local housing policies, many Latinos were forced out of the Mission District and San Francisco 
overall (Mirabal 2009). From 2000 to 2005, ten percent of San Francisco’s Latino population 
moved out of the city in response to rising housing prices (Mirabal 2009). In 2018, 24% of 
Latinos living in San Francisco had been threatened with eviction during the past five years (San 
 
 98 
Francisco Department of Planning 2018, 54).Today, many Latinos are remaining in the Bay area 
but moving into surrounding counties or lower-income neighborhoods (Bowe 2015).  
 3b. The Tech Boom – Influx of Wealthy, Highly Educated Elites 
 The increasing housing instability black and Latino residents face is being driven by the 
influx of wealthy elites moving to San Francisco, many to work in the tech industry. San 
Francisco is now home to more billionaires per capita than any region on earth (Heller 2019a). 
Since 2000, the population of San Francisco residents with income over 200% of the Area 
Median Income (AMI) has increased by nearly 250% (San Francisco Department of Planning 
2018, 30). Subsequently, the percentage of residents with over 200% of the AMI now accounts 
for nearly 30% of San Francisco’s population, compared to only nine percent in 1990 (San 
Francisco Department of Planning 2018, 30).This influx of elites in response to the tech demand, 
has led to an increase in the overall socioeconomic status of San Francisco, as well as an increase 
in the economic homogeneity of the city (Heller 2019b). However, this economic homogeneity 
has perpetuated socioeconomic disparities between elites and other, low income groups (San 
Francisco Department of Planning 2018, 54). Higher incomes over the AMI are 
disproportionately white, whereas low-income groups are majority people of color (San 
Francisco Department of Planning 2018, 50). The accumulating wealth of one primary 
population demographic influences local political dynamics including competition over 
resources, political participation and lobbying influence. These relationships will be evaluated in 
greater depth in the following section. 
 The majority of interviewees discussed the migration of wealthy individuals to San 
Francisco as a key factor in both political processes shaping supportive housing and homeless 
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policy outcomes. Additionally, interviewees discussed other, acute and long-term effects of 
wealth influx on the housing market and ultimately rates of homelessness.  
 Multiple interviewees discussed the relationship between Single Resident Occupancy 
(SRO) housing units and tech entrepreneurs. Since the 1950’s in San Francisco, SROs have been 
primarily allocated as low-income rental units (McGarry 2008). These units have provided 
housing for many low-income single adults and elderly occupants (San Francisco Department of 
Public Health 2006). Recently, in the wake of the tech boom, many single adults working in tech 
have opted to rent SROs as a quick fix for cheaper housing, offering more money to landlords 
and pricing out current renters. As a result, many previous renters end up on the streets. “…other 
big trend is the loss of affordable housing … 5-6 years ago, [was] when we first started hearing 
about Twitter employees renting out rooms in these SROs, basically saying folks were coming 
and saying all I need is a bed, $1000 room.”xvi  
Downstream, the concentrated influx of wealthy elites has led to a steep increase in 
housing prices (as discussed above). Over the past decade housing prices in San Francisco have 
grown over 400% (Rahaim et al. 2018, 26). Ultimately, this demographic shift has driven the 
exodus of less wealthy racial or ethnic minority groups out of San Francisco and promoted 
housing insecurity and homelessness within the city (Policy Link, Program for Environmental 
and Regional Equity, and University of Southern California 2015; San Francisco Department of 
Planning 2018).  
 3c. Summary 
 San Francisco is now dominated by wealthy elites. The influx of elites has had the effect 
of increasing housing prices, and pricing out low-income groups, and many racial and ethnic 
 




minority groups, and most recently the elderly, as a result of rising housing prices. Homeless 
rates across adults and the elderly, have all increased over the last half-decade, in response to 
rising housing prices and a stagnation of growth in low-income and supportive housing units 
(Applied Survey Research 2017; City and County of San Francisco n.d.; San Francisco 
Department of Planning 2018).  
The growing homogeneity of San Francisco’s political economy may not seem to be a 
problem at face value. Democracies are based in majority opinion. However, democracies, as the 
next section discusses, are rooted in protecting political participation for minority group 
members so that all groups are able to participate in political processes and do not face tyranny 
of the majority where majority opinion obscures minority preferences and voices (G. W. Brown, 
McLean, and McMillan 2018). The next section will evaluate how the increasing homogeneity of 
San Francisco’s political economy is stagnating minority group political participation, and in 
particular, participation by target populations in supportive housing policy, homeless policies 
overall, and homelessness prevention efforts. Obscuring minority group and target population 
participation from supportive housing policy debates creates inherent challenges for supportive 
housing efforts by increasing the probability of creating policies that may not work to their 
intended goals due to information asymmetries about policy workability on the ground, 
stemming from participatory inequity (Lillvis and Greer 2016; Willison 2017a). 
4. Participatory Inequity and the Competing Preferences Between Economic Elites and 
Bureaucrats 
 This section focuses on the dynamics of political participation in San Francisco’s political 
economy of homeless politics - or debates over policies affecting people experiencing chronic 
homelessness. This section in particular emphasizes the mechanisms of elite participation and 
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what this means for overall participation by actors in decision-making to address chronic 
homelessness. The political economy evaluates the degrees to which certain actors are 
constrained, while others may have greater ability to participate in political decision-making, 
emphasizing the role of financial capital as a means to sway power dynamics and engender 
political privilege (Elkin 2008). The research identified two main types of political participation 
in homeless policy debates: informal and formal processes. This section evaluates how economic 
elites participate in local politics surrounding homelessness, and what that means for 
participation overall, in terms of constraints on certain groups or more power for others across 
these two types of political participation processes.  
 The influence of the dynamics and composition of the political economy matters for 
participatory equity in democracies, or the variable plurality of political participation. Do all 
actors have comparable ability to participate in debates? If such debates or spheres of 
participation are dominated by one group or another, this affects overall policy outcomes and 
may bias policy outcomes in favor of one group over another. When thinking about health equity 
or civic engagement, this relationship is particularly important for marginalized communities 
who inherently have less political capital and have been historically, purposefully excluded from 
policy debates (Bridges 1999; R. Mickey 2015; Trounstine 2008). Thus, minority group absence 
from political debates or constraints against minority group participation shifts dynamics in 
decision-making towards other actors or elites in particular. Finally, there is a history of 
exclusion of target populations from public health policy debates, or the absence of input from 
groups who are specifically affected by public health policies (Einstein, Palmer, and Glick 2018; 
Lillvis and Greer 2016).  
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 This research finds that economic elites dominate debates over approaches or solutions to 
chronic homelessness in San Francisco across informal and formal types of political 
participation. This result may not be particularly surprising given San Francisco’s demography. 
It is surprising, given the HUD mandate to increase community participation (U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 2014), and the implications of a lack of participatory equity 
for health policy outcomes. The absence of minority group preferences in San Francisco 
homeless policy debates directly interferes with regulatory supportive housing policy by 
prioritizing elite preferences and obscuring the needs of low-income groups and persons 
experiencing or at risk of homelessness who are most affected by the policies in question. 
4a. Informal Political Engagement  
 This first section describes ‘informal’ means of political participation by different groups 
in the political economy, and the overall degrees of participatory equity in the political economy 
as expressed by actors in the field. Informal means of participation is defined here as impromptu 
engagement with policy makers or service providers about homelessness policy and 
programming, outside of scheduled policy debates or votes. This definition does include formal 
channels of engagement – such as calling or writing to a municipal Supervisor about concerns or 
policy opinions or calling or submitting requests through 311. 311 is San Francisco’s local 
hotline, and now local website and phone application that allows residents to get information and 
submit complaints, concerns, or service requests to the City.  
 The other main mechanism of informal participation as discussed by policy actors is 
police engagement. Residents frequently call the San Francisco Police Department to report 
concerns about homelessness or make policy or service requests. Police officers interact with 
persons experiencing homelessness regularly, and they themselves are now policy implementers, 
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across different types of homelessness policies. Police interactions affect service delivery and 
service delivery strategies. Therefore, police officers often become the first point of engagement 
or first mode of participation over homeless programming preferences by San Francisco 
residents.   
 Interviewees expressed frequent public, informal engagement through these different 
types of channels to express concerns about homelessness in the City. All interviewees who 
discussed informal channels of policy participation only discussed participation by wealthy 
residents. The residents described were typically residents living in desirable neighborhoods, 
who participate through informal channels in order to issue complaints or concerns about 
homelessness. The primary goal of these complaints, as described by interviewees, is to request 
the removal of individuals experiencing homelessness from an area, generally related to the 
visibility of homelessness and the desire for it to not be visible in a resident’s area. Although the 
goal of participation is the same across these channels, both types of participation end in 
different results for local supportive housing policy, planning, and implementation. Informal, 
elite engagement through the police leads to direct, often acute police responses to homelessness 
that interrupt access to services for persons experiencing homelessness. Informal, elite 
engagement with elected officials interferes with regulators’ duties to implement supportive 
housing policies, as elected officials directly pressure bureaucrats in response to elite requests to 
address homeless behaviors as opposed to long-term solutions to chronic homelessness. Often 
times, this interference in bureaucratic duties takes the form of direct orders to pursue other 
activities not aligned with existing regulation. 
 4a1. Informal Elite Engagement and Policing 
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 All interviewees described frequent interactions between police and individuals 
experiencing homelessness, primarily individuals experiencing chronic homelessness. Compared 
to Atlanta and Shreveport, police engagement with individuals experiencing homelessness in San 
Francisco works very differently. In this regard, police in San Francisco are specifically trained 
to engage with individuals experiencing homelessness through a harm reduction approach. This 
means that police first respond by redirecting individuals to social services before responding 
with a criminal approach (Commander David Lazar 2017, 14). San Francisco also has a 
designated policing unit, the HOT team, or Homeless Outreach Team, that exists to address calls 
related to homelessness (Commander David Lazar 2017). This training and expert response 
infrastructure is a result of San Francisco’s integrated municipal approach to chronic 
homelessness. The CoC has been managed through the municipal government since 1996 and 
has subsequently been able to coordinate and develop policies across municipal spaces through 
that authority (Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing and City and County of 
San Francisco 2019).  
 Despite this strong institutional policy capacity to develop appropriate responses to 
chronic homelessness through policing, tension still exists between elite preferences, the reality 
of chronic homelessness and municipal, regulatory policy goals. This tension arises as a result of 
rising rates of chronic homelessness, increased visibility of homelessness as a result, and strong 
elite preferences that are further magnified through San Francisco’s increasingly, 
socioeconomically homogenous population. “I think from the point of view of an average SF 
person, which is an extremely affluent city, the problem of homelessness is they don’t like seeing 
people who look homeless, people who are racial minorities, people who are behaving in ways 
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that are unconventional, nonconformist, or just people who are hanging around outdoors.”xvii 
This tension comes to light when wealthy residents issue informal complaints, requests, 
concerns, or otherwise about individuals experiencing chronic homelessness through the San 
Francisco Police Department (SFPD).  
 The majority of interviewees, and all interviewees who responded to prompts about 
policing and homelessness, stated that citizens request most police responses to homelessness in 
San Francisco. Interviewees also stated that complaints primarily arise from residents living in 
desirable or wealthy neighborhoods. “People are very into their neighborhoods, quaint place 
with Victorian houses, density of houses is very difficult to build on 49 square miles, still single-
family homes, no density … [opposition] Is liberal, wealthy, etc, don’t want poor people living in 
their neighborhoods.”xviii “…here they are trying to fix a … great deal of frustration by SF 
residents, by what they term as ‘street behaviors’, and something else, forgetting the term,… so 
you have many highly visible people, some having bad street behaviors that are distressing to 
citizens of SF, who then call police or call 311.”xix  
Municipal policing records were not available to measure the presence of citizen 
requests. However, publicly available 311 data was used to measure the frequency of requests 
(some 311 data includes police responses) (City and County of San Francisco 2019). The 311 
data concords with the interviewee results, demonstrating the very high frequency of 311 
requests made about homelessness, especially behaviors associated with chronic homelessness. 
Homeless encampment cleanup was the third most common type of request made through 311 
 
xvii xvii Interviewee 1.11 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/Healthcare Practitioner 
xviii Interviewee 1.8 Academic Expert/Healthcare Practitioner  
xix Interviewee 1.11 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/Healthcare Practitioner 
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from 2008-2019, with 172,483 callsxx or nearly fifty calls per day regarding encampments alone 
(not including other calls related to other behaviors associated with chronic homelessness) (City 
and County of San Francisco 2019). Overall, informal channels of homeless policy engagement 
through policing are primarily occupied by wealthy residents.  
Some interviewees emphasized that not all requests for police responses to homelessness 
are negative. Interviewees stated that many are made out of genuine concern for individuals in 
this circumstance. The main theme interviewees reiterated was that regardless of the reason for 
requests for police responses, these responses often end in outcomes that directly contradict 
municipal, regulatory policy initiatives seeking to end chronic homelessness.  
Resident, in particular economic elite engagement through policing has a very direct and 
acute influence on local supportive housing policy and homeless policy outcomes overall. 
Interview results and 311 data demonstrate that when residents reach out to police regarding 
behaviors associated with homelessness, the responses often end in outcomes that conflict with 
supportive housing and housing first policy goals. Despite HOT team protocol and training, 
individuals experiencing chronic homelessness are often arrested, removed from an area, and or 
homeless encampments and possessions are removed and destroyed. In 2016, 70% of a survey of 
nearly 400 persons experiencing homelessness in San Francisco were forced from an area 
(University of California Berkeley School of Law Human Rights Center 2017). 69% received 
citations, and 22% received more than 5 citations (University of California Berkeley School of 
Law Human Rights Center 2017). While these actions certainly align with preferences about the 
desirability of homelessness, and possibly even public health concerns over sanitation and waste, 
redirecting individuals experiencing chronic homelessness into jail or away from certain areas 
 




creates barriers to supportive housing policy implementation by interfering with service 
engagement opportunities.  
Just as in Atlanta and Shreveport, when individuals experiencing chronic homelessness 
are incarcerated, they are directed away from supportive housing prioritization efforts. Upon 
reentry from jail, individuals are often not directed to social services (Hawthorne et al. 2012; 
Segal, Frasso, and Sisti 2018). As a result of this service gap many individuals remain homeless 
upon reentry and face challenges being redirected to points of service to mitigate homelessness 
and address behavioral and physical health issues (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and Office of Disability 2018). 
Relocating individuals experiencing chronic homelessness to different neighborhoods and or 
destroying encampments has a similar outcome. Individuals are often moved to districts with 
fewer resources and or that may be further away from areas with social service points. In 
response, providers may have a harder time locating individuals and continuing outreach efforts 
“…right now there is a big effort to clean up the streets, get people living in tents off the streets, 
[they use the] sweeping the streets approach, they come and throw [homeless people’s] stuff 
away to get them to move on, in theory they are supposed to have people linking them to 
services, but there aren’t enough beds and no housing, so a lot of those people [homeless] are 
ending up in jail because of warrants or whatever.”xxi Overall, police responses to homeless 
behavior as a result of elite and citizen requests do not solve chronic homelessness and have the 
effect of continuously creating barriers to supportive housing policy implementation by 
restricting service access and engagement efforts. 
 4a2. Informal Elite Engagement and Elected Officials 
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Beyond policing as an informal space for policy engagement, elected officials also 
receive informal feedback from San Francisco residents about homeless policy efforts. The 
majority of interviewees described frequent communication between residents and elected city 
Supervisorsxxii, about homelessness and chronic homelessness in San Francisco. Interviewees, 
similar to policing engagement discussions, described that primarily wealthy residents comprise 
the majority of informal lobbying efforts – emails, phone calls, – to municipal Supervisors about 
homelessness.xxiii This included all interviewees working in the municipal bureaucracy, and 
interviewees engaged as stakeholders in policy spaces and debates.  
The informal policy engagement, interviewees described works in similar ways as the 
engagement through policing but to a different end. Ultimately, informal, elite engagement with 
elected officials puts pressure on municipal bureaucrats, both indirectly and directly, to change 
supportive housing policy goals and implementation.  
  This section demonstrates the tension and divergence between municipal regulatory 
decision-making and elite preferences in San Francisco homeless policy, or policy conflict due to 
the separation of these two interests in their divergent policy processes: the integrated municipal 
and CoC policy efforts, and local economic elites. Overall, this research finds that regulatory 
decision-making is influenced by informal pressure from elected officials, and elected officials’ 
behavior is shaped by economic elites. Suffice to say, San Francisco’s responses to chronic 
homelessness from a regulatory perspective are swayed by typically short-term preferences of 
wealthy residents.  
 A main theme that arose from interviews with municipal bureaucrats is the degree to 
which pressures from political actors stemming from economic elites, impedes bureaucrats’ 
 
xxii San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors is San Francisco’s city council 
xxiii There is no available archival documentation of these engagement efforts. 
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ability to do their tasked work to their intended policy goals. Here, I define pressure on the 
bureaucracy as both direct pressure from elected officials on bureaucrats, as well as public 
pressure on elected officials that translates into action directed to, or pressure on bureaucrats. 
The challenge arises here, as much of political science finds, in that regulators are supposed to 
carry out purposes of legislation, or promulgate rules based on existing legislation, based on their 
expertise. If legislators are directly influencing bureaucrat’s ability to carry out rules, policies 
may not work well to their intended goals, or may not function well due to a lack of expertise to 
which the bureaucracy is central (S. L. Greer, Wismar, and Figueras 2016; Huber and Shipan 
2002).  
For public health, this tension or influence matters if elected officials’ preferences 
conflict with evidence-based practices, or cause harm by limiting regulators’ ability to 
implement such practices or policies. In interviews municipal bureaucrats identified three main 
ways that elected officials responding to elite requests impeded pre-existing supportive housing 
policy goals: 1) Pressure to act faster, or at a pace that does not align with effective supportive 
housing policy implementation; 2) Pressure to address homeless behaviors as opposed to 
identifying effective solutions to chronic homelessness; 3) Pressure against building new housing 
infrastructure for permanent supportive housing, or low-income housing, generally.  
  The first theme discussed by interviewees working in the municipal bureaucracy was the 
conflict between the pace or timing of supportive housing policy. Different notions about the 
desired pace of homeless solutions was a source of pressure for bureaucrats that manifested as a 
direct challenge to implementing intended policy goals.  
Overall, regulators stated that effective implementation of supportive housing policy 
required a careful, long-term approach in order to house individuals long-term, and end 
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homelessness (San Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016). Elites desire a 
short-term approach that typically does not align with evidence-based methods and prefer an end 
to homelessness as soon as possible. Interviewees emphasized that this latter preference is 
incompatible with the mechanisms required to implement permanent, supportive housing. “The 
speed which certain things are done in the community and what is prioritized on a week by week 
basis may also be motivated by how the others in the neighborhood are experiencing people who 
are homeless in the neighborhood and encampments and encampment resolution team.”xxiv All in 
all, elite informal engagement with local elected officials initiates informal policy processes that 
directly interfere with the regulatory goals of ongoing municipal supportive housing policy. In 
some instances, bureaucrats actually described their policy implementation processes and goals 
being changed immediately upon request or order from elected officials. “There is a lot of … 
political power to clean things up quickly…It looks like a mandate to take anyone from the San 
Francisco Police Department, who is using any substance on the street to take people off 
the street and bring them in, and it’s over capacity to [our public clinic], there is no protocol to 
handle a totally different clinical protocol [e.g. different diagnoses]…[there is] opposition from 
our [clinicians] that there was a mandate that started yesterday, and we don’t have the resources 
to do this, but opposition is not that they [clinicians] don’t want to, but that we don’t have the 
resources to do it. There is no name of the [new] mandate, you’re probably gauging how I 
feel...”xxv 
 A secondary theme discussed by interviewees in the municipal bureaucracy was pressure 
on bureaucrats from elected officials, stemming from elite requests to address homeless 
behaviors as opposed to identifying and implementing solutions to chronic homelessness which 
 
xxiv Interviewee 1.3 CBO Actor/Homeless Services 
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is the intended goal of supportive housing policy. The context of this informal engagement is 
similar to the elite informal engagement with SFPD through requests to respond to behaviors 
associated with chronic homelessness. Here, interviewees stated that requests to address 
homeless behaviors were often made in response to public complaints about the visibility of 
persons experiencing chronic homelessness in their neighborhoods (of work or residence). “…we 
had the homeless response coordinated more around city districts, so each district would have a 
response team that knew homelessness in terms of relationships…so they knew the people to 
engage them in care. This was hard because even if that’s your core job, you would still end of 
getting phone calls from constituents about specific homeless people, the Supervisor or Mayor 
would call and demand action, made it hard to be responsive in a meaningful way.”xxvi Visibility 
of chronic homelessness may include simple prominence – persons experiencing chronic 
homelessness sitting, sleeping, etc. on sidewalks or walkways in neighborhoods or outside of 
offices. Visibility also includes the conspicuousness of injection drug use, public intoxication, 
and or behaviors associated with mental illness or psychosis all in public areas.xxvii  
 The main outcome interviewees described from this pressure on elected officials and then 
to bureaucrats is to institute a competing policy goal for regulators: addressing behaviors 
associated with chronic homelessness as opposed to addressing the causes of chronic 
homelessness. The effect at the municipal level creates further fracturing within the municipal 
government that generates challenges for implementing effective, coordinated supportive 
housing policy. “…And mainly it’s [cleaning up the streets approach] reactive to complaints by 
citizens – but in the process, it’s not just a clear out of here approach, coupled with offering 
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services; complicated because you move them [homeless] from one are, and they move to 
another. Mayors are definitely under pressure; city is under pressure for people who can’t 
conceivably understand why the city is allowing these things [homeless behaviors] to happen.”xxviii 
Interviewees gave multiple examples where elite pressure has led to regulatory changes or even 
additional homelessness programming that competes with or detracts from housing first efforts.  
The primary example cited by the interviewees involved is the recent development of 
‘Navigation Centers’. Navigation Centers are ‘low-threshold, high-service residential programs 
for adults experiencing homelessness in San Francisco’ (Department of Homelessness and 
Supportive Housing 2019). Navigation Centers were introduced in 2015 in response to growing 
rates of chronic homelessness and are meant to increase shelter space while individuals, 
transition to permanent housing options (Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing 
2019). Many interviewees were frustrated by the Navigation Center initiatives because they do 
not address the causes of chronic homelessness. “The city then turned towards emergency 
responses as opposed to prevention, the number of emergency shelter beds is very low in San 
Francisco, that’s where they are focusing right now, this is inadequate because it reduces 
tension in the city to solve the problem. And all of these Navigation Centers are just shelters. 
Nothing special.”xxix Navigation shelters are time-limited shelter space to give individuals a place 
to stay and get them off the streets until they can access permanent housing (Department of 
Homelessness and Supportive Housing 2019). Interviewees emphasized that while the 
Navigation Centers are not harmful, they take away resources that could be used for supportive 
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housing and permanent supportive housing construction, and ultimately focus more on reducing 
the visibility of homelessness in the short term without offering long-term solutions.  
The new Incidence Command Structure (ICS), the system typically relegated to disaster 
responses in San Francisco has now been relegated to manage homelessness (Fracassa 2018). 
This change was another common example cited by interviewees, where elected officials 
introduced a change to regulatory approaches by treating chronic homelessness as an acute 
emergency response rather than a crisis necessitating long-term solutions. “…you would activate 
[ICS] in case of a disaster or catastrophe, earthquake, epidemic of something, … a sudden acute 
problem …activating this [ICS] for the problem of most chronic homeless in San Francisco, is at 
best somewhat perplexing, and reflects them reading into it, well what are, when you’re going to 
fix homeless problem, what are you saying you’re going to fix, here they are trying to fix a great 
deal of frustration by the police, and great deal of frustration by SF residents.”xxx Interviewees 
felt that pressure from residents to reduce the visibility of chronic homelessness was leading to a 
fracturing in the bureaucratic responses to homelessness in San Francisco by prioritizing shorter-
term solutions that do not effectively end chronic homelessness (Eskenazi 2019). Recent Data 
from the Navigation Center outcomes to date show that the majority of clients in the Navigation 
Centers are discharged without permanent housing options (Department of Homelessness and 
Supportive Housing n.d.).  
 The final theme that municipal bureaucrats discussed as pressure from elected officials 
comes in the form of a direct implementation challenge. Municipal bureaucrats are tasked with 
ending chronic homelessness – which requires housing individuals who are experiencing chronic 
homelessness and therefore requires housing infrastructure. However, municipal bureaucrats face 
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constant backlash against new housing infrastructure. This includes pressure from the 
public/elected officials, cuts to plans or funding for new housing stock, or pushback against plans 
for additional housing stock. Even the Navigation Centers, although they are not housing, 
received significant public pushback despite their inception stemming from elite requests against 
homeless visibility (Fracassa 2019a).  
The heavy pressure against building any type of new, low-income housing is a constant 
source of pressure for bureaucrats because it inhibits them from solving the ultimate cause of 
homelessness – housing insecurity/access to affordable housing – as well as ending chronic 
homelessness, which requires access to permanent supportive housing units. Municipal 
bureaucrats described pressure against low-income housing as a constant challenge that has 
increased in recent years and inhibits implementing supportive housing policy goals. Ultimately, 
bureaucrats frequently stated that they are limited in their ability to act, since shortage of low-
income housing affects the ability to move forward with housing people overall and ending 
chronic homelessness. “San Francisco’s goal is Housing First, but I think it’s hard to achieve in 
a city where housing stock is so low…people are making a lot of efforts to get people treated… 
you know we can refer people to residential treatment, but we don’t have any ability to get 
people into housing, and I think that’s a very permanent experience that is very challenging for 
our patients.”xxxi 
4b. Formal Engagement  
 This second form of political participation in homelessness politics in San Francisco is 
formal political participation. This includes participation that is scheduled specifically to initiate 
participation by different groups of actors. As opposed to the first type of participation, which 
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requires initiative by public actors, this type of participation happens when policy makers 
schedule opportunities for the public to participate in policy debates in a formal setting or 
respond to proposed policies. This type of participation includes community meetings about 
homeless policy or development and solicited community input from the Continuum of Care in 
their Annual Action Plan, planning. Federal HUD funding for the CoC since 2016 has required 
‘community input’ from the CoC during their planning processes in order to improve equity in 
the planning processes (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2014). 
 The interviews and archival analyses demonstrate that as with the informal forms of 
political participation, formal participation is overwhelmingly concentrated by elites. This is in 
part due to the increasing homogeneity of San Francisco’s demographics (influx of wealthy elites 
leading to rising housing prices and an exodus of lower income and minority communities) as 
previously discussed. This is also in part due to accessibility issues inherently facing low-income 
communities and at-risk populations. Individuals with lower income may have less time off from 
work to attend formal community meetings, face transportation challenges, etc. (Lucas 2012). 
Individuals experiencing homelessness or formerly homeless are often not represented at 
meetings for many reasons, including the reality that individuals at-risk of or experiencing 
homelessness face greater, acute needs compared to formal political engagement. “…a challenge 
in policy promulgation is who’s in the room from the community to give input – African 
American led CBOs have trouble – another challenge is folks with lived experience being in the 
room sometimes difficult with how they are facilitated to give your input, lots of barriers to 
participating.”xxxii  
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 The majority of interviewees described high participation in formal community meetings 
from wealthy residents on homeless policy and programming. Further, interviewees stated that 
the majority of the discussions or preferences cited at these meetings were related to complaints 
about the visibility of homelessness, behaviors associated with homelessness and severe mental 
illness, and ultimately ‘not in my backyard’ preferences where wealthy residents emphasized that 
regardless of the solutions on the table, the solution should not happen near their place of work 
or residence. “There is a lot of [economic] change in the city – different stakeholder groups and 
different residents that have very different opinions – public safety meetings – people who come 
and have a bone to pick – crazy ideas about how homeless people are bringing crime – the 
public seems to be very split – often split along class lines….[people say] ‘We just need law and 
order, put them in jail, criminalize them for continuing to show up in front of my house.’”xxxiii The 
majority of interviewees described that individuals at risk of homelessness, formerly homeless or 
currently homeless almost never attend community meetings and or have opportunities to speak 
if they do attend. “… community input has been quite weak, [the] voice of people experiencing 
homelessness has been exceptionally weak in that [CoC implementation] process, it definitely 
feels like a sort of …yea… we have to do this that gets us [federal] funding, but it’s not where the 
policy making action is, it’s not where the activity is.”xxxiv  
The majority of interviewees described that this pressure from wealthy residents in 
formal community debates is one of the greatest barriers to supportive housing policy 
implementation. The most common barrier cited aligns with the discussion in the previous 
section regarding implementation. Many of the community meetings pertain to new 
constructions for low-income housing, permanent supportive housing, or shelter space (San 
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Francisco Board of Supervisors 2019). Interviewees emphasized strong opposition to new 
housing construction. Interviewees elucidated that this direct barrier to housing construction 
directly inhibits the goals of supportive housing policy implementation. Even though San 
Francisco approaches chronic homelessness through a housing first approach, it becomes 
ineffective unless there are housing units available to provide to clients. “NIMBYISM is 
incredible, no one can build but no one wants it… that population with severe meth psychosis 
are really struggling; then people are aging, more disabilities, and then they become homeless 
and they have a disability and there is no place to go…”xxxv 
The existing state of formal political engagement and the existing barriers for minority 
and target population participation in formal debates promotes participatory inequity in San 
Francisco’s political economy. It might seem reasonable to say that participatory inequity 
doesn’t matter if the existing political participation is representative of the current municipal 
demographics. However, San Francisco’s changing political economy was instigated through the 
housing crisis. Today San Francisco’s demographics are not totally homogenous, and political 
participation should include and protect minority group participation. Further, San Francisco’s 
homeless population is growing. 2018 estimates counted 7,500 individuals experiencing 
homelessness in the City of San Francisco (San Francisco Department of Planning 2018). The 
risk of perpetuating participatory inequity in San Francisco’s political economy is to obscure 
minority populations’ voices and preferences, as well as obscure the preferences and voices of 
individuals who are targeted by the policies under debate: policies affecting individuals 
experiencing or at risk of homelessness and chronic homelessness. Eliminating political 
participation by affected or targeted populations may undermine policy effectiveness (Lillvis and 
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Greer 2016). In time, the continued inequity in San Francisco’s political economy may actually 
perpetuate the homelessness crisis by eliminating input from affected populations and tailoring 
policy solutions to elite preferences aiming at homeless behaviors instead of long-term solutions 
to homelessness. This outcome is not preferred by any group.  
4c. Summary 
This section shows that participatory constraints on pluralistic, democratic participation 
may be inhibiting the elite and the integrated CoC and municipal government from aligning and 
coordinating across policy spaces. San Francisco’s political economy is one where economic, 
elites dominate public debates over housing policy, with the absence of marginalized populations 
and groups directly affected or targeted by these policies: persons experiencing homelessness or 
formerly homeless, and persons at risk of homeless. These divergent policy processes with 
competing policy goals reinforce participatory inequity by offering multiple, concurrent channels 
of participation dominated by elites while also generating regulatory hurdles and implementation 
challenges for local supportive housing efforts.  
Without improving participatory equity, the outcome for homeless policies may remain 
skewed towards policies favoring economic elites and which do not directly address 
homelessness, perpetuating policies that are in direct conflict with policies pursued by the city of 
San Francisco that seek to address the causes of homelessness. This participatory equity also 
bleeds into the influence of elected officials on the bureaucracy. Elected officials create tension 
and conflict for pre-existing policies seeking to mitigate chronic homelessness, by constantly 
attempting to re-structure policies and shift them from their intended goals (Hacker et al. 2004), 




5. Bringing the State Back In  
The state of California acts as another, perhaps unexpected, conflicting actor or source of 
competing policies with divergent goals, design and implementation mechanisms compared to 
the policies targeting homelessness on the ground in San Francisco through the municipal CoC. 
The state level policies seek to address homelessness in different ways compared to municipal 
approaches, and coordination with municipal approaches is limited. The competing policies and 
politics stemming from California’s state level policies acts as a direct and indirect barrier to 
municipal supportive housing policy design and implementation in San Francisco by generating 
administrative barriers and funding constraints that constrain local supportive housing efforts.  
 As reflected in the interviews, the state of California exists as a primarily separate 
governance structure with independent decision-making and implementation processes. 
California has many policies with the potential to assist supportive housing efforts and reduce 
chronic homelessness. However, the majority of existing state level policies have not been fully 
implemented leading to resource constraints; or the policies work across different assumptions 
about population needs creating administrative barriers for local policy efforts. All in all, these 
state policies fall short for homeless providers and individuals experiencing chronic 
homelessness in San Francisco as a result of divergent policy goals and policy processes. 
Responding to the existing challenges with state level policies, the majority of interviewees said 
that the state isn’t doing much and could be doing more.  
Interviewees and archival analyses identified two main policies encompassing the state 
policies affecting or intended to manage homelessness in California. These policies are 1) 
Medicaid and 2) The Millionaires Tax. A third policy space was mentioned tangentially, the 
California Interagency Council on Homelessness (CICH). The majority of interviewees did not 
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mention the CICH, and the minority of interviewees who did only mentioned it to say that they 
were not aware of anything that the agency had done. Therefore, the CICH was omitted from the 
results due to limited salience among local policymakers. Additionally, there are other policies 
that address other issues associated with homelessness that did not arise as primary concerns for 
interviewees. These and other policies (such as Conservatorships, Community Development 
Block Grant (CBDG) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) funding) may be 
a part of the existing state policy space but are not reviewed here due to their limited salience 
among policymakers at the local level.   
Interviewees and archival analyses revealed two primary challenges stemming from the 
state level policy space that conflict with or directly impede local level supportive housing policy 
making and policy implementation: 1) conflicting policy goals; 2) Implementation challenges – 
defined here as administrative burdens and funding challenges. Based on the results, 
implementation challenges appear to come from conflicting policy goals.  
5a. Medicaid and conflicting policy realities 
As discussed, the health effects of homelessness are immense, significantly increasing 
mortality, rates of chronic and communicable diseases, and adverse behavioral health outcomes 
including severe mental illness and substance use disorders (Fazel, Geddes, and Kushel 2014; 
Maqbool, Viveiros, and Ault 2015; Stringfellow et al. 2016; Young and Manion 2017). The 
acute and long-term health consequences of homelessness most often require access to health 
services as well as housing (Department of Housing and Urban Development 2016; S. G. Kertesz 
et al. 2016). This dual approach has been shown to lessen homelessness, reduce morbidity and 
mortality, and improve quality of life (Doran, Misa, and Shah 2013; HHS 2014; Larimer et al. 
2009). Before the Affordable Care Act (ACA), many homeless adults, primarily single men, did 
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not have health insurance coverage. Lack of health insurance limited the scope of services and 
programming that could be offered to address homelessness and improve health outcomes. In the 
wake of the ACA, many practitioners and advocates hoped that Medicaid Expansion would 
substantially improve access to necessary supportive medical services to more effectively 
address the complex medical conditions many homeless patients face (Tsai et al. 2013). 
Interview results demonstrate that Medicaid Expansion did not significantly affect 
municipal homelessness policy functioning due to divergent policy goals between state and local 
policy, resulting in two types of implementation challenges – 1) administrative burdens and 2) 
funding limitations. A lack of an influence of Medicaid Expansion on San Francisco’s municipal 
homeless policy is surprising, because many policymakers viewed Medicaid Expansion as a kind 
silver bullet, anticipated to greatly improve access to healthcare for persons experiencing all 
types of homelessness, in particular individuals experiencing chronic homelessness.  
5a1. Divergent Policy Goals 
The divergent goals between municipal regulatory supportive housing policy and 
California’s Medicaid Expansion are not difficult to see. San Francisco’s supportive housing 
policy is targeted directly towards individuals experiencing chronic homelessness and focuses on 
addressing the causes of homelessness through access to housing, medical/behavioral, and social 
services. Medicaid Expansion was never a policy intended to specifically target individuals 
experiencing homelessness. Medicaid as a policy focuses solely on providing healthcare 
insurance coverage to low-income individuals and low-income persons with disabilities. There is 
a clear overlap in populations served by the two policies. However, the goals of the policies are 
so different that the population of interest – in this case persons experiencing chronic 
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homelessness – interacts with two very separate policies, in very different ways and to different 
ends.  
Supportive housing policy is designed to explicitly address the needs of this high-risk 
population. Medicaid expansion, serves a large and relatively diverse population and therefore 
does not have population specific policy goals or implementation mechanisms (beyond retaining 
categories of able bodied/not) (Grogan, Singer, and Jones n.d.). At face value, this may not seem 
to be a challenge, and is perhaps a virtue of Medicaid by not differentiating coverage across 
social categories. Yet, where the policy goals engender policy conflict, is in the fact that 
homelessness programming relies on and in many cases requires Medicaid as a major payer of 
medical services that are used in homelessness programming and supportive housing (Cassidy 
2016). Therefore, if Medicaid policy works on different priors of access and eligibility that do 
not align with needs specific to persons experiencing homelessness or long-term homelessness, it 
creates unintentional barriers to accessing Medicaid, and challenges for homelessness policy and 
programming implementation. 
5a2. Implementation Challenges – Administrative Burden and Funding 
Medicaid’s goal to expand insurance access for recipients is vital for supportive housing 
policy. This focus on coverage access is also where the Medicaid policy processes begins to 
diverge from homelessness politics and the San Francisco local policy efforts by generating 
administrative burdens the inhibit access to Medicaid for individuals experiencing homelessness 
and in particular chronic homelessness.  
The traditional methods of distributing access to Medicaid does not translate directly to 
persons experiencing homelessness. In California, different from Louisiana, the state is the main 
administering entity for Medicaid and sets policies for eligibility and enrollment (Department of 
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Health Care Services State of California n.d.). Yet despite state administration, California faces 
similar challenges to Louisiana stemming from enrollment processes. Even under state 
administration, many eligibility determinations and program implementation is designated to 
local county welfare offices (Department of Health Care Services State of California 2011, n.d.).  
Interviewees described that county level administration increases administrative burden 
on enrollees who are homeless by requiring residency in the county of enrollment and tying 
enrollment to residency. Most persons experiencing homelessness, particularly chronic 
homelessness, do not have an address by virtue of being homeless. Individuals who are 
chronically homeless often move in and out of county-lines for service utilization (Degeorge 
2010; Gray et al. 2011; Metraux, Treglia, and O’Toole 2016). Both of these factors increase dis-
enrollment, or enrollment churning, for persons experiencing homelessness (Sommers et al. 
2016; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation and Office of Disability 2018). Interviewees discussed the challenges associated with 
Medicaid enrollment, and how it has not worked as well as anticipated for retaining healthcare 
coverage and improving access to necessary health services as a result of administrative burdens. 
“Oh yes – Medicaid expansion means that most of the homeless people are basically eligible for 
Medicaid, our biggest issue is Medicaid retention – terminating enrollment is a huge issue – the 
homeless people don’t fill out the paper work and get kicked off … a few people move out of 
County – all of Medicaid in California is county based – which doesn’t make sense with cities – 
homeless people travel around the state and hop around – your Medicaid benefits are tied to the 
county you live in, so when you show up, if you’re trying to get them into the behavioral health 
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system, you have to track down what their residence is, or the county pays for it out of their 
budget.”xxxvi 
Medicaid implementation challenges resulting from administrative burdens also intersect 
with the existing challenges stemming from the crowded policy space surrounding chronic 
homelessness. High rates of incarceration among individuals experiencing chronic homelessness 
(Hawthorne et al. 2012; Tsai and Rosenheck 2012; Volk et al. 2016), as a product of punitive 
policies most often pushed by economic elites to address homeless behaviors, create inherent 
challenges for Medicaid eligibility. Individuals previously enrolled in Medicaid are dis-enrolled 
when incarcerated and face re-enrollment barriers after being discharged (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and Office of 
Disability 2018). Re-enrollment barriers stem from a lack of alignment with Medicaid 
administration and the carceral state. Many individuals who experienced homelessness prior to 
incarceration face a dearth of services and limited connections to services after re-entry, upon 
which many are released to homelessness (Snyder 2016a). Very similar to results in Shreveport, 
the majority of interviewees in San Francisco cited that a lack of coordination between state 
Medicaid programming, local carceral policy and municipal regulators in the CoC promotes gaps 
in services upon re-entry and facilitates cycling of incarceration for individuals experiencing 
chronic homelessness. “…the problem is once you go into jail, this is all general funded no 
Medicaid in jail – so we can’t afford certain things without grant funded programs. At the same 
time, the people are here, they are at risk when they get released from jail.”xxxvii  
The misalignment of policy goals across state and local policies and policy processes 
further intensifies the administrative burden on individuals seeking services by placing 
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enrollment responsibility on at-risk individuals, rather than having supported enrollment relying 
on systems to catch vulnerable individuals. For persons experiencing chronic homelessness, who 
face higher rates of chronic medical conditions, disability and rates of severe mental illness 
stable access to medical services through continuous health insurance enrollment is crucial for 
supportive housing policy success and ending homelessness. “…the mental health system and 
substance use disorders system is episodic, you leave or get thrown out, discharged, and there 
are no services that are lifetime… when they [homeless] are discharged, there are no CBOs that 
are in charge of following a person through the process. That is what we [new Whole Person 
Care Medicaid Waiver Programxxxviii] are trying to address. There is no such service [for 
coordination]. …and you don’t transition from one place to the next…”xxxix 
Funding is the second means by which Medicaid goals are not aligned with supportive 
housing policy efforts, creating conflict and tension between the two policy initiatives. Funding 
challenges stem directly from policy conflict resulting from divergent policy goals. Medicaid 
funding statutorily cannot pay for housing (rent, housing construction, housing subsidies etc.) 
(Paradise and Cohen Ross 2017). This may not seem to be a direct policy conflict, at first look. 
However as mentioned Medicaid is the primary payer for wrap around supportive medical 
services for individuals experiencing chronic homelessness (Cassidy 2016). When Medicaid 
funds a large part of supportive housing policy implementation but not the majority, it not only 
creates funding challenges by creating complicated funding streams for supportive housing 
policies it also begs the question of what role Medicaid should have in supportive housing and 
 
xxxviii Whole Person Care is an existing Medicaid Waiver pursued by the city and county of San Francisco to 
specifically target chronic homelessness. WPC seeks to align state and local programming to improve coordination 
and delivery of services to individuals experiencing chronic homelessness. At the time of this research WPC was not 
implemented, so interviewees could not speak to the effects of WPC on the delivery of services to persons 
experiencing chronic homelessness and improved policy alignment of state and local efforts to address chronic 
homelessness. 
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homeless policy. “Medicaid through series of waivers in CA have allowed Medicaid to be used 
for wrap around funding – more savvy players are trying to use Medicaid to fund services 
delivery part of SH, but it can’t pay for brick and mortar, maybe in assisted living, [it] mostly its 
payed for wrap around services.”xl The majority of interviewees cited Medicaid funding as a 
barrier to supportive housing implementation. 
This funding challenge acts as a persistent barrier to policy coordination across Medicaid 
and homelessness policy due to divergent policy goals. Interviewees stated that they face 
constant challenges as a result of policy complexity and funding gaps. HUD funding has not kept 
up with inflation and low-income housing needs over the past ten years, and has recently faced 
more cuts to low-income housing assistance (Mazzara 2018; Urban Institute and Kingsley 2017). 
Medicaid funding has increased and offers more opportunities for supportive medical services. 
Therefore, interviewees cited that local providers and policy makers face a tradeoff where they 
may be able to provide medical services but have substantial gaps in funding to pay for housing. 
Medical services without permanent housing do not solve chronic homelessness and have been 
shown to be ineffective in ending homelessness alone. Both housing and medical care are 
required in tandem to end chronic homelessness (Leff et al. 2009).  
In the end interviewees detailed that they either: face funding gaps, are unable to fully 
implement policies by prioritizing wrap around services without housing, and or pursue multiple 
funding streams and face further administrative barriers when attempting to enact and implement 
policies that are funded through different pots of money and different funding requirements. 
“…[we work] to create the political role to create this [SH policy] change, and to have the 
resources to do this… that the San Francisco Board of Supervisors understands … the funding 
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we need at a local and state level to meet our goals. …the biggest challenge is having the 
funding in order to execute the plan. And we’re not going to get it from the feds.”xli 
5b. California’s Mental Health Services Act, policy misalignment and stagnation  
 The second policy area most often referenced in interviewees and archival analyses and 
highlighted by the majority of interviewees as a policy space that created simultaneous hope for 
local policy initiatives and direct barriers to local supportive housing policy implementation, is 
the California Mental Health Services Act (MHSA). MHSA was originally passed in November 
of 2004. Alternatively known as the ‘Millionaires’ Tax’, MHSA was intended to impose a 1% 
income tax on personal income in excess of $1 million, in order to generate funding specifically 
designated for county level behavioral health services (Department of Health Care Services State 
of California n.d.).  
Since its inception, MHSA has suffered from both inconsistent policy goals and 
implementation problems. Though originally intended to support behavioral health service 
efforts at the county level, the policy was reconceptualized and monies were promised to instead 
fund permanent supportive housing efforts. In both cases, the policies were never fully 
implemented, and funding has not been distributed as intended. Ultimately, MHSA has generated 
direct barriers to supportive housing policy implementation in San Francisco and across 
California by stagnating funding for permanent supportive housing construction originally 
intended to address high rates of chronic homelessness (The Editorial Board 2018).  
5b1. MHSA’s evolution towards new policy goals and implementation failures 
Interviewees stated and archival research demonstrate that MHSA evolved over time, 
shifting from the original policy and original policy goals. The original MHSA taxed millionaires 
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to gain revenue for behavioral health services at the county level, including but not limited to 
prevention services and community services and supports (Scheffler and Adams 2005). MHSA 
has been collecting revenue since 2005, accumulating a total of 14.6 billion dollars to date 
(California Mental Health Services Oversight and Accountability Commission 2019). Since then, 
MHSA has provided significant revenue to county level behavioral health agencies, providing on 
average about one fourth of funding for county level behavioral health services across California 
(County Behavioral Health Director’s Association n.d.). In 2011, the focus on MHSA changed 
from targeting behavioral health services broadly across populations to focus specifically on 
severe mental illness (SMI) (County Behavioral Health Director’s Association n.d.). This shift to 
focus solely on SMI was hailed by stakeholders in homelessness programming and policy due to 
increases in chronic homelessness and unaddressed SMI needs for this population (San Francisco 
Department of Public Health 2019, 7). 
The major policy shift happened in 2016 when then Governor Jerry Brown instituted No 
Place Like Home (NPLH) (California Department of Housing and Community Development 
2019). NPLH was established in order to use MHSA money to specifically create new permanent 
supportive housing beds. NPLH would provide state level bonds to providers to construct new 
permanent supportive housing (PSH) units. The bonds would be repaid through the MHSA tax 
(California Department of Housing and Community Development 2019). While Continuum of 
Care providers across California, and the municipal CoC in San Francisco were happy about this 
redirection of MHSA funding, many behavioral health providers were not. Some California 
providers felt that this funding should remain targeted at behavioral health services, especially in 
lieu of a severe psychiatric bed shortage across the state (White 2018; Witkin and Huang 2018). 
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This policy shift created a fragmentation across the two stakeholder coalitions and pushback 
against supportive housing efforts stemming from MHSA.  
The pushback from behavioral health coalitions was compounded by opposition from 
elites who strongly opposed, and as discussed continue to oppose, PSH construction (Fracassa 
2019b; Monkkonen and Livesley-O’Neill 2017; Waxmann 2019). Lobbying efforts from elites 
and behavioral health providers led to stagnated implementation of No Place Like Home (NPLH) 
(Witkin and Huang 2018). Interviewees emphasized that they have not received any support 
from the state from NPLH, and this revenue loss has been a barrier to local supportive housing 
efforts in San Francisco. “No Place Like Home … it’s a state program that’s meant to give 
counties funding for housing for homelessness. It’s not established, maybe not even 
implemented.”xlii  
Similar to the absence of Medicaid dollars for PSH, the retraction of promised NPLH 
funding for PSH has led local providers to not trust state level supportive housing efforts and rely 
almost entirely on local funding initiatives. While San Francisco is able to leverage local 
funding, many localities do not have a sufficient, resources. In these cases, state level policy 
failures may have a much more dramatic impact on local level supportive housing and homeless 
policy efforts. Additionally, the absence of state funding further constrains local funding 
initiatives in an already limited local resource environment with severe policy capacity needs to 
address the homeless epidemic (San Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016). 
By 2019, NPLH had not provided any monies for PSH construction as a result of implementation 
challenges (L. Dillon 2018).xliii  
 
xliiInterviewee 1.12, City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/Healthcare Practitioner 
xliii Funding announcements were just listed in January 2019 after CA voters passed Proposition 63 to allow for 
MHSA funds to be used for PSH. CA announced funding calls in March but has not yet distributed monies. The 
funding competition will continue through summer 2019 for the first and second rounds.  
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MHSA is different from Medicaid politics because it is an example where the conflict 
between policy goals has led to policy implementation stagnation, and eventually an inability of 
the state to fulfill its intended policy goals. The way that the policy goals and intentions changed 
over time created challenges for supportive housing policy by agreeing to secure very different 
policy outcomes and producing neither – first behavioral health then supportive housing. Each 
original policy goal spoke to different stakeholder communities. The shifting policy trajectories 
generated animosity among both stakeholder groups by not delivering the intended policy 
products.  
Simultaneously, each policy trajectory also drew contingents of detractors – primarily 
from wealthy elites (Scheffler and Adams 2005). The shifting trajectories compounded with the 
failed implementation of state level funding initiatives for PSH under MSHA furthered animosity 
among detractors by providing rationales to repeal MHSA (Enos 2018). Overall, the modified 
policy trajectories ending in unattained policy goals created additional barriers to supportive 
housing policy efforts by strengthening coalitions of elites who oppose supportive housing 
efforts and the original taxation, while also generating conflict and fragmentation among 
coalitions of behavioral health stakeholders and supportive housing stakeholders due to the failed 
implementation of both intended policy outcomes (Graves 2018; White 2018).   
5c. Summary 
 The results of this section demonstrate the existence of separate policy processes between 
state and local policy regarding the goals policies seek to accomplish and or the needs of targeted 
populations, and the processes used to accomplish these goals. This separation primarily arises 
from conflicting goals between local policymakers in the San Francisco CoC or municipal 
bureaucracy, and the state of California. Democratic conflict is crucial to the success of 
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democracies. Challenges arise and policies stagnate when conflict never subsides to overcome 
collective action problems and leads to policy fragmentation affecting successful 
implementation. Here, the deep rift or divergence between local and state regulators is generating 
direct barriers for local supportive housing policy implementation. Ultimately, these policy 
misalignments not only influence the success of both state and local policy efforts, but negatively 
influence the health and wellbeing of individuals experiencing chronic homelessness by 
restricting access to critical medical services and supportive housing efforts.  
6. Summary  
 San Francisco is an example of the significance of policy implementation as a critical 
process that cannot be overlooked when examining the success of policy initiatives. At first 
glance, San Francisco should be very well positioned to successfully tackle chronic 
homelessness compared to other cities across the United States. San Francisco has a strong 
municipal tax base that allows for local investments in social services that other municipalities 
are not able to provide. The liberal ideology of San Francisco has historically placed San 
Francisco on the forefront of innovatively tackling social problems related to chronic 
homelessness including HIV/AIDS and county level behavioral health services. Finally, San 
Francisco has a municipally governed Continuum of Care that is supported by other strong, local 
social service and health programs including the Department of Public Health and the Human 
Services Agency. This position in local government allowed San Francisco’s CoC to have 
improved ability to participate in municipal decision-making related to homelessness and 
provide the CoC with authority to successfully design and carryout local policies related to 
homelessness. This is an advantage compared to other decentralized counterparts across the U.S. 
that have little to no governing authority and are limited in their ability to coordinate with police, 
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county public health agencies, elected officials and have a voice regarding municipal funding, 
zoning, or budget priorities.  
 Yet, despite all of these facets that would appear to place San Francisco at the pinnacle of 
success for supportive housing policy implementation, many of the CoC’s efforts have been 
stagnated at the implementation phase as a result of elite interference, and state level 
administrative and funding constraints. Elites dominate San Francisco policy debates related to 
chronic homelessness, both formally and informally. In formal participation, elites overshadow 
municipal debates and individuals affected by the policies in question are rarely present. The 
strength of elite preferences is magnified through multiple, available informal channels of 
participation where elites assert their preferences through alternative policy mechanisms 
including policing and pressure on elected officials to intervene in undesirable regulatory 
policies, supportive housing policy. The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
requires community participation in CoC planning processes. Yet as this research has 
demonstrated, these processes are not equitable, and majority elite opinion overshadows the 
preferences of minority groups and individuals directly affected by homelessness programming 
and supportive housing policy.  
 The state of California’s remains relatively separate from municipal activity attempting to 
mitigate chronic homelessness. State level goals, including Medicaid and the Mental Health 
Services Act, are not aligned with local supportive housing goals and are not tailored to address 
the needs of persons experiencing or at risk of homelessness and chronic homelessness. As a 
result, both state level policies generate barriers for supportive housing implementation by 
establishing administrative burdens to accessing health services for individuals experiencing 
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chronic homelessness and restricting valuable funding streams to finance local supportive 
housing initiatives.  
 San Francisco is a city with a very visible homelessness epidemic. The problem will not 
be solved until implementation problems can be overcome by improving participatory equity in 
political decision-making to include minorities and at-risk groups, limiting elected officials’ 
ability to interfere with bureaucrats’ duties to carryout supportive housing regulation, and 
improving state level coordination with municipal goals to reduce administrative burdens and 








Chapter 6: Atlanta: Municipal Governance, Fragmentation and Elite Influence 
 
 
1. What’s Happening in Atlanta?  
Like San Francisco, Atlanta is a case where the Continuum of Care has been integrated into 
Atlanta municipal government, in order to more effectively coordinate supportive housing policy 
efforts. Atlanta, too, also came to have a municipal supportive housing policy by way of 
institutional restructuring. Unlike San Francisco, Atlanta’s change occurred relatively recently, 
when the Continuum of Care restructured, moving from a tri-jurisdictional arrangement to 
separate city and county CoCs. The restructuring was prefaced by an investment in homelessness 
and chronic homelessness prevention and services in Atlanta by the city. Since Atlanta has 
restructured, the city adopted a supportive housing policy, and made the choice to oversee the 
new city of Atlanta Continuum of Care, therefore officially merging the CoC into a part of the 
City of Atlanta local government.  
Since the restructuring, Atlanta has also made strides towards not only addressing supportive 
housing, but directly addressing punitive responses to homelessness, and the cyclical relationship 
between chronic homelessness and incarceration. Nationally, over twenty percent of incarcerated 
individuals with severe mental illness were homeless in the months before their incarceration 
(Parker and Griffin 2017). In this vein, Atlanta, in 2017, established a Pre-Arrest Diversion pilot 
project to reduce quality of life arrests (QOL), by diverting any arrest for quality of life reasons 
(e.g. sleeping outside, eating outside, urinating in public) out of jail, and into social services (as 
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the primary group affected by QOL arrests are people experiencing chronic homelessness 
(Macias 2017).  
These developments have been rapid and quite substantial. Despite these developments and 
direct policy movement to adopt and begin implementing a supportive housing approach in 
Atlanta, the city still faces significant challenges in policy implementation and decision-making. 
These challenges primarily include: 1. Jurisdictional boundaries affecting service delivery and 
responsibility; 2. Economic elites and policing; and 3. Funding, and ongoing relationships 
between state and federal entities. These ongoing challenges threaten effective policy 
implementation and may have the unintended effect of policy feedbacks that prevent supportive 
housing policy of working effectively to its intended goals (S. Greer et al. 2016).  
All in all, the structural organization of the Atlanta metropolitan area, as a product of the 
segregated south, has a direct and negative affect on the ability of overlapping jurisdictions to 
coordinate and organize over an overlapping problem and the same target population. In 
addition, despite strategic efforts by the City to move away from ineffective, punitive responses 
(Pre-Arrest Diversion Design Team 2017; Torres and Garland 2018), there still exists strong, 
separate policy mechanisms mobilizing police services to coordinate an indirect and informal 
policy space of moving groups of persons experiencing homelessness to other jurisdictions or 
away from desirable areas based on the desires of economic elites. Finally, Atlanta faces ongoing 
funding challenges related to the jurisdictional organizations, the CoC history and restructuring, 
and a historic absence from the state of Georgia. The state and economic elites’ policy responses 
remain separate from the local government/CoC policy initiatives, constraining local supportive 
housing decision-making and policy implementation as a result, while the institutional 
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arrangements of Atlanta as a metropolitan area have direct, negative effects on all policy efforts, 
and any policy coordination overall.  
2. How did Atlanta get a Supportive Housing Policy? Shifting Intergovernmental Relations 
and Policy Capacity 
Atlanta’s movement to a municipal level supportive housing policy occurred with the 
intersection of policy capacity and institutional restructuring. Unlike San Francisco, Atlanta 
began building policy capacity around homelessness specifically, instead of a tangential social 
service or health area that opened the gates to focus on homelessness as an addition. Once 
Atlanta had established sufficient policy capacity, in terms of funding, expertise, and awareness 
of homelessness as a municipal priority, the tri-jurisdictional Continuum of Care across the City 
of Atlanta, Fulton County, and DeKalb county, made the decision to split in 2013, just 3 years 
after direct city investment, and move on as separate Continuums of Care in an attempt to 
receive more federal dollars as separate entities than as a singular organization. During this 
restructuring, the City Atlanta, given their recent prioritization of homelessness and chronic 
homelessness as a policy issue, and investment by the city in resources to address homelessness, 
realized they had the opportunity to house the CoC as a governmental entity, within the City of 
Atlanta, or keep it as a decentralized, non-governmental entity as CoCs have historically been 
organized. The choice to merge the CoC and municipal government policy efforts, ultimately 
cementing a municipal governing role in homeless policy, coalesced around local and national 
salience and trends in supportive housing, pushing the city of Atlanta to adopt a supportive 
housing policy at the time when the city had to define the local government’s approach. The City 
formally adopted a supportive housing policy, just a few years after cementing a municipal 
governance structure for homelessness and after years of exponential growth in policy capacity. 
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This chapter argues that both policy capacity and institutional restructuring – or an alignment of 
the CoC and municipal policy efforts by integrating the CoC into Altanta city government – were 
required for Atlanta to establish a municipal supportive housing policy.  
 Developing Policy Capacity  
 Atlanta began building policy capacity to address homelessness at the turn of the 21st 
century, with the election of Mayor Shirley Franklin. The previous Mayor, Bill Campbell, had 
initially started an emphasis on housing in the 1990’s. The effort, however, ended in failure when 
it turned out that the programming was not only not successful but rife with corruption and direct 
interference from Mayor Campbell (Georgia Public Policy Foundation 1997; Sherman 2000). 
The election of Mayor Shirley Franklin proved to grow a tangible interest and effort in 
addressing homelessness and chronic homelessness in the city of Atlanta.  
The majority of Mayor Franklin’s efforts prioritized municipal and philanthropic investment 
in supporting and growing community organizations’ efforts to address and prevent chronic 
homelessness (Mayor Shirley Franklin 2002). The effect that this had on Atlanta’s policy 
capacity around homelessness as well as on policy mobilization was substantial. The Franklin 
administration’s initiatives effectively developed Atlanta’s current structure of community-based 
organizations that work together to manage homelessness in the metropolitan area.  
Mayor Franklin initiated and leveraged partnership through the United Way of Metropolitan 
Atlanta to review current practices used to address homelessness in Atlanta (Deloitte Consulting 
2003; Gateway Center’s Commitment n.d.; Tatum 2013). This review ultimately culminated in 
the recommendation to create a ‘Regional Authority on Homelessness’ to promote coordination 
across decentralized bodies of community-based organizations (Deloitte Consulting 2003, 1) 
“We found a huge number of people living in shelters for more than a year… our [previous] 
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Mayor Franklin was approached by the faith-based community, she asked the United Way to 
come up with a strategic plan because they work with corporations [to coordinate funding]”xliv. 
The Authority was eventually incorporated by the United Way (now the Regional Commission 
on Homelessness), which now acts as a de-facto and parallel governing body for metropolitan 
area homelessness planning and service delivery, assisting with coordination across CoC and 
metropolitan area jurisdictions (Gateway Center’s Commitment n.d.; Tatum 2013; United Way 
Atlanta 2017). Thus, the Franklin administration’s efforts drove direct movement towards a 
coordinated systems approach to managing homelessness in Atlanta.  
Although institutional efforts were primarily very decentralized, the administration made 
strides towards formalizing municipal tax structures as funding mechanisms to reduce 
homelessness by developing Homelessness Opportunity Bonds through a rental car tax (though 
now defunct) (Atlanta Development Authority 2008, 8, 2009). The majority of interviewees also 
emphasized that Mayor Franklin’s work affected political interests by successfully coordinating 
alliances across stakeholder groups to prioritize homelessness as an issue of interest among both 
elected officials and bureaucrats in Atlanta for the eight years she was in office (Vogelsang-
Coombs 2007).  
By the time Mayor Kasim Reed was elected in 2010, Atlanta had a restructured, and 
expanded network of non-governmental organizations or CBOs focused explicitly on addressing 
homelessness. “Mayor Reed saw homelessness was an issue, he was very active with influential 
people throughout the country … he didn’t just talk to people here, he reached out, that’s why we 
got the Bloomberg grant, [it] funded other projects too, the 311 system, that was part of it, that 
really helped guide us to looking at it, as to how it [homelessness] can be fixed, we have this 
 
xliv Interviewee 3.17 CBO Actor 
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Bloomberg grant, let’s get experts who know what to do.”xlv The expansion of the CBO space had 
the dual effect of also creating a new base of organizations with explicit interest in homelessness. 
CBOs were interested in homelessness by virtue of their existence and mission, as well as the 
fact that the expansion of nongovernmental actors had a vested interest in their own 
organizational success and commitment as employers. As a result, the CBO space became an 
increasingly active voice in homelessness policy and programming in Atlanta (Holland 2009). 
This activity almost certainly increased salience of the issue, acting as a policy feedback to 
promote homelessness as a persistent political issue in Atlanta.  
Following Mayor Franklin’s work, Mayor Reed worked to prioritize chronic homelessness as 
a political issue in Atlanta. In 2011, Mayor Reed specifically sought out philanthropic financial 
assistance to address chronic homelessness in Atlanta in order to further build policy capacity, 
address the city’s financial limitations to address chronic homelessness itself, and work to 
coordinate across the decentralized policy space (City of Atlanta 2011; Mayor’s Innovation 
Delivery Team Atlanta Georgia 2014).  
Mayor Reed began prioritizing solutions to chronic homelessness by enlisting consultation 
and financial support through a Bloomberg Philanthropies grant (City of Atlanta 2011; S. Jacobs 
and Torres 2013; Saporta 2011). The aim of the grant was to specifically initiate coordination 
between Atlanta’s municipal government and community organizations to address and reduce 
chronic homelessness and veteran chronic homelessness (City of Atlanta 2011; Mayor’s 
Innovation Delivery Team Atlanta Georgia 2014; K. Reed 2014; Saporta 2011). This effort 
resulted in a significant growth in policy capacity, training over a hundred providers in evidence-
based, supportive housing and vulnerability prioritization practices (S. Jacobs and Torres 2013; 
 
xlv Interviewee 3.4 City of Atlanta Bureaucrat, Government Operations 
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Mayor’s Innovation Delivery Team Atlanta Georgia 2014). The investigation into and focus on 
chronic homelessness and systems coordination in Atlanta also led to a discussion about the 
governing structures. The Bloomberg Innovations project ultimately proposed a change to the 
CoC structure, generating momentum for reform and laying the groundwork for a greater 
municipal role (Pendered 2013). The proposed governing structure in 2013 included the creation 
of a separate governing council composed of local government and other stakeholders, that 
would direct policy and set priorities separate from but in coordination with the non-
governmental, implementation bodies (City of Atlanta Innovation Delivery Team 2014; 
Governing Council of Continuum of Care 2017).  
By 2013, when the CoC was actively restructuring, Atlanta had a substantially expanded 
policy space working directly on chronic homelessness and homelessness overall (Governing 
Council of Continuum of Care 2017). The policy space had expanded in terms of funding 
opportunities; efforts to recentralize or coordinate existing policy structures and programming; a 
significant expansion of policy capacity in the way of expertise based in CBOs and 
nongovernmental organizations dedicated to addressing different types of homelessness in 
Atlanta; and an overall growing political mobilization around the issue that had persisted since 
Mayor Franklin’s election in 2000. The result of this continued mobilization and expanded 
policy capacity regarding homelessness and chronic homelessness in Atlanta was increased 
salience and attention on the part of municipal government and non-governmental actors.  
 Continuum of Care Restructuring and Shifting IGR 
 Following a decade of increasing levels of salience and political mobilization around 
homelessness in Atlanta, opportunities for structural realignment began to appear. As mentioned, 
examination into the Atlanta’s homeless policy and programming by Mayor Reed, led to an 
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examination of the existing CoC structures (City of Atlanta 2011). This inquiry called for a 
greater role by municipal government in CoC governance in order to respond to needs for 
effective policy and program coordination across sectors (Governing Council of Continuum of 
Care 2017).  
The opportunity for restructuring, however, did not become attainable until the Tri-j CoCs 
themselves began having discussions about their own funding and structural organization 
(Sheperd 2013) “Well [a nonprofit was] created by the city about three years ago [to be the CoC 
governing entity], but it was created in the midst of the breakup of a prior CoC which was a tri-
jurisdictional CoC, which was Atlanta and two of our counties, so now all three municipal 
counties operate their own municipal CoCs, so… prior to that, it was a much different 
governance structure, the city was always supportive, but the city operated in a different way, so 
for last three or four years, the city has been very supportive of the CoC and helped to establish 
it.”xlvi The development of a formal role for Atlanta municipal government in homelessness 
policy governance culminated in a structural realignment of the Continuum of Care. The Tri-
jurisdictional CoC would break up, so the City of Atlanta would have its own CoC (City of 
Atlanta Continuum of Care 2015). This decision forced municipal actors to choose between a 
direct municipal role, or continued decentralization. The years of increasing interest by 
municipal actors in homelessness policy and programming, paired with increasing centralization 
across multiple spheres, allowed Atlanta to step into a direct municipal role when the opportunity 
arose. Overall, increased salience, substantial growth in homeless policy capacity and movement 
towards centralization paired with structural realignment by intergovernmental partnerships 
incentivizing centralization, allowed Atlanta to establish a formal municipal role.  
 




All of the interviewees that were familiar with Atlanta’s policy explicitly discussed the 
restructuring of the Continuum of Care as a critical factor in the municipal policy development. 
Both in terms of establishing a formal role for the city of Atlanta, as well as subsequently 
developing and establishing Atlanta’s current supportive housing policy approach. The previous 
CoC, known as the Tri-J or tri-jurisdictional Continuum of Care, decided to restructure as a 
result of a shared funding stream that the Tri-J ultimately decided resulted in lower amounts of 
federal funding, compared to each independent jurisdiction applying for and receiving its own 
separate amount of federal funding (City of Atlanta Continuum of Care 2015; Partners for Home 
2017). As mentioned, when discussions about CoC restructuring began in 2013, Atlanta had 
already heavily invested in homelessness policy and programming (Pendered 2013). The Tri-J 
restructuring decision, too, followed just two years after Mayor Reed had proposed a plan to 
formalize the city of Atlanta’s role in CoC governance (City of Atlanta 2011).  
The restructuring ultimately aligned CoC governance with Atlanta’s interest in and 
movement towards centralizing by locating an independent CoC in the city of Atlanta’s 
jurisdiction, as opposed to the previous shared model. Locating an independent CoC within the 
city of Atlanta itself came with inherent questions about what authority would run the CoC. 
Initial discussion prior to the 2013 decision suggested that the CoC would be overseen by an 
independent nonprofit.xlvii However, the change that ultimately occurred, was to designate the 
CoC as a governmental entity, or a part of Atlanta’s municipal bureaucracy, as opposed to a 
completely decentralized, nongovernmental entity (City of Atlanta Continuum of Care 2015, 
152; Partners for Home 2017; Pendered 2013). This decision was made based on existing interest 
in coordinating homelessness policy in Atlanta, as a result of the growth in policy capacity and 
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expertise to evaluate and improve homelessness systems, policy and programming in the metro 
area (Governing Council of Continuum of Care 2017; Partners for Home 2017). Shifting 
authority to the city of Atlanta, as a result of the restructuring, inherently opened an opportunity 
for Atlanta to establish a municipal level policy on homelessness and chronic homelessness. 
“2013 is when they [Tri-j CoC] broke up, I don’t know when the conversations actually started, 
but it was 2013 when the city of Atlanta formed Partners [new CoC governing organization]. So 
that would have been when Mayor Reed was already mayor. And, shortly [after]… they carried 
out, in 2013, as part of Unsheltered No More, a homeless registry, the first comprehensive 
registry to count people and count unsheltered, that is the pilot for coordinated entry…”xlviii  
After establishing a formal municipal role, the movement to supportive housing policy was 
relatively fast. As of 2015, CoCs are required by the federal government to apply a Housing First 
approach (Goodloe 2015).  This federal policy change aligned with many of the policy goals and 
initiatives established by Mayor Reed, all following in a trauma informed, supportive housing 
approach to specifically address Atlanta’s high rate of chronic homelessness (Governing Council 
of Continuum of Care 2017; Partners for Home 2017). Ultimately, Atlanta’s strong foundation in 
policy capacity, the establishment of a specific governance role for the city of Atlanta following 
institutional restructuring, as well as national policy change governing the CoCs themselves, all 
acted together to push Atlanta towards a municipal level supportive housing policy in 2017 
(Governing Council of Continuum of Care 2017; Torres and Garland 2017).  
Without the previous development in municipal level policy capacity, including funding and 
expertise, Atlanta may not have felt prepared as a municipality to step into a formal governance 
role when the CoC restructuring occurred. Similarly, without the CoC restructuring, it is not 
 




clear that the City of Atlanta would have taken steps to formalize a municipal role and ultimately 
a municipal level supportive housing policy, due to the strong history of decentralization both in 
Atlanta and in homeless policy and programming, nationally. Most likely, we can assume that 
Atlanta may have eventually formalized a more indirect municipal role, as was originally laid out 
in Mayor Reed’s original plan for a municipal seat in the governing board overseeing the CoC, 
but not towards seating the CoC within Atlanta city government itself. This case, as in San 
Francisco, posits the necessity of both policy capacity and institutional, intergovernmental 
arrangements, as critical factors in promoting, or disincentivizing, municipal level homelessness 
policies.   
3. Jurisdictional Boundaries and the Histories of Race and Racism 
Now that Atlanta has a formal municipal level supportive housing policy and the CoC is 
integrated into local government in order to coordinate these policy efforts, one of the City’s 
primary challenges to policy implementation, decision-making and any service coordination are 
the existing municipal jurisdictional boundaries. These jurisdictional boundaries exist as a 
product of the histories of race and racism in the segregated south (Bayor 1988; R D Bullard, 
Johnson, and Torres 1999; Robert D. Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 2000; Jackson 2009; Kruse 
2005). The interviews and archival analyses all demonstrated that coordinating policy and 
service distribution across multiple, overlapping municipal jurisdictions results in: collective 
action problems, questions of authority and responsibility, coordination challenges, and 
deliberate gatekeeping mechanisms. As a result of the challenges posed by the jurisdictional 
boundaries, supportive housing policy implementation is stagnated, and policies do not currently, 
and face the prospect of not in the future, working to their intended ends.  
Why Does Atlanta Have Multiple Overlapping Jurisdictional Boundaries? 
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Atlanta is a city that exists within five separate incorporated counties – Fulton, DeKalb, 
Gwinnett, Cobb and Clayton. This arrangement is not typical. Most cities exist within one 
county, or sometimes two overlapping counties. Atlanta’s arrangement is a product of direct 
segregation efforts, to establish areas outside of the city that were (and are) primarily inhabited 
by white, wealthy elites, separated from and outside of the black, poor, metropolitan downtown 
city (Bayor 1988; Kruse 2005). Atlanta’s white flight is not unusual. Cities across the south and 
the United States, including Detroit, Cleveland, Queens, New Orleans, experienced great 
migrations of white, wealthy elites out of metropolitan areas during the mid-late 20th century, as 
a result of increased racial animus by whites during the civil rights movement and white 
responses to direct efforts to reduce segregation. In effect, whites responded to growing 
economic mobility by blacks and increased de-segregation efforts, with further segregationist 
efforts including flights to the suburbs where they could insulate themselves through Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) FHA redlining and racially discriminatory private business 
practices (Biles 2011; Frey 2019; Kruse 2005, 169).  
Atlanta substantially grew and established the perimeters of its protected, white suburbs out 
of reach of black America in the 1960’s and 70’s (Bayor 1988; R D Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 
1999; Kruse 2005). With this, came the establishment of new governments (school boards), and 
separate governance and decision-making structures, all run by this new, separate groups of 
wealthy whites (Frey 2019; R. Mickey 2015). The effect of expanding existing and creating new, 
separate governing entities that overlapped jurisdictionally with the City of Atlanta was not only 
to perpetuate racial animus and segregation in the American south, but to also engender further 
fragmentation of political decision-making, and inherent challenges for governance of collective 
problems within the Atlanta metropolitan area (Robert D. Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 2000).  
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A. Collective action problems and policy coordination 
The first challenge observed as a product of multiple, overlapping municipal jurisdictions in 
supportive housing policy implementation is an inherent collective action problem. The 
collective action problem arises because, although the City of Atlanta is a separate entity from 
the other municipal jurisdictions, three of the municipal jurisdictions serve the same, or strongly 
overlapping, population. These jurisdictions are the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, and DeKalb 
county (which were formerly combined as the Atlanta Tri-jurisdictional Continuum of Care). 
This is because persons experiencing homelessness, and chronic homelessness in particular, may 
be mobile or migratory around metropolitan areas for a variety of reasons (Gray et al. 2011; 
Metraux, Treglia, and O’Toole 2016). These reasons include: forced mobilization by municipal 
authorities to dissuade individuals from entering certain areas or clustering (Mcnamara, 
Crawford, and Burns 2013); mobilization caused as an after effect of incarceration; necessity to 
access services that are located in different municipal areas (e.g. city vs. county administrative 
processes required to obtain social services); among others (Gray et al. 2011). As a result of this 
mobilization, the closely overlapping jurisdictions within the larger metropolitan areas, serve 
very similar or overlapping groups of persons requiring/seeking services.  
When working to address one, collective issue, or a problem that simultaneously affects all 
overlapping jurisdictions, buy-in or some type of participation is required by all affected areas in 
order to sufficiently address the problem and resolve the collective-issue. This is particularly true 
in the case of chronic homelessness, which requires (and now is required by federal regulatory 
bodies) to implement coordinated entry and assessment, along with an integrated and 
coordinated Homelessness Management Information System (HMIS) (Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 2017; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d.). 
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These systems work to effectively identify coordinate the flow of information across 
organizations to clients’ needs, identify clients with the highest needs to prioritize service access 
based on risk, and follow clients throughout the systems to make sure that individuals who are 
seeking help are able to receive aid and do not fall outside of the systems (Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 2017; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
n.d.). Therefore, participation and buy-in from all jurisdictions within the metropolitan area is 
required to implement effective programming that can successfully execute supportive housing 
protocol and place individuals into supportive housing as well as other services.  
A clear example of the collective action problems facing supportive housing policy 
implementation is the use of the HMIS across jurisdictions. Stakeholders discussed that some 
individuals who have been in existing supportive housing units for extended periods of time are 
stable and ready to transition out of these units, into other supportive but less intensive 
environments. This transition would then free up more supportive housing units for currently, 
chronically homeless individuals. However, the lack of coordination across the jurisdictions has 
resulted in a fragmented HMIS network, where providers are unable to track unit availability, to 
help clients access services through the system. “…[chronically homeless] people sit on the que 
for over a year sometimes, and if no one has made contact with them in 90 days, they are 
bumped off the que, that doesn’t really make sense, and they are using it off of our [Atlanta CoC] 
HMIS, but not everyone uses that, so that person could have been touched by an agency but 
maybe that person didn’t get into the system because that agency didn’t use HMIS...”xlix “They 
will have like five beds over here, and 7 beds from another county, [but they] can only fill beds 
for people living in certain county. It’s weird how they decide.”l  
 
xlix Interviewee 3.18 City of Atlanta Bureaucrat/Homeless Services Practitioner 
l Interviewee 3.7 Academic Expert/CBO Actor Homeless Services 
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As it currently stands, the historic separation of the multiple jurisdictions within Atlanta’s 
metro area acts as a barrier to collective action around homelessness. All interviewees stated that 
not all jurisdictions participate in homelessness programming and implementation, and if they 
do, not all jurisdictions participate to the same degree. For example, Fulton was reported as 
typically less participatory or more absent from most decision-making and programming 
meetings. Fulton County is the jurisdiction with the most overlap with the City of Atlanta. 
Further, Fulton County is the primary arbiter of public health services in the Atlanta metropolitan 
area, following traditional city/county arrangements of public health service delivery. Lack of 
participation by Fulton County acts as a direct barrier to policy decision-making and 
implementation, as Fulton is not only a jurisdiction governing a core portion of the primary 
population but also as a service provider. Therefore, limited participation by Fulton effectively 
constrains access to resources and governance structures necessary to implement supportive 
housing policy and homelessness services in the metropolitan area for the shared, targeted 
population. “Now a lot of the difficulty is we have two CoCs [Atlanta and Dekalb] that are very 
active and participatory, and [homeless services] providers whether they like them are not are in 
communication with them, but then you have Fulton County that is in and out at best.”li   
Overall, lack of participation, or comparably less participation, by any of the individual 
jurisdictions constrains action and effective governance on the part of the other participating 
jurisdictions due to the overlapping target population and the policy goals requiring coordination 
across systems to monitor service access and client needs. Multiple overlapping jurisdictions 
serving the same client population need to all buy-in to decision-making and implementation or 
the system cannot successfully deliver policies and track client needs. 
 




B. Questions of authority, responsibility and gatekeeping 
Beyond the inherent collective action problem, the multiple jurisdictions also create inherent 
questions of authority and responsibility that follow-from or may perpetuate collective action 
problems. Interviewees frequently discussed challenges in determining which jurisdiction is 
responsible for which population, and how the reorganization of the Continuum of Care 
exacerbated some of these issues. Specifically, the re-organization moved from a singular 
system, into a system that still serves an overlapping population and therefore requires 
coordination but is governed through three separate entities. In this way, the restructuring may 
have had a double-effect: allowing the City of Atlanta to formally establish a municipal level 
policy and formal governing role for the city yet fracturing a system that already faces 
jurisdictional challenges.  
The questions of designated authority or responsibility for a shared, target population 
primarily affect policy implementation in one critical way, as highlighted in the interviews. The 
effect is delineating boundaries of responsibility within each jurisdiction, where the lines 
dividing jurisdictions become gray zones of service gaps as well as reduced visibility for 
individuals experiencing homelessness and chronic homelessness. These service gap zones, or 
zones where individuals experiencing homelessness effectively lose visibility or homelessness 
becomes less salient, may also be used as a deliberate, gatekeeping mechanisms to shift visible 
homelessness into less desirable areas. Deliberate gatekeeping will be discussed more in the next 
section, as well.   
The question of authority or responsibility pertaining to service gaps works in two ways. The 
first, are presumptively non-deliberate service gaps. Non-deliberate service gaps are a result of 
the jurisdictional boundaries, where services levels are inherently lower at the boundaries 
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between jurisdictions compared to the center. As mentioned, there are many different reasons 
why individuals experiencing chronic homelessness may end up on the fringe of jurisdictional 
boundaries. The result, however, is that without an effective coordinated approach across 
jurisdictional boundaries, individuals living on the boundaries of the jurisdictions receive less 
services and are often harder to track. Besides structural service density, individuals living on the 
boundaries may also face service gaps due to the second type of mechanism behind service gaps.  
The second are deliberate service gaps, where different jurisdictions may or may not be 
responsible, or perceive responsibility, for different tasks in implementing supportive housing or 
an overall coordinated approach. The effect from deliberate service gaps on individuals living on 
the boundaries is a lack of certainty regarding which municipal jurisdiction is responsible for that 
population. Often, the lack of certainty, according to interviewees, results in inaction, 
compounding the lack of service access and ineffective policy implementation specifically for 
individuals living in the boundaries between municipal jurisdictions. This ultimately perpetuates 
the collective action problem facing supportive housing policy implementation.  
Finally, the deliberate service gaps may also be a product of or be directly related to 
deliberate gatekeeping mechanisms. Deliberate gatekeeping mechanisms will be discussed more 
completely in the context of the local political economy. However, the ability of these 
gatekeeping mechanisms to exist is directly related to the municipal jurisdictions. All of the 
interviewees discussed the use of some deliberate gatekeeping mechanisms by jurisdictions in 
the context of keeping people experiencing chronic homelessness out of less desirable areas. 
Specifically, interviewees discussed that individuals who live between jurisdictions have less 
visibility which may be more desirable to some stakeholders or jurisdictions, overall. In effect, 
these results query the relationship between deliberate service gaps between jurisdictions and 
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elite stakeholder preferences. “…the homeless congregate in the boundaries, e.g. north Cobb 
people congregate in this boundary between north Cobb and Cherokee…both sides want people 
to go on one side or the other, or across ends of a parking lot. Policing stays away from the 
edge. You can tell, you drive through the city and you can see that. You can see there will be a 
bulk of homeless people, those people probably aren’t being served if they aren’t in the city of 
Atlanta, agencies congregate in city of Atlanta, a lot of them [homeless] are on the boundaries.”lii   
4. Economic Elites and Policing – Participatory Equity 
The presence of a municipal supportive housing policy in Atlanta, as well as the presence of 
specific efforts to decriminalize homelessness and chronic homelessness, have not yet translated 
into successful policy implementation. Perhaps (ironically), the existence of direct municipal 
decriminalization efforts, in particular, has not ceased one of the largest challenges facing 
supportive housing and decriminalization implementation – which is the relationship between 
policing and homelessness in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The relationship between policing 
and homelessness in Atlanta cannot be separated from the relationship between wealth and 
policing. Similar to San Francisco, this research finds that the processes surrounding informal 
policing of persons experiencing homelessness (outside the decriminalization initiatives) are a 
product of the police responding to or carrying out preferences of wealthy stakeholders in the 
metropolitan area. Regarding policy implementation, the interviews and archival analyses all 
demonstrated that policing efforts as directed by wealthy stakeholders result in direct 1) barriers 
to service access and homelessness programming roll-out and, 2) growing participatory inequity 
in the Atlanta political economy. As a product of the challenges posed by policing and elite 
preferences, supportive housing policy implementation has stagnated, and policies do not work 
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to their intended ends. The resulting participatory inequities threaten growing inequity in 
decision-making that may prioritize wealthy stakeholders over the targeted population, or at-risk 
or vulnerable groups, generally.  
 Currently, in Atlanta, the relationship between policing and homelessness occurs on two 
axes. The first are efforts to decriminalize quality of life crimes, of which persons experiencing 
chronic homelessness are typically cited for. In Atlanta specifically, one out of every ten 
chronically homeless individuals was housed in jail on any given night (Fulton County 2012, 
13). Quality of life crimes include behaviors resulting from behavioral health disorders, sleeping 
in public, eating in public, etc., or all crimes that are a direct result of being homeless, and are 
not in and of themselves a product of criminal behavior or intentions (Macias 2017). Atlanta has 
started a pilot program that re-directs persons who have been charged with a quality of life crime 
out of jail, and into social services to address the causes of the quality of life crimes in the first 
place (Macias 2017). Atlanta has also eliminated bail for quality of life crimes, so individuals 
experiencing chronic homelessness (or poverty) are not held in jail simply because they are 
unable to pay bail for a misdemeanor (Torres and Garland 2018). Finally, the Atlanta Police 
Department has a HOPE team (Homelessness Outreach Proactive Engagement) as a means of 
training police officers with crisis intervention, to delineate between crisis behavior and criminal 
behavior, and also as a means to connect individuals experiencing chronic homelessness and 
other types of homelessness with social services, as police are often the first point of contact for 
individuals experiencing homelessness.  
 Despite these notable efforts, stakeholders in Atlanta consistently reported an alternate 
relationship between policing and homelessness. This secondary relationship is one that is 
responsive to the interests of wealthy or influential members of the public or constituencies 
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within Atlanta, and act as a means of addressing the visibility of homelessness, as opposed to 
connecting individuals with services, or addressing the causes of chronic homelessness (in order 
to ameliorate homelessness). The interviewees emphasized that although new efforts exist to 
shift towards a compassionate approach, the limited resources available to sufficiently address 
the causes of homelessness paired with efforts to purposefully redirect individuals experiencing 
homelessness out of visible areas, they do not make up for or override the substantial 
implementation challenges borne out of the reactive relationship between policing and 
homelessness.   
Barriers to service access and programming 
The reactive relationship between policing and homelessness in Atlanta mirrors that of San 
Francisco. Police officers react to calls or complaints about homelessness from actors, notably 
wealthy or influential actors, and in response enact protocol to respond to that complaint, which 
typically takes the form of moving encampments out of desirable areas, into less desirable areas 
of the city. What is notably different in Atlanta compared to San Francisco, is that elite interests 
appear to be comprised of corporate interests, as opposed to wealthy individuals, or independent 
citizens. This process between elite stakeholders and police officers creates independent policy 
mechanisms – both decision-making and implementation – where elite preferences guide a direct 
response to homelessness that addresses homeless visibility or homeless behaviors as opposed to 
the causes of homelessness. This policy goal directly contradicts the goals of supportive housing 
policy, while also working through very different decision-making mechanisms and 
implementation processes. The result is a process that creates inherent barriers to implementation 
by pushing individuals experiencing homelessness out of areas where they are able to access 
 
 154 
services, ultimately perpetuating homelessness as opposed to resolving it by addressing the 
causes of homelessness.  
All interviewees discussed three main ways that elite actors typically commence this 
alternative policy process and response. These are 1) external corporate interests (movies and 
sporting events); 2) municipal downtown development (housing and other); and 3) the history of 
wealth and racial segregation. The preferences of these wealthy elite/structural interests are 
realized with structural limited options for other actors to participate or share their preferences, 
while creating inherent barriers to coordinating services for individuals experiencing chronic 
homelessness and effectively implementing supportive housing policy.  
External, organized corporate entertainment interests are a growing presence in Atlanta 
(Kahn 2019). What delineates these interests from downtown development, is that these 
structural interests (Alford 1975) are typically external actors, who do not reside in Atlanta but 
have a vested economic interest in Atlanta for an acute period of time. From the interviews, the 
two most commonly cited types of these structural interests are movie productions, and national 
sporting events. While the introduction of these structural interests into Atlanta’s economy is 
arguably a good thing for many reasons, these interests are one mechanism for catalyzing the 
separate elite policy efforts and causing direct policy conflict with supportive housing policy 
implementation and efforts to address chronic homelessness, overall. “…police are running the 
streets, when things happen, when a convention happens, when Super Bowl… like we just did, we 
know, as we did from the Olympics, the community doesn’t want to show its negative side, so 
they sweep the problems away.”liii 
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The majority of interviewees were not aware of the mechanisms by which police responses 
were activated – e.g. if the City of Atlanta calls police on behalf of these external interests, or, if 
these interests alert the police of their preferences. Regardless, interviewees all stated that prior 
to the arrival of these interests – notably film crews, the Olympics, the Super Bowl (Gustafson 
2013; Smothers 1996; Stokes 2019) – individuals experiencing chronic homelessness, or visible 
homelessness (e.g. living and sleeping on downtown streets individually or in encampments) are 
removed from these areas (or areas that will be utilized by external interests) as are their 
belongings. “…officers use [quality of life ordinances] to sweep them [homeless] off the streets, 
almost all of them were put in place in order to sweep the streets for the Olympics.”liv The areas 
that are typically affected are downtown areas, areas where homelessness services and 
programming are primarily located. Many interviewees stated explicitly that their clients are not 
returned to the downtown, or original locations after the exit of these external interests. The 
result is a direct inability to locate clients, impeded access for clients to homelessness services 
and programming by redirecting individuals away from downtown areas, and an overall barrier 
to implementing supportive housing policy by limiting providers’ ability to reach out to clients 
and coordinate service access. These findings align with previous research on the interactions 
between policing and chronic homelessness in municipalities across the U.S. (Mcnamara, 
Crawford, and Burns 2013). 
Downtown municipal development is the second structural interest that interviewees cited as 
a primary catalyst for reactive police responses to chronic homelessness, or a second driver of 
the elite policy initiatives. Downtown municipal development refers to the growth of new, 
generally more costly infrastructure, typically owned by large corporations or entities, in the city 
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of Atlanta itself. This includes new residential property, as well expansions for other uses 
developed by existing downtown entities such as Georgia State University. These interests differ 
from the former as they are entities that reside in Atlanta and have long-term developmental 
interests and relationships in the city.  
Downtown development, too, is growing in Atlanta and is also arguably good for Atlanta’s 
economic growth, in many ways. However, the introduction of new, wealthy, political actors into 
Atlanta’s downtown political economy, who are leveraging an informal network of political 
participation through policing that does not allow for input by other individuals or the targeted 
population, also contributes to direct barriers to supportive housing policy goals and 
implementation. Interviewees cited efforts by both new residential properties and Georgia State 
to remove individuals experiencing homelessness from or near their properties to the same 
effects as the external actors: displacing individuals into areas with low access to homelessness 
services and programming, effectively restricting policy ability to reach clients and coordinate 
access to supportive housing and other services to ameliorate homelessness.  
Finally, the history of wealth and segregation in Atlanta further compounds the effects of the 
mechanisms of the elite policy efforts on homelessness policy and programing in Atlanta. 
Atlanta, as discussed in the previous chapter, has a very long history of racial and economic 
segregation, by which and for why the municipality’s overlapping jurisdictions developed (Kruse 
2005). Interviewees stated that when these structural interests – both internal and external – enact 
policing procedures to remove individuals experiencing chronic homelessness, such individuals 
are typically moved to certain parts of the metro area. These areas are historically segregated, 
low-income and low-service areas. Interviewees stated that this is generally south Atlanta, past 
highways 75 and 80. “So, we don’t actually move them around, if you drive under 75/80 right 
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now, there are encampments there. Somebody calls and complains, if the right person sees it, we 
have to go, we let them [homeless] know you have 24 hours to move your stuff, in 24 hours we 
come and get rid of things, it’s really whoever calls and complains. It’s a really reactive 
profession [policing], so the proactive part of that is really non-existent.”lv 
Moving individuals experiencing chronic homelessness to racially and economically 
segregated and overall disadvantaged areas of Atlanta stagnates supportive housing policy 
implementation by moving individuals further away from outreach and service efforts, but also 
inhibits actions by individual’s experiencing homelessness ability to return to serviceable areas 
themselves, by effectively cutting individuals off from any other services including transit, food 
systems, and medical care. Thus, the history of and structural arrangements of wealth and race in 
Atlanta, in conjunction with the elite policy mechanisms, protect elite preferences while 
insulating at-risk population’s preferences from the larger political economy while 
simultaneously inhibiting supportive housing policy implementation. “[The public transit 
system] is segregated by race and by class, people who use public transport are more at-risk of 
homelessness than people who don’t. There is direct opposition on extending the subway system, 
into different more suburban neighborhoods, in places where they were concerned about 
bringing more poverty in [to their neighborhoods]…being a behavioral health provider, it’s a 
huge issue a lot of patients are trying to use public transit and they can’t get to their 
appointments on time.”lvi 
Growing Inequity in Atlanta Political Economy 
Atlanta’s political economy has always been inequitable due to the history of slavery and 
segregation in the south (R D Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 1999; Robert D. Bullard, Johnson, 
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and Torres 2000; Kruse 2005; R. Mickey 2015). This section highlights the role of the history of 
inequity and segregation in Atlanta, compounded by a new, changing political economy in the 
downtown city of Atlanta. Ultimately, the research finds that increasing income inequality is 
exacerbating inequity in political participation by structurally limiting homeless, racial 
minorities, and low-income groups’ access to wealthy or gentrifying areas in the Atlanta 
metropolitan area. The increasing practice of engendering inequality through structural 
arrangements in Atlanta may perpetuate the threats to successful implementation of supportive 
housing policy, and further fragment the existing and conflicting policy approaches.  
As a product of historic segregation, the city of Atlanta is surrounded by wealthy primarily 
white suburbs (Kruse 2005). All interviewees, overwhelmingly, insisted that there is no direct 
opposition by any entity to supportive housing policy or homelessness services and 
programming, generally. What interviewees did state, however, is the history of segregation in 
the Atlanta metropolitan area has engendered strong feelings of protectionism among wealthy, 
suburban areas. As a result, instead of direct opposition to homelessness, or supportive housing 
development, as seen in San Francisco, Atlanta experiences opposition to development that 
would further economic integration or allow more mobility of residents experiencing 
homelessness and low-income residents into wealthy neighborhoods. This typically comes in the 
form of strong opposition to subway expansion, or expansion of the transit systems, in general 
(Rankin et al. 2015). “Expansion of MARTA discussions have been ongoing. This is the bus 
service and train …it’s really limited, bus service is really slow, it takes a long time, Atlanta is 
very segregated economically, those [segregated/wealthy] populations voted down expanding 
 
 159 
MARTA, lots of really racist arguments were made against expanding MARTA…it’s a really 
frustrating thing because it could help Atlanta become a lot more integrated economically.”lvii 
As a result of this historic segregation, and protectionism or NIMBYISM among suburban 
elites, most low-income individuals, and individuals experiencing homelessness and chronic 
homelessness, reside in the downtown city of Atlanta (R D Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 1999; 
City of Atlanta Continuum of Care 2015; Holt and Lo 2008; Pearce et al. 2016). What this 
research finds are increasing concerns among stakeholders about growing inequality in 
downtown Atlanta, that threatens pushing low-income, at-risk, and homeless or chronically 
homeless individuals out of downtown, further out of Atlanta jurisdictions, and risking greater 
housing insecurity. Interviewees working in homeless policy and programming in Atlanta stated 
that they anticipate rates of homelessness in Atlanta to rise, due to the changing economy in 
downtown Atlanta, in the coming years.  
The compounding effects of historic segregation and increasing gentrification in Atlanta may 
have an effect similar to that in San Francisco. The result may be an exodus of marginalized 
communities out of metro Atlanta, and out of the political economy. These two parallel forces 
work to increase inequity in Atlanta’s political economy by effectively constraining ability of 
marginalized communities to participate by removing them from the metropolitan area. This 
trend is not uncommon and was used very intentionally in major metropolitan areas during the 
mid-twentieth century as a way to decrease political participation by less-desirable, out-group 
members (Bridges 1999; Galster 2012; Sugrue 2014; Trounstine 2008). Political debates, thus, 
become inherently inequitable or biased towards the dominant group if another group is ousted 
or has constrained access to political debates. Regarding supportive housing efforts in the City of 
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Atlanta, a restructuring of the political economy to a more homogenous group of wealthy 
individuals may leave less support for supportive housing by removing buy-in from groups that 
would benefit from supportive housing efforts.  
Summary 
The existence of these two-separate policy processes in decision-making and implementation 
– elite and municipal – with fundamentally separate policy goals leads to further stagnation of 
efforts to address homelessness by crowding the policy space with multiple, competing policies 
and actors that all directly contradict each other’s efforts. These policy processes, similar but a 
bit different from San Francisco, also structurally engenders inequality. The mechanism by 
which these processes occur – request by one individual (or single entity) through informal 
channels for action regarding chronic homelessness – allows no time for input or political 
participation from other entities or actors. It simultaneously creates a siloed and one-sided, 
policy response to chronic homelessness that also substantially affects other actors’ goals and 
abilities. 
5. Barriers to Policy Implementation: Brining the State Back in and Improving Municipal 
Accountability 
The presence of a municipal supportive housing policy in Atlanta, as well as the presence of 
specific efforts to decriminalize homelessness and chronic homelessness, have not yet translated 
into successful policy implementation. A primary challenge restricting policy implementation in 
Atlanta is a lack of funding, as well as challenges pertaining to the utilization of existing funding. 
The main funding challenges exist in two domains: 1) the lack of state participation, 2) the local 
government’s use of funds, generally, and local funding initiatives.  
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This research finds that Atlanta sits in a circumstance where the state of Georgia is relatively 
absent. As of 2017, Georgia was entirely absent on the front of legislation or funding directly 
targeting homelessness. This limited participation by the state of Georgia is exacerbated by the 
fact that the City of Atlanta itself relies on little to no municipal resources for homelessness 
programming. Finally, even further constraining these limited municipal resources is the reality 
that Atlanta has a history of corruption and limited transparency around the use of federal dollars 
for supportive housing and other efforts in the City of Atlanta CoC (Deere 2018, 2019). 
Therefore, much of the funding that has been leveraged to fill the gaps in municipal and state 
funding has come under scrutiny due to questionable uses or a limited return on investment 
(Deere 2018). Overall, the challenges posed by funding constraints at the state and local level 
have created barriers to supportive housing policy implementation and efficacy. This section 
argues that solutions to these challenges may come in the form of merging the state and elite 
policy processes with the municipal/CoC efforts, in order to more effectively align policy goals, 
reduce participatory inequity and establish systems of accountability.  
Bringing the State Back In 
All interviewees stated that Georgia, as a state, is relatively absent from municipal level 
homeless policy concerns. One interviewee succinctly stated that Atlanta is a system that has so 
few municipal and state level resources that they rely very heavily on private funds. “…the 
corporations of Atlanta… Georgia isn’t known for its state funding or county or city government 
for this issue. So, we raised lots of private money with the agreement that we wouldn’t take away 
from the HUD money. Mostly private money here.”lviii The reliance on private donations allows 
Atlanta to be more innovative, yet the tradeoff that arises is a lack of sustainability and 
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consistency to effectively achieve policy goals over a long period of time. Interviewees 
emphasized that more resources from the state would be greatly appreciated by municipal actors. 
As of 2017, Georgia had no state level policies addressing homelessness or chronic 
homelessness. Georgia has also not expanded Medicaid and does not have any existing Medicaid 
Waivers to be used as funding or pilot funding for supportive services or issues tangential to 
homelessness and chronic homelessness such as low-income risk pools (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services 2019). In San Francisco and Shreveport, interviewees highlighted 
Medicaid funding as a major asset for supportive housing policy development and 
implementation. In Atlanta, the majority of interviewees illustrated the lack of state funding 
overall, as a barrier to supportive housing policy development and implementation. Municipal 
level actors and providers also emphasized the absence of Medicaid Expansion as a missed 
opportunity for additional state level funding to facilitate supportive housing implementation. 
“We haven’t expanded Medicaid, so paying for the services is really challenging. We are 
thinking through a sustainability plan for 550 units of PSH … we are developing right now... Oh, 
and beyond the Medicaid, sustainability in terms of other public resources to homelessness, we 
have no dedicated state or local dollars for investments in homelessness.”lix 
Despite these drawbacks, this research found policy mobilization among municipal level 
actors that was unique to the case of Atlanta. This policy mobilization is specific engagement by 
local level actors, both political and bureaucratic, to seek out and advocate for state level 
resources to assist in homelessness and supportive housing policy and programming. These 
interviewees emphasized that their efforts to seek out state level resources were motivated by a 
lack of municipal governmental funding, as well historically limited federal funds for the Atlanta 
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Continuums of Care (CoC), which will be discussed more in the next section. Interviewees felt 
that some state level resources could be made available that would help support their efforts in 
the absence of or constrained municipal and federal funding. “…the state their Department of 
Community Affairs funds some programs through passthrough CDBG grants, behavioral health 
and disabilities, provider vouchers for people with MH...There has been now more a concerted 
effort [from the state] to partner with Partners for Home [new Atlanta CoC]…they fund 
physicians to fund PATH [Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness] outreach 
teams…”lx 
These municipally driven efforts to seek out state funding have proven fruitful so far. As 
mentioned above, local actors have been able to leverage additional support for behavioral health 
services. Local actors stated that the relationships with state level bureaucrats in these agencies 
are growing, and they are hopefully that these relationships will continue to increase state 
investment to support local initiatives in to fill in funding gaps. Local actors in Atlanta may have 
been more willing to seek out state level funding compared to San Francisco and Shreveport due 
to the highly constrained funding environment at the municipal and federal levels.   
Georgia, as one of the states that strongly contributed to the development of the new 
Republic Party is a historically conservative state (R. Mickey 2015). This history of policy 
conservatism makes future participation in welfare or social service funding unlikely. However, 
in recent years, state level representation and public opinion has been changing. Aside from 
potential swings in public and representative ideology, policy diffusion from other conservative 
states regarding Medicaid Expansion utilizing waivers may increase the likelihood of Georgia 
taking interest in Medicaid Expansion options. Atlanta’s CoC has also taken an active role in 
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lobbying Georgia for the benefits of Medicaid Expansion (Partners for Home 2017). The 
changing political environment, paired with an increasing relationship between municipal and 
state actors, may ultimately move the policies towards greater alignment and may help Atlanta’s 
municipal level supportive housing efforts work better to their intended ends (Lillvis and Greer 
2016).   
Municipal Accountability and Funding 
In this section, there are two distinct barriers to supportive housing policy that stem from 
Atlanta’s funding for homelessness programming and Atlanta’s use of funding for homelessness 
programming. The first refers to two issues: Atlanta’s history of a low-level of federal 
Continuum of Care funding, and a history of very limited or no municipal level funding for 
homelessness programming and policy (e.g. taxation, bonds, etc). The second refers specifically 
to Atlanta’s murky relationship with federal funding as a product of the limited transparency 
around federal funding and a history of corruption.  
When the Continuum of Care funding streams were formalized by the federal government in 
1995, local communities were required to identify a ‘CoC’ in order to submit a single application 
for federal funding (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012). Since the 
passage of the McKinney Vento Act in 1987, most communities already had some type of 
organization among community groups overseeing homelessness programming, and therefore the 
formal transition to a CoC was less challenging. Atlanta, however, was late to the game. 
Although there is limited documentation and literature on this topic, interviewees emphasized 
that Atlanta’s slow decision to establish a CoC substantially reduced the metropolitan area’s 
baseline amount of funding, as the initial amount was tied to formally establishing a CoC. The 
downstream effects of this choice constrain Atlanta’s resources for homelessness programming, 
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requiring the municipality to look elsewhere for funding sources. “From what I understand, 
when the CoC funds first came out in the ‘80s, Atlanta didn’t go after the money initially, they 
were slow to apply, that made a big difference … just from day one essentially, if you didn’t 
apply in the beginning, you had a lower dollar amount at a later date, we started out at a 
disadvantage, you can only increase in bonus dollars, … CoCs can only grow in small 
increments every year.”lxi  
Despite the reality of limited federal funding, the City of Atlanta has a history of no to very 
limited municipal governmental efforts to levy funds to address homelessness. There has been 
opposition to taxation, in particular, as a funding source.lxii Other municipal funding Atlanta has 
been limited to public-private partnerships, with the majority of municipal funding coming from 
philanthropic or corporate investments (Atlanta Development Authority 2009; Torres and 
Garland 2017). The United Way has been one of the largest sources of funding, acting as both a 
partner providing match funding for municipal investments, as well as a source of staffing for 
municipal bureaucracy dedicated to homelessness programming and the CoC itself. “[With the 
CoC restructuring] …until the dollars were available for that [the United Way] funded it and 
staffed it until the resources were coming in in a more sustainable way, [the United Way] funded 
it for a year or two, providing staffing still now, but not to the same degree.”lxiii This limited 
governmental funding is surprising, especially on the part of the municipal government giving 
the constrained federal funding opportunities. However, this hampered arrangement makes the 
growth of a submerged state role as a primary funder less surprising (Weir and Schirmer 2018). 
Overall, all interviewees emphasized that the reliance on non-governmental sources of funding 
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acts as a serious barrier to supportive housing implementation, because funding sources are not 
sustainable. Therefore, much programming goes un-funded, or not implemented, especially in 
the way of building more supportive and/or affordable housing units. 
In this inhibited funding environment, there are two additional barriers that directly affect 
supportive housing policy implementation. These two constraints may be directly related to the 
history of a limited governmental role, or the major role that private or non-governmental actors 
play as funders and contractors in Atlanta’s homelessness policy and programming. These 
additional barriers are a history of corruption, and reduced transparency around governing efforts 
and use of funding. In a strongly delegated state, even with a newly established role for 
municipal government that pulls agents towards greater potential oversight and centralization, 
delegated, private actors have their own interests that may contradict policy goals and may be 
easier to conceal in a delegated state with limited transparency and oversight (Hackett 2016; 
Mettler 2016; Weir and Schirmer 2018).  
The majority of interviewees, unprompted, directly cited corruption and or misuse of 
appropriated public or (private funds for public use) by public officials as a major challenge to 
homeless and supportive housing programming and policy in the city of Atlanta. In Atlanta, 
decades of corruption in housing and homelessness policy and programming, specifically, ruled 
the city in the 1990s (Deere, Trubey, and Klepal 2018; Jarvie 2006). Since then, rumors of 
corruption in the Franklin Administration, Reed Administration, and new charges of corruption 
among the current Bottoms Administration are an undercurrent continually tying elected officials 
to staffing bribery schemes and unauthorized uses of municipal funds (Cardinale 2014; Deere 
2019). Most recently, the Bottoms Administration had 2017 Continuum of Care funding 
withdrawn as a result of misuse of federal funds (Deere 2018).  
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The environment of limited governmental funding, and a strong reliance on non-
governmental actors not only as service providers but as funders themselves, engenders a state of 
limited transparency and oversight of public investments. The continued reliance on private 
dollars, as a result of a strong delegated state and a history of limited governmental investment, 
presents serious barriers to supportive housing policy implementation. Despite Atlanta’s 
significant efforts to establish both municipal level supportive housing policy and de-
criminalization legislation, the lack of transparency and accountability create threats that must be 
addressed in order for policies to function effectively.  
6. Summary  
Atlanta is a case where the Continuum of Care has become integrated into municipal 
government and homeless policy processes. Atlanta, too, also came to have a municipal 
supportive housing policy by way of institutional restructuring. Atlanta’s reform occurred when 
the Continuum of Care restructured, moving from a tri-jurisdictional arrangement to separate city 
and county CoCs. The restructuring was prefaced by an investment in homelessness and chronic 
homelessness prevention and services in Atlanta by the city. Since then, the city adopted a 
supportive housing policy, and made the choice to oversee the new city of Atlanta Continuum of 
Care, therefore officially integrating these policy processes.  
Despite these policy changes Atlanta still suffers from serious barriers to policy 
implementation resulting from the histories of race and segregation, entrenched elite preferences, 
and limited state involvement. There still exists a strong, separate policy effort mobilizing police 
services to coordinate an indirect and informal policy space of moving groups of persons 
experiencing homelessness to other jurisdictions or away from desirable areas based on the 
desires of economic elites. Finally, Atlanta faces significant funding challenges related to the 
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history of Atlanta’s CoC, limited governmental funding, and a reliance on nongovernmental 
actors as both providers and funders. The state and economic elite policy initiatives remain 
separate and constrain decision-making and policy implementation as a result, while the 
institutional arrangements of Atlanta as a metropolitan area have direct, negative effects on all 








Chapter 7: Shreveport: No Municipal Governance, Administrative Burdens and Elite 
Influence 
 
1. What’s Happening in Shreveport?  
Unlike San Francisco and Atlanta, Shreveport, Louisiana serves as the representative case for 
municipalities without a municipal government level supportive housing policy. Thirty percent 
of the cities in our national dataset without a supportive housing policy matched the same criteria 
(variables) as Shreveport. Shreveport is a case where the Continuum of Care (CoC) and the local 
government remain very separate. In homeless policy decision-making and in practice, 
Shreveport’s local government and the CoC are very separate, especially when compared to the 
integration seen in Atlanta and San Francisco. This separation, in policy design and practice, was 
the most prominent theme among interviewees. The CoC in Shreveport has strong policy 
capacity and despite of limited municipal involvement has made great strides in reducing 
homelessness in Shreveport. Yet in the face of this success, the lack of local government 
involvement presents continuous barriers to supportive housing policy design and 
implementation for the CoC by limiting their authority and the resources available to the CoC to 
pursue and execute homeless policy.  
Beyond the separation of municipal government and the CoC, Shreveport also experiences a 
strong, and independent influence from economic elites that engenders further barriers to 
supportive housing policy similar to San Francisco and Atlanta. Orgnaized economic elites acts 
as an informal, policy mechanisms outside of local government decision-making and CoC 
activity to unofficially govern the activity of individuals experiencing homelessness through elite 
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requests for police department action to manage homelessness. Most of this police activity is 
punitive and contradicts CoC policy and evidence-based homelessness reduction programs (cite). 
As discussed previously, although police departments are a part of local government 
infrastructure, this action by elites is classified as a separate policy process because the policy 
mechanisms function in a different manner compared to all other types of local government 
policy making (legislation, ballot initiatives, and regulation). The CoC in Shreveport has taken 
steps to curb such police activity, but these efforts are not formal policy and have not been 
widely effective due to the limited participatory ability of the CoC as nongovernmental actors.  
Finally, the state of Louisiana also remains separate from local homeless policy decision-
making. [as is the case in San Francisco and Atlanta]. Shreveport sees more direct state level 
policies that offer to provide tangential support for homelessness policy and programming, 
especially chronic homelessness. Yet, severe resource constraints facing Louisiana overall 
negatively affect many state level efforts, perpetuating misalignment between state and local 
initiatives and act as further barriers to local supportive housing policy efforts.  
This chapter will focus on explaining why, as compared to San Francisco and Atlanta, 
Shreveport experiences little to no municipal governmental involvement in homelessness policy 
and programming or supportive housing policy, and outlining the barriers to 1) municipal 
governmental involvement and 2) the influences of the barriers resulting from the lack of a 
municipal role on the current supportive housing efforts put forth by the CoC.  
Overall, Shreveport presents a case of a strong delegated state with few incentives for 
municipal governmental participation. An absence of incentives for municipal involvement are 
exacerbated by participatory inequity in local governmental decision-making; racial tensions and 
racism; and limited state involvement that fails in implementation.  
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2. Formalizing the Role of the Delegated State 
Shreveport is a case of nearly full delegation of homelessness policy and programming to 
non-governmental actors. The City of Shreveport, based on archival results and interviews, does 
not participate in homeless policy implementation and has very limited involvement in decision-
making. The Continuum of Care acts as the primary governing entity for homeless policy and 
programming in Shreveport and the regional area (City of Shreveport Louisiana 2016). The 
designation of the CoC as the main governing entity means that the CoC designs policy priorities 
regarding responses to homelessness, decides how federal CoC dollars will be used and works 
with other local non-profit organizations that are a part of or work with the CoC to implement 
homeless policies such as coordinated entry, permanent supportive housing units, etc.  
The primary role of the City of Shreveport, from 2002lxiv onward has been to act as a 
passthrough organization to distribute federal funding for the CoC. This federal funding includes 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, Housing Opportunities for Persons with 
AIDS (HOPWA) and CoC Emergency Solutions Grants (ESG) (City of Shreveport Louisiana 
2016). “The city itself does very little… [the] Department of Community Development has 
passthrough money through ESG funds, so we can access that funding, but the Department of 
Community Development doesn’t have a clear understanding of how that funding needs to be 
used.”lxv Beyond allocating federal funding, there have been fewer than ten instances between 
2002 and 2019 of City Council or Mayoral deliberations or decisions pertaining to homelessness 
in the city of Shreveport (City of Shreveport Louisiana 2019).  
 
lxiv 2002 is the limit of Shreveport’s archival database and in person records I was able to access. Interviewees 
recollection dates back to early 2000’s, with more established timelines from 2008 onward.  
lxv Nonprofit/CoC Stakeholder Interviewee 2.2 
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The first instance was a long deliberation over nearly two years from 2014 through 2015 
debating whether or not to allow the CoC to use public land to build a new homeless shelter. 
Interviewees emphasized that this was one of the few times that the city was involved in 
homeless policy decision-making. Interviewees also cited that the CoC received strong pushback 
when trying to receive permission to build the new shelter despite serious capacity constraints at 
the original shelter location. Ultimately, in 2014, the City Council agreed to authorize the Mayor 
to execute a cooperative agreement for the CoC, HOPElxvi for the Homeless, to utilize a public lot 
in Shreveport to construct the new shelter (City of Shreveport Louisiana 2014).  
The second major instance was in 2012 when the City Council agreed to reallocate 79,000 
from the Farmers Market fund to the CoC for homeless services programming (City of 
Shreveport Louisiana 2016). Other instances include a few deliberations over constructing low 
income housing developments, the development of a ten year plan for homelessness in 2005 
(which there is limited archival documentation at the municipal level on whether or not this was 
completed and what actions may have stemmed from this), and two debates over declaring 
November as homelessness awareness month (Everson 2014).  
The near complete absence of policy debates regarding homelessness at the City level 
validates interviewees statements that the City of Shreveport is in practice essentially uninvolved 
in local homeless policy. The City is more involved in tangential policy spaces including 
affordable housing through the Shreveport Housing Authority, regarding distribution of federal 
affordable housing funding, and parish level Medicaid administration via Medicaid expansion 
enrollment efforts. Yet, overall, the results demonstrate that Shreveport stands as a direct 
comparison to the policy models in Atlanta and San Francisco where there has been deliberate 
 
lxvi Acronym not defined. Organization name written in all capital lettering for ‘hope’.  
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and purposeful integration of municipal government and the Continuum of Care to oversee and 
implement local homeless policy and programming.  
This research was not able to find a record of a statutory designation of authority for 
homeless policy and programming to the CoC by the City of Shreveport or Bossier Parish. In 
addition, this research was also unable to find records of the historical development of 
Shreveport’s CoC. Based on the extant literature, Shreveport’s informal delegation of authority 
to the CoC would align with federal homeless policy and the history of decentralization and 
neoliberalism in U.S. homeless policy overall (Moser Jones 2015). Prior to the McKinney Vento 
Act in 1987, most municipalities did not formally address homelessness (Grob 1994). Culturally, 
homelessness was thought to be the responsibility of families or community organizations. The 
development of the CoC’s was argued to be a natural extension of the existing community or 
non-governmental structures that had been historically responding to homelessness (Grob 1994; 
Moser Jones 2015). Therefore, in many municipalities across the U.S., cities’ roles in addressing 
homelessness may not come out as a question, due to the institutionalization of the CoCs as the 
main arbiters of homeless programming and the policy histories of limited role for municipalities 
in many parts of the U.S (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). 
In summary, this research finds that across the past twenty years to the present Shreveport 
has retained very separate municipal government and Continuum of Care in homeless policy 
processes. The ways that this separation plays out in practice, regarding political decision-
making and policy implementation, has notable implications for homeless policy governance. 
These implications shape who decides, what policy options are available, and how homeless 
policies are implemented and overseen. The bifurcation also ultimately influences the success of 
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various homeless policy goals, such as effectively introducing and implementing coordinated 
entry, supportive housing or housing first.  
3. The Voluntary Welfare State: Participatory Inequity in Local Decision-Making and the 
Functioning of Complete Delegation 
The results of the interviews and archival analyses reiterate that Shreveport is a case of 
complete delegation of homelessness policy and programming to nongovernmental actors. As 
discussed above, this delegation may not be entirely surprising given the history of homelessness 
policy in the United States and the alignment with conservative ideals of welfare state 
governance (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development n.d.). What this section discusses, following from Shreveport’s history of 
delegated authority to nongovernmental actors, is how this delegation affects policymaking in 
decision-making and implementation. This section also evaluates Shreveport as a case of the 
implications of complete policy delegation for homelessness policy outcomes. To date, most of 
the research on delegated authority to nongovernmental actors in different welfare policy spaces 
has focused on identifying and measuring degrees of delegation, which actors comprise the 
delegated state, and processes leading up to the choice to delegate away from government. This 
section also adds to the literature on the delegated or submerged state by providing empirical 
evidence of the mechanisms of the delegated state at work in active policy processes.  
The most striking result from the case analyses was that nongovernmental or CoC 
interviewees stressed their absence from most local policy decision-making. Interviewees 
expressed that this absence was not desired on their part as stakeholders in homelessness policy 
but a reality in Shreveport due to the overall absence of any local government authority in 
homelessness policy decision-making or programming. Beyond a general absence, interviewees 
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also emphasized their difficulty accomplishing tasks directly related to homelessness policy or 
programming as a result of limited to no access to local governmental processes or decision-
making. In effect, constrained political participation and reduced political leverage across 
Continuum of Care actors introduced to barriers to homelessness policy and supportive housing 
implementation in Shreveport.   
The majority of interviewees cited local government’s general absence in homelessness 
governance and programming. The absence, interviewees stated, and archival analysis reflects, 
comes in the form of: staffing or monetary resources, bureaucratic expertise and formal 
opportunities for political participation. The City of Shreveport provides no municipal level 
monetary resources for homelessness policy or programming (City of Shreveport Louisiana 
2016). Staffing is explicitly directed to the Continuum of Care. Bureaucratic expertise or policy 
capacity for homeless programming is also delegated to the CoC (HOPE Connections 2019b; 
Shreveport Downtown Development Authority 2019).  
In practice, the CoC does attempt to coordinate with the city regarding Community 
Development Block Grant (CBDG) funding and for housing vouchers through the Community 
Development Department. However, the CoC does not directly receive CBDG funding. Further, 
the CoC relies heavily on private donations to fill in gaps in federal support and due to the lack 
of local or state funding. “We can’t do it without the federal funding, but sometimes there is a 
disconnect with boots on the ground…One of our largest funders is the Community Foundation 
[private funding entity].”lxvii 
Regarding bureaucratic policy capacity and staffing, the CoC remains relatively separate 
from the city regarding meeting attendance and homelessness policy governance. The majority 
 
lxvii Interviewee 2.5 CBO Actor/Homeless Services 
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of decision-makers and attendees at CoC monthly meetings who provide essential policy 
capacity to support federal designated goals come from nongovernmental actors in the local area 
(HOPE Connections 2019b). 
Considering formal opportunities for political participation, the majority of interviewees 
stated that they as CoC member organizations or stakeholders had never been invited to a 
municipal governmental meeting. Interviewees also emphasized that the bulk of instances where 
local government does reach out to the CoC is not about homeless policy or planning but in 
response to elite complaints about the presence of individuals experiencing homelessness in 
downtown business districts. “The only time I’ve ever been called to a meeting with the city 
council to talk about issues of homelessness, I was like sweet maybe the city will start doing 
something, awesome, and they called us in and they said that they had complaints about people 
pooping in the doorway of the Courthouse, and I was like that’s all you want to talk about, and 
so we were like we could really use money for a low-barrier shelter, and nothing ever came of 
that.”lxviii This prioritization of very different interests reiterates the separation of the CoC and city 
government, where the CoC prioritizes evidence-based homeless reduction initiatives and the 
city’s limited participation prioritizes policy discussions focused on addressing undesirable 
behaviors associated with homelessness. 
Following from reduced opportunities to participate in political decision-making, most 
interviewees described participatory inequity for the CoC compared to municipal actors in policy 
spaces necessitating participation in order for the CoC to successfully carryout homeless 
programming. In effect, CoC actors have very limited opportunity to participate in municipal 
policy debates. Yet, CoC actors require municipal resources and access to municipal decision-
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making in order to implement homeless policy and programming. Such municipal resources 
include debates on building permitting or zoning ordinances for construction of CoC space and 
affordable housing, local funding initiatives and policing. Overall, the participatory challenges 
CoC actors face to enter municipal policy spaces present ongoing barriers to any homeless policy 
implementation, let alone supportive housing policy.  
The most frequently cited example of participatory inequity interviewees discussed was the 
case of building the new Shreveport CoC shelter. Prior to 2015, Shreveport did not have a 
singular homeless shelter that had the ability to offer and coordinate food services, social 
services, medical and housing needs (Brumble 2013; Durden 2015). The CoC at the time was 
working towards adopting a coordinated entry system for homelessness management (City of 
Shreveport Louisiana 2016). The CoC decided that in order to begin moving towards a 
coordinated entry approach they needed a shelter that provided a ‘one stop shop’ for individuals 
experiencing homelessness. This one stop shop would allow individuals experiencing 
homelessness to register for social services, register with the CoC and begin receiving medical 
aid and other vital services without having to travel to multiple locations across the city. A 
centralized registration process would also allow the CoC to track clients and prioritize their 
needs based on federal vulnerability scales in order to implement coordinated entry and begin 
moving towards supportive housing or housing first programs.  
When the CoC began working through the permit approval process, they faced substantial 
pushback from City Council members, the Community Development Department and the private 
Shreveport Downtown Development Authority (DDA). Overall the discussions from the 
interviews demonstrated that a lack of participation or a seat at the table in municipal policy 
debates inhibited the CoC’s ability to lobby for their case to construct the shelter. The strong 
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economic alliances between the private business community and City Council further 
exacerbated existing participation disparities facing the CoC.  
The original challenge the CoC faced in this process regarded the location of the shelter. The 
CoC wanted to build the shelter downtown, to promote ease of access to services for individuals 
experiencing homelessness. Interviewees described that ultimately strong pushback from the 
DDA and limited input from the CoC resulted in the CoC changing their request for permitting 
downtown to different location. “I don’t know if you’re familiar with how Shreveport is. The city 
wanted to revitalize the downtown, but at the same time other people wanted a lot of homeless 
out of downtown – fund the day shelter that is like 5 miles away. It’s always very political.”lxix 
The new location was over one mile away from downtown and proved difficult to access for 
low-income or homeless individuals facing transportation constraints. The shelter was built in 
2015 year, after delays related to permitting and due to funding shortages (City of Shreveport 
Louisiana 2014, 2015). The political participation constraints facing the CoC directly conflicted 
with CoC policy goals to promote coordinated entry, and federally mandated goals to provide 
coordinated entry and work towards housing first, by inhibiting policy implementation and 
creating new barriers related to transportation and access. 
The second, most prominent theme interviewees cited as a constant policy barrier directly 
related to participatory inequity or limited CoC authority are police relations. Currently, under 
federal regulation, CoCs must be working to reduce criminalization of homelessness in order to 
continue to receive federal funding (Tars 2015). In practice, the absence of any municipal 
governmental role for the CoC makes this mandate not feasible. The majority of interviewees 
cited continual challenges between Shreveport and Bossier parish police officers regarding 
 
lxix Interviewee 2.4 CBO Actor 
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punitive responses to homelessness, management of homelessness, and barriers to implementing 
CoC coordinated entry practices. Punitive responses include: jailing or citing individuals for 
quality of life crimes or behaviors related to mental illness; management of homelessness 
including relocating individuals to less desirable or less accessible areas; and coordinated entry 
barriers including attempts to work with police officers to redirect individuals experiencing 
homelessness to the CoC instead of jail or hospital emergency departments. Overall, 
interviewees described requests for police reform through primarily educational outreach but an 
absence of any firm policy. “So that has been a continual challenge and I’m sure it is elsewhere. 
We have tried to work with community police, we’ve done education with them, and we try, we 
have a program where they have community liaison officers, that individual really tries to 
integrate into a certain part of the city and learn who the individuals are who are homeless, as 
you know it becomes a revolving door because they don’t want to arrest them because they have 
to house them and [there are] no options when they get released [from jail]. It is very 
difficult…but you get a new officer who tries to jump to that arrest vs. looking at options that are 
available.”lxx  
CoC actors without municipal authority cannot require police officers to make any policy or 
practice changes regarding homelessness. Interviewees stated that the CoC continually offers 
trainings for officers on engagement practices, quality of life crimes, and responding to mental 
health crises or behaviors. Interviewees stated that while they have had luck with some 
individual officers, they face uncertainty regarding the police department as a whole and ongoing 
challenges in educating new recruits or transfers. The lack of any authority or greater political 
participatory equity places CoC policy in a voluntary state. CoC actors may be required to 
 
lxx Interviewee 2.8 Healthcare Practitioner/Academic Expert/CBO Actor 
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promote or work towards certain policies and practices, but in cases of primary policy 
delegation, participation from municipal actors who are vital to the implementation process 
remains voluntary.  
The absence of any local government participation in homelessness policy, paired with 
severe constraints on political participation for CoC members ends in the reality of a voluntary 
policy space. Complete delegation of homelessness governance translates into a policy space 
where regulations governing the CoC cannot be translated into practice as a direct result of the 
limited to no authority CoC actors have over any municipal services, or other private or 
nongovernmental actors, in order to effectively coordinate policy implementation. CoCs in this 
space can only ask and hope for buy-in from critical actors. In cases where actors governing 
housing resources, zoning and building permitting, police activity and even county or parish 
level health insurance enrollment choose not to participate, homelessness policy and 
programming may fail or stagnate with serious consequences for persons experiencing 
homelessness and local economies (Willison 2017b). Without any real CoC governing authority, 
homelessness policy under the delegated state remains voluntary.  
The voluntary status of the current delegated state of homeless policy in Shreveport and 
many municipalities across the U.S. assumes adequate levels of policy capacity and action by the 
local CoC. Shreveport is a case where the CoC is very strong and has been able to make strides 
in homelessness reduction due to their adoption of a coordinated entry model of service delivery 
(prioritizing the most vulnerable first) (HOPE Connections 2019a). Even with this strong CoC 
model seen in Shreveport, as outlined in this chapter the CoC faced very substantial challenges to 
implementing these policies, reducing punitive responses to homelessness and building more 
housing infrastructure. Other literature has demonstrated notable heterogeneity in CoC service 
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capacity and gaps in service delivery, nationally (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). In 
municipalities with the same characteristics as Shreveport, where the municipality is not 
involved, but the CoC does not have strong policy capacity, the effects of delegation and a 
limited municipal role may pose greater challenges to homeless policy implementation and have 
stronger implications for the health and wellbeing of individuals experiencing homelessness and 
at risk of homelessness.  
4. Policing, Economic Elites, and Race 
The previous section outlined Shreveport’s history of delegation of homelessness governance 
to nongovernmental actors and the practical implications of this delegation to the functions of 
homelessness policy. This section will consider the role of elites in further fragmenting the 
decentralized policy space and exacerbating implementation challenges for the Continuum of 
Care. In Shreveport, organized elites as a structural interest function very similarly as in Atlanta 
and San Francisco. Wealthy elites and business owners make formal or informal complaints with 
police officers, who respond by reacting to homeless behaviors either through statutory functions 
or informal activities like removing persons experiencing homelessness from desirable areas or 
business districts.  
What is very different in Shreveport compared to San Francisco and Atlanta, is that without a 
formal governing mechanism for the CoC through the local government, the CoC as stated has 
no authority or leverage over police activity and cannot review current practices or make any 
time of acute or long-term reforms. The absence of formal CoC roles and constrained political 
participation for the CoC has led to a challenging relationship between police officers and the 
CoC. The entirely voluntary reform efforts on the part of the police department regarding 
policing and punitive responses to homelessness also developed from this institutional 
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relationship. The police department, or municipal corrections, are not discussed as community 
partners in any of the CoC’s recent Annual Action plans to HUD (City of Shreveport Louisiana 
2016, 2017). Similarly, with little to no oversight of police activity and limited viable 
mechanisms for reform, Shreveport interviewees discussed issues of racism and/or bias against 
individuals with severe mental illness. Both of these issues have serious consequences for the 
treatment of individuals experiencing chronic homelessness, while also creating substantial 
barriers to implementing homelessness policy and programming and or best practices including 
supportive housing and coordinated entry.  
As mentioned, policing homelessness in Shreveport works through very similar mechanisms 
as in San Francisco and Atlanta. The primary mechanism interviewees discussed is wealthy elites 
and business owners issuing complaints to police officers. Interviewees outlined that the 
complaints usually pertain to the presence of persons experiencing homelessness in the 
downtown district. Business owners are typically the most common complainers, because they 
have concerns that the presence of homelessness dissuades patrons from entering their 
businesses. Many people experiencing homelessness spend time downtown because of access to 
services and transportation. Organized business also issues complaints about homelessness in the 
downtown district. This refers to the Downtown Development Authority (DDA) which will both 
submit complaints to City Council to encourage greater police responses to homelessness, as 
well as direct requests to police officers to increase enforcement in the downtown core. “ [The] 
DDA is very vocal against homeless people in Shreveport, as far as taking away benches 
downtown so there’s no place to sit, that was the City Council, the DDA had pressure on the 
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Council to do that, you know you’ve hear about all of the weird anti-homeless city ordinances, 
you can’t do whatever, I know our folks get harassed a decent amount.”lxxi  
The second type of interactions police officers have with persons experiencing homelessness 
is through patrols. In the instance of patrolling, interviewees described police interaction being 
initiated as a result of behavioral health symptoms including substance use disorders and or 
severe mental illness. Patrolling may also initiate responses based on police judgement of 
misdemeanor infractions which usually pertains to loitering. Interviewees emphasized that 
loitering citations are usually issued specifically for their homeless clients, who have nowhere 
else to go beyond outdoor, public locations. “A lot of repeat arrests… it may be getting arrested 
for loitering, and if you’re out on parole, then you get thrown back in jail, very minor like that, 
sleeping on a park bench.”lxxii  
As touched upon previously, police officers respond to these complaints in a number of 
ways. The different responses have varied effects on individuals experiencing homelessness. 
Loitering is the most common citation interviewees highlighted that their clients experience as a 
result of police interaction. Many interviewees discussed the burden of these minor citations, 
where homeless clients typically end up with multiple loitering tickets because they have no 
other place to go, are waiting for social services, the bus, etc., and may be subsequently 
incarcerated for failing to pay the tickets as a result of income constraints. “I can tell you what 
we experience with our patient population, if they got a transportation problem, if there is 
someone who has been incarcerated before, they have to pay a monthly fee they have to pay, 
then they will arrest them again. I wish I could give you the right terminology, if they are 
released early, but there is the monthly fee they have to pay, I don’t know if it’s the Parole 
 
lxxi Interviewee 2.7 CBO Actor/Low-income Services 
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Board, fifty, thirty bucks a month, if they can’t pay that fee they get picked up again. I’ve seen 
that someone was supposed to be at clinic, but they’ve been re-arrested.”lxxiii  
After loitering, there are a number of police responses in Shreveport that vary in severity. As 
in San Francisco and Atlanta, police will remove individuals experiencing homelessness from 
Downtown Shreveport to less desirable and accessible parts of the city, in response to elite 
requests. Removing individuals from downtown reduces their access to services and public 
transportation. This removal requires individuals experiencing homelessness to travel further to 
receive services, and or for health and social service outreach teams to travel further to establish 
interactions. Even if outreach teams reach these individuals, accessing services remains 
challenging for individuals if they remain in these out of reach areas as it is harder for them to 
travel from the local to various service area locations. This removal also has the additional, 
unintended consequence of deterring some individuals from receiving services at all. 
Interviewees cited that some persons experiencing homelessness become so disenchanted with 
police interactions that they retreat to other, highly inaccessible locations such as wooded areas, 
preferring to live off the grid than face consistent pushback against their attempts at accessing 
housing and medical services.  
Beyond removal, individuals experiencing chronic homelessness may also be jailed for a 
variety of quality of life infractions, including sleeping in public, eating in public, urinating in 
public, etc. Jail creates even greater barriers for individuals experiencing homelessness and 
homelessness policy overall as a result of repeating cycles of incarceration and re-entry, where 
persons are disconnected from services upon re-entry and not appropriately reconnected with 
services or the CoC system after discharge from jail. The lack of appropriate re-entry service 
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coordination often leads individuals to be re-incarcerated for failure to treat behavioral health 
symptoms or address homelessness (Parker and Griffin 2017). Interviewees emphasized that 
individuals experiencing homelessness and severe mental illness are disproportionately 
incarcerated in Shreveport and Bossier (HOPE Connections 2003). “…of course, people with 
mental illness, that is criminalization of mental health issues, … but if we had hospitals like we 
needed, that would cut down a lot. There are a lot of people who cycle between jail and 
homelessness – it’s about 60% of our clients, it may be higher, 60% at least – [we] see our 
clients in and out of jail all the time – especially at the behavioral health unit… and it’s nothing 
more than mental health – they get stabilized, get out and end up right back in [jail].”lxxiv 
Interviewees also discussed the same result for people of color, explicitly citing segregation and 
racism as influential factors. The wealth disparities that exist in Shreveport exacerbate this, 
where low-income individuals in Shreveport are disproportionately Black, and low-income and 
Black individuals face higher rates of homelessness.  
The final type of interaction between police and people experiencing homelessness are 
shootings. San Francisco and Atlanta did not discuss police violence. The majority of 
interviewees in Shreveport discussed negative or inappropriate responses to persons experiencing 
homelessness by police, with a few discussing explicit, violent responses to persons experiencing 
chronic homelessness. Interviewees cited police shootings as a response to persons who are 
homeless and suffering from severe mental illness. A commonly cited incident was a recent 
incident where a long-term client of the Shreveport CoC was shot in a casino after being released 
from jail. The client was schizophrenic and was not currently on appropriate medication after re-
entry. When the police responded, the individual was not able to cooperate with orders as a result 
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of his schizophrenia. Police officers perceived this to be a threat and shot and killed the client. 
“We had a client that had been in and out of our system for about a year, schizophrenic, had 
delusions, he was involved in criminal justice system… I guess it’s been about a year ago now, 
he was at a local casino, he was banned but they called the police, he was delusional, our client 
went for officer’s gun, and he was shot and killed. We had … tried to have him involuntarily 
committed, about two weeks before, it’s just, our system is so broken, when it comes 
to people with high mental health needs, it’s sad that his life ended that way...”lxxv  
 
Interviewees used this as an example of the lack of awareness and training among Shreveport 
police officers on appropriate responses to behavioral health crises. Interviewees outlined that a 
lack of initiative among police, and the lack of authority for the Shreveport CoClxxvi to institute 
any trainings or reforms, as primary reasons for inappropriate or violent police interactions with 
persons experiencing homelessness and SMI.  
These interactions between police and individuals experiencing homelessness, paired with 
the engagement constraints CoC actors face in coordinating with local police, present adverse 
consequences for chronically, homeless individuals as well as direct barriers to homeless policy 
implementation. Direct effects on individuals include barriers to accessing services resulting 
from removal from economic zones or incarceration, while also facing direct threats to mortality 
in the cases of shootings of persons suffering from severe mental illness. The effects on 
individuals are directly related to the effects on homeless policy implementation. The CoC’s 
limited authority restricts their ability to review police interactions and initiate efforts to 
 
lxxv Interviewee 2.6 CBO Actor/Healthcare and Homeless Services 
lxxvi The defined lack of authority by interviewees and archival documents was most often described as ‘requests’ or 
‘asks’ for reform or participation by police in trainings and the absence of any ‘mandate’ or ‘requirement’, paired 
with the described separation of the Continuum of Care from local government. 
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implement federal regulations aimed at reducing punitive responses to homelessness and 
promoting supportive housing.  
5. Medicaid Expansion Realities and Implementation Challenges 
Like San Francisco and unlike Atlanta, Shreveport is a case where the state of Louisiana 
policies exist and run parallel to the Continuum of Care policies. What this means, is that 
Louisiana has policies in place that are related to or provide support for individuals suffering 
from severe mental illness and/or homelessness; or resources and funding to support health 
services and behavioral health programming related to homelessness and severe mental illness. 
These policies center around include Medicaid expansion and alternative Medicaid waivers. 
These are not all of the policies that may be related to supportive housing policy and 
programming however, these are the two policies that stakeholder interviewees specifically 
identified and emphasized the influence of these policies on local level policy decision-making 
and implementation.  
The existence of these policies is an important first step, and one that offers alternative 
resources and funding opportunities for CoCs and communities looking to address homelessness 
in Louisiana. However, even though the state level policies target homeless populations and 
supportive medical services related to supportive housing policies, in practice the state level 
policies have different goals and work through different mechanisms to design and implement 
policy compared to the CoC in Shreveport. For example, Medicaid policy is developed through 
regulatory mechanisms at the state level with federal oversight through the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. Medicaid policy is implemented through local county (of here parish) 
public health offices. Medicaid goals are centered around behavioral health interventions and 
healthcare coverage. These mechanisms and goals are very different compared to CoC 
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governance structures and policy goals. This divergence creates 1) administrative barriers and 2) 
funding constraints that effectively engender implementation challenges for CoC actors working 
towards supportive housing policy.  
Without working to align policy goals and processes between state and local initiatives, 
supportive housing programming and policy in Shreveport will continue to face implementation 
challenges. This effect is compounded by an overall absent municipal government where state 
level funding and programming could fill this gap. Simultaneously, misalignment of these 
intergovernmental policies may further disincentivize municipal level actors from becoming 
more engaged in homelessness policy and programming by offering limited rationale and no 
downward pressure for policy engagement in terms of resources, requirements, or oversight.  
5A. Administrative Burden 
The policy space that the majority of interviewees cited as having the greatest influence on 
local homelessness policy and practice is Louisiana’s Medicaid expansion. Most interviewees 
emphasized that Medicaid expansion, overall, was beneficial for the state and provided access to 
new resources for persons experiencing homelessness, and in particular chronic homelessness. 
The reality of these new resources, though, is not ease of access to resources that sufficiently 
support local homelessness policy efforts. Nearly half of interviewees described challenges 
stemming from Medicaid expansion administration that simultaneously improve access to 
resources and services while also engendering new policy implementation barriers and short-
lived benefits for individuals. Archival documentation illustrated similar challenges related to 
Medicaid expansion implementation and homelessness. All in all, the evidence outlined 
challenges presented for supportive housing policy by Medicaid expansion as a product of state-
level policy design that did not adjust or work with local level implementation practices and 
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were not designed to adapt to inherent challenges posed by homelessness. Most of the design 
adaptation problems were associated with administrative features that 1) do not align with local 
level needs or practices and 2) directly contradict or create implementation challenges for 
homelessness specifically.   
Half of interviewees and all provider interviewees emphasized the challenges inherent to the 
discrepancies between local systems implementation and/or capacity and state level Medicaid 
requirements for implementation. This administrative misalignment ends in administrative 
burdens on local entities attempting to manage Medicaid billing and services in order to fund 
homelessness policy and programming and provide clients access to services. Or, billing 
challenges resulting from state level administrative burdens that do not align with local 
implementation practices.   
For example, the majority of the agencies that provide homelessness services and 
programming in Shreveport are very small, non-profit and non-governmental organizations. 
Interviewees detailed the challenges that these organizations face in working to actually bill 
Medicaid, due to the high administrative requirements to file and contest Medicaid 
reimbursements for different services. Many of these organizations face challenges related to 
sustaining Medicaid as a payer due to their inability to afford, as an organization, the 
infrastructure and resources to actually bill and manage Medicaid claims. This is exacerbated in 
certain types of claim circumstances. For example, interviewees outlined that case management 
services tend to be more challenging to bill for Medicaid compared to traditional medical 
services, often facing multiple claim rejections that require a higher administrative infrastructure 
to dispute the rejections. “The [case management] billing has proven difficult, in fact the, LA put 
our some housing that used Medicaid case management as ‘match’, two main agencies, our 
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providers of that have had a very difficult time keeping it a float, it’s very expensive to do 
Medicaid billing, to get reimbursements, so your agency’s too small, we almost have to have a 
third party billing company to bill Medicaid, yea it’s really complicated, they [Medicaid] will 
reject anything if they can.”lxxvii Case management services are a vital part of supportive housing 
and housing first. This administrative barrier presents a direct challenge to supportive housing 
policy by placing high barriers to retaining critical services.  
Beyond direct billing, Medicaid networks present a similar challenge for local community 
organizations working to address homelessness and chronic homelessness. Despite Medicaid 
Expansion, interviewees cited challenges finding providers who accept Medicaid, especially in 
the realm of primary care. This challenge compounds the effects of an environment already rife 
with implementation barriers. The compounding effect happens by constricting service access for 
at-risk clients who require medical interventions and coordinated primary care to manage and 
ameliorate homelessness (Stergiopoulos et al. 2015). Interviewees cited the limited Medicaid 
provider networks to be products of the challenging funding environment, where providers may 
be dis-incentivized from accepting Medicaid as a payer due to administrative reimbursement 
challenges and low-reimbursement rates. Ultimately, the misalignment between state level 
administrative requirements governing billing practices and shaping provider networks create 
additional administrative burdens for practitioners on the ground. These administrative burdens 
ultimately influence practitioners’ ability to adequately implement supportive housing policy and 
programming and homelessness services overall.   
Secondly, interviewees described administrative, implementation barriers arising from policy 
misalignment over issues inherent to homelessness. Interviewees described challenges 
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illustrating a lack of alignment between Medicaid policy procedures and Medicaid’s ability to 
work with and address the needs of persons experiencing homelessness, despite the high target 
population overlap between Medicaid recipients and homeless and chronically homeless 
individuals. The two most common examples of this type of policy misalignment interviewees 
cited are the relationship between homelessness and incarceration, and the administrative burden 
of Medicaid enrollment for individuals experiencing homelessness. 
The policy implementation challenges stemming from the interactions of incarceration, 
homelessness, and Medicaid, are very similar to the challenges facing San Francisco. Because of 
the strong relationship between incarceration and homelessness (Parker and Griffin 2017), 
individuals experiencing chronic homelessness tend to cycle in and out of jail. This cycling often 
leads to gaps in services for individuals released from incarceration, and is associated with 
higher rates of homelessness upon reentry, especially for individuals who were homeless prior to 
incarceration (McNiel, Binder, and Robinson 2005; Parker and Griffin 2017). In Shreveport 
specifically, interviewees stated that over half of incarcerated individuals in local jails are 
formerly homeless or cycling in and out of jail and homelessness (HOPE Connections 2003; 
Hope for the Homeless 2014). Local data was not available to verify these estimates, but a point 
in time count from Louisiana in 2013 showed 40 percent of homeless individuals surveyed had 
been recently incarcerated (Matheny et al. 2013). Medicaid enrollment does not work well in 
practice to address the persistent relationship between homelessness and incarceration (Snyder 
2016b; U.S. House of Representatives 2019). Therefore, when individuals experiencing 
homelessness who are enrolled in Medicaid are incarcerated, they lose Medicaid (Louisiana 
Department of Health 2017b, 4), and are often not re-enrolled upon re-entry (Medicaid and CHIP 
Payment and Access Commission 2018, 5; The Council of State Governments 2013). The 
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Louisiana Department of Health is working to address this policy misalignment, which may in 
the future reduce coverage gaps and enrollment challenges (Louisiana Department of Health 
2017a). 
This persistent service gap further perpetuates homelessness after re-entry by not promoting 
access to crucial services that can help reduce homelessness and manage chronic medical and 
behavioral health conditions (Greenberg and Rosenheck 2008; Hawthorne et al. 2012). The 
policy misalignment between Medicaid enrollment and outreach in Louisiana, and the lived 
experience of individuals experiencing chronic homelessness in Shreveport, create inherent 
barriers to effective supportive housing and homeless policy implementation by perpetuating 
gaps in access to necessary services (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and Office of Disability 2018). “I have been to several 
meetings with the Louisiana LaPre program, which is a special pilot program for post 
incarceration.  I have tried to stress the importance of providing RX & patient info about the 
person being released so they can provide that info to us when they return to the community. 
Unfortunately, we still have folks show up at [our clinic], with a 5 days of meds [that are put in a 
brown paper envelope] and they have no written medical or RX documentation.  That is how 
they are released. It makes more difficult for us to continue with care.”lxxviii 
Enrollment procedures and eligibility requirements also create inherent barriers to supportive 
housing and homelessness policy and programming overall by not tailoring policy approaches to 
population specific needs. Interviewees discussed two main administrative barriers related to 
Medicaid enrollment and eligibility. As discussed in San Francisco, prior to Medicaid Expansion 
the majority of chronically homeless individuals were not eligible for Medicaid (Warfield, 
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DiPietro, and Artiga 2016). This new eligibility has been a big benefit to individuals 
experiencing homelessness in Shreveport. What has been a challenge is the administrative 
process of enrolling individuals experiencing homelessness in Medicaid, as well as the eligibility 
requirements outlined by Medicaid that do not align with needs or reality of homelessness.   
Interviewees cited enrollment procedures as a common administrative barrier that created 
policy implementation conflict as a result of direct discord from issues inherent to homelessness. 
These enrollment procedures are common among federal medical and social service benefit 
programs. However, these requirements create policy tradeoffs for actors in the policy space as a 
result of the benefit inaccessibility for their targeted population.  
In Shreveport, interviewees cited basic enrollment procedures including having a form of 
identification as barriers to Medicaid enrollment for persons experiencing long-term 
homelessness. Often, such individuals have been without formal identification or any kind of 
identification for a very long period of time. Thus, requiring formal identification may create a 
barrier due to lack of trust among this vulnerable population, as well as through the processes 
required to obtain formal identification itself. As a result, provider organizations both in the 
Continuum of Care and external to the CoC face a choice of either providing in-house 
identification and enrollment processes, or not offering or relying on Medicaid resources due to 
these multiple levels of enrollment barriers persons experiencing chronic homelessness and 
severe poverty endure. “For homeless folks, getting ID's and paperwork to enroll in Medicaid 
can be a challenge at times. Some of the homeless providers, who say they help with ID's don't 
provide a good service all the time.”lxxix “…before [Medicaid expansion] we had charity 
hospitals, there was no need for any documentation of any kind, that is… it was easier for super 
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poor people, for working poor or people like that [to get care]...lxxx” The reality of this tradeoff 
exemplifies the misalignment between local and state level policy mechanisms in design and 
implementation, that ultimately influence policy decision-making and implementation outcomes 
which shape access to services for individuals experiencing chronic homelessness.  
The disconnect between the reality of homelessness and Medicaid eligibility also generates 
more challenges for homeless policy and programming in Shreveport. Shreveport is a 
municipality that exists thirty minutes outside of the Texas border. As mentioned in Atlanta and 
San Francisco, persons experiencing homelessness, especially chronic homelessness, are often 
mobile within or between metropolitan areas (Gray et al. 2011). Due to the proximity with 
Texas, many persons experiencing homelessness in Shreveport have often moved from Texas or 
move between Texas and Louisiana. This mobility creates fundamental challenges for Medicaid 
eligibility based since eligibility is tied directly to an individual’s place of residence, specifically 
parish (county) and state (State Health Access Data Assistance Center, Division of Health Policy 
and Management, and University of Minnesota School of Public Health 2018).  
Since persons experiencing homelessness do not have a place of residence, this policy 
misalignment between Medicaid and homeless needs creates consistent barriers to policy 
implementation. The barriers to policy implementation are generated by reducing accessibility to 
medical and other supportive services necessary to address the causes of chronic homelessness. 
In effect, when persons move to Shreveport from Texas and are on Texas Medicaid, they cannot 
receive services, and either must go back to Texas or must re-enroll in Louisiana Medicaid. 
“People will be coming in from Texas and Arkansas, they get on the bus, they have Texas 
Medicaid, but they can’t get their Medication filled, we get them enrolled in Louisiana Medicaid 
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until they complete that process, or they can leave again.”lxxxi Similarly, when persons live across 
parish lines in off-grid areas, residency is difficult to determine. Or, if individuals move between 
parishes as a result of police responses or service needs, they may not be able to access services 
outside of their parish network based on their Medicaid eligibility network.  
5B. Funding Constraints 
Funding was the second major concern or barrier interviewees discussed in reference to the 
role of state policies in shaping local homelessness policy and programming. Interviewees 
broadly emphasized that the state of Louisiana was not involved or was involved to a lesser 
degree compared to local and federal counterparts. Medicaid was the policy referenced most 
often by interviewees as a source of funding with constraints. However, interviewees reiterated 
an overall concern for the lack of state involvement or funding for behavioral health services and 
supportive services for homelessness programming generally from any state entity. Effectively, 
the interviews demonstrated a state policy space that both 1) runs parallel to local interests but 
due to misaligned interests or funding constraints is not able to interact effectively with local 
priorities, while simultaneously illustrating a state level policy space that is 2) otherwise absent 
due to greater economic constraints on the state of Louisiana.  
When thinking about local level incentives for supportive housing policy, actors consistently 
referenced state level policies that exist that could be leveraged for supportive housing policy but 
are either unable to due to state and local policy misalignment or overall funding constraints 
within these state level policies. Considering the first issue of policy misalignment, the majority 
of actors in Shreveport expressed concerns similar to those in San Francisco. This is the fact that 
Medicaid policy is a great resource for health services but has significant funding limitations for 
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anything beyond the scope of traditional health services. This illustrates a fundamental policy 
misalignment. Medicaid is increasingly advertised as a policy space amenable to homelessness 
programming, specifically in the context of supportive housing policy. However, Medicaid does 
not currently pay for housing itself (Paradise and Cohen Ross 2017).  
Further, local actors face many barriers to leveraging Medicaid resources for other supportive 
services beyond housing, too. The supportive services that nearly all interviewees mentioned as 
outside of current state policy resources are long-term behavioral health services. All health 
providers interviewed independently cited limited funding for long-term behavioral health 
services, even with Medicaid expansion. “No one is taking homeless people who are mentally ill. 
Nowhere for them to go. I deal with this weekly. Twice a month, I get a call from a parent, 20 
years old, schizophrenic, homeless, nowhere to go. No funding for long term care.”lxxxii 
Louisiana currently has multiple Medicaid 1915c Waivers to be used for long-term 
behavioral health services through Permanent Supportive Housing among various at-risk 
populations (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2019; Wagner 2017). However, in 
2017 Louisiana only had just over 2,000 PSH units available for the entire state (Wagner 2017). 
Further, state level policy documents outline presumed coordination between state level 
Medicaid policy and the Louisiana Housing Authority in order to develop and implement PSH 
among chronically homeless populations (State of Louisiana n.d.; Wagner 2017). The lack of 
knowledge among interviewees of state level PSH activity for long-term behavioral health 
services paired with state acknowledgement of limited capacity and coordination challenges 
suggests that findings of policy misalignment between state and local government may be 
occurring at the implementation phase. The misalignment may be a product of the fact that 
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Louisiana’s efforts to target long-term behavioral health among this population are relatively 
new, as well as the fact that coordination challenges between traditional ‘health services’ 
Medicaid policy and housing policy may further compound effects of misalignment by 
attempting to merge two programs with very different goals and administrative mechanisms.  
The recent efforts by Louisiana to merge the state policy administrative entities coordinating 
housing and supportive services for persons experiencing chronic homelessness may signal 
downstream policy change that would increase alignment of policy goals across the state and 
local policy efforts to eventually improve supportive housing policy implementation (State of 
Louisiana n.d.; Wagner 2017). However, an ongoing concern that may threaten these efforts is 
the limited capacity in terms of funding and housing output (units) for supportive housing 
development, even with ongoing state efforts (State of Louisiana n.d.). Interviewees additionally 
discussed the presence of the Louisiana Housing Corporation as a great coordinator of federal 
funding, but with limited funding opportunities overall (Louisiana Housing Corporation 2016, 3).  
Concerns about funding limitations in general, beyond issues of policy misalignment, take us 
to the second major finding regarding state involvement and funding. Interviewees discussed the 
increasingly uncertain economic circumstances facing Louisiana as a state. Interviewees often 
connected notions about state economic disadvantage to limited or absent state funding overall, 
as well as a reliance among policy makers and providers in the homeless policy space on federal 
funding and nonprofit donations over state resources as a whole. “You have to understand our 
state is a very depressed condition right now economically, facing really challenging financial 
cuts last few years, that has severely limited what the state can do… I don’t think they have the 
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resources or finances to really do what would be ideal. I just don’t think the state can become 
the player it could be or should be just because of those constraints.”lxxxiii 
The majority of interviewees stressed Louisiana’s dire economic situation in the context of 
any state involvement in homelessness policy or programming or tangential policies. 
Interviewees, including all state employees who were interviewed, felt that Louisiana’s 
economic circumstances constrained state level grants or investments in this policy space as well 
as others. Interviewees felt that these limitations constrained Louisiana to the degree that even 
without any political constraints the state could not become more involved in homelessness 
policy due to economic concerns. These concerns reiterate the potential for capacity constraints 
to limit state involvement in homelessness policy and programing even in the face of policy 
alignment efforts.  
6. Summary  
Unlike San Francisco and Atlanta, Shreveport serves as the representative case for 
municipalities without a local government level supportive housing policy. Shreveport, 
Louisiana, is a case where the Continuum of Care (CoC) and municipal policy goals, decision-
making and implementation remain very separate. The separation is evident in policy decision-
making and implementation, where the municipality has little to no involvement in homeless 
policy aside from coordinating passthrough federal funding. The CoC operates independently, 
debating homeless policy choices and implementing policies without aid from and little to no 
input from the local government. The lack of involvement by Shreveport’s municipal 
government presents direct barriers to supportive housing policy design and implementation in 
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Shreveport, by restricting the authority and the resources available to the CoC to coordinate 
policy activities.  
Unlike Atlanta and San Francisco, where the local government and the CoC have merged to 
jointly govern homeless policy, the Shreveport CoC remains independent, and in this 
independence effectively constrained in their ability to design and implement some policy 
changes. As discussed in the chapter, policing remains a persistent challenge in interactions with 
persons experiencing chronic homelessness, as well as a challenge for federal requirements to 
move away from punitive responses to homelessness and chronic homelessness. Since the CoC 
has no municipal authority, they are greatly limited in their ability to coordinate with the 
Shreveport Police Department, to require trainings on best practices or responses to individuals 
experiencing chronic homelessness and severe mental illness, or support coordinated entry 
practices with the assistance of police officers. Zoning remains another challenge. With limited 
ability to participate in municipal debates, the CoC is often disadvantaged in debates over new 
shelter or low-income housing constructions and often overshadowed by economic elites in the 
Downtown Development Authority. This is a stark comparison to San Francisco, and even 
Atlanta, where CoC actors are a part of the municipal bureaucracy, are heavily involved in policy 
design with city officials, and are able to coordinate with and facilitate design and 
implementation of policing interventions, supportive housing policy design and development, 
and municipal level funding initiatives.   
The Continuum of Care in Shreveport is a very strong organization with actors who have 
strong policy expertise and have been able to design a coordinated entry approach that embraces 
housing first. The CoC has been able to develop these activities due to strong buy in from the 
local CoC stakeholder network, even in the face of limited municipal support. If the CoC did 
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have a formal municipal role, their existing policy capacity would place them in a strong position 
to lobby for policing and reentry interventions, more supportive housing units and shelter 
development, and possibly municipal revenue sources to fill in existing resource gaps. Without a 
formal role for CoC actors, most of these activities may remain voluntary – hinging on the 
interest from other actors with few incentives to participate – for Shreveport and other city cases 








Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
1. Summary of Findings 
Chronic homelessness has severe implications for health disparities. Black Americans are 
four times as likely and Hispanic Americans are two times more likely to experience 
homelessness compared to white Americans (Fusaro, Levy, and Shaefer 2018). Homelessness 
contributes to high rates of chronic disease, adverse behavioral health outcomes, increased 
mortality, and lower rates of educational and job attainment over the life course (United States 
Interagency Council on Homelessness 2015). Longer durations of homelessness are associated 
with high mortality rates, adverse behavioral health outcomes and chronic medical conditions; 
moreover, persons experiencing chronic homelessness are more likely to remain homeless as 
length of homelessness increases (Stafford and Wood 2017). Homelessness and chronic-
homelessness hit large metropolitan areas especially hard over the past two decades (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2018). Unsheltered homelessness, which is 
primarily long-term homelessness, is increasing again for the first time in ten years. What are 
municipalities doing to address this public health crisis?  
Homelessness is a surprising case of a public health issue that is governed by a primarily 
decentralized system of non-governmental actors – both historically and today. The history of 
devolution and decentralization in homelessness governance makes it a unique policy arena 
where various actors compete and implement very different types of policies, all attempting to 
manage homelessness and long-term homelessness to different ends. The Department of Housing 
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and Urban Development has recently been encouraging partnerships between non-governmental 
actors and local governments in homeless policy governance to help improve policy coordination 
and implementation. This dissertation specifically investigates why municipal governments may 
choose to formally engage in responses to chronic homelessness, or not.  
Most research on homelessness focuses on empirical research identifying best practices 
for solutions to chronic or long-term homelessness. However, there is a wide gap in the literature 
investigating the political processes shaping the reality of establishing or implementing these 
best practices. As a secondary goal, this dissertation also seeks to understand the political 
processes influencing adoption by municipalities of best-practice solutions to reduce chronic 
homelessness, or the adoption of permanent supportive housing solutions.  
This dissertation argues that homelessness policy is a very fragmented and disjointed 
policy space as a result of decades of decentralization. Responses to chronic homelessness are 
governed in four separate and distinct policy arenas: the state, local government, elites, and 
homeless service providers or the Continuum of Care.lxxxiv The separation and conflict between 
these governing approaches result in increased challenges to establishing and implementing 
effective policy solutions to end chronic homelessness. Challenges include relatively limited 
state-level support such as financial resources and/or administrative burdens stemming from 
misaligned policy goals between state policies and CoC programming or the needs of persons 
experiencing homelessness on the ground; inequity in political participation that may exclude at-
risk populations or bias participation in favor of economic elites; and, finally, limited 
 
lxxxiv “Continuum of Care and Continuum means the group organized to carry out the responsibilities required under 
this part and that is composed of representatives of organizations, including nonprofit homeless providers, victim 
service providers, faith-based organizations, governments, businesses, advocates, public housing agencies, school 
districts, social service providers, mental health agencies, hospitals, universities, affordable housing developers, law 
enforcement, organizations that serve homeless and formerly homeless veterans, and homeless and formerly 
homeless persons to the extent these groups are represented within the geographic area and are available to 
participate.”(Housing and Urban Development 2017) 
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involvement by municipal governments in many cases. When municipal governments remain 
absent from homeless governance, CoCs may be constrained in their ability to carry-out policies 
and programming as a result of insufficient funding, coordination with local government to 
coordinate other necessary services such as behavioral healthcare, Medicaid administration, 
policing and incarceration, and zoning for or constructing supportive housing units themselves.   
This research finds that growth in policy capacity paired with structural changes 
incentivizing re-centralization of homelessness governance may be required to promote 
interaction and coordination across the policy approaches to overcome collective action 
problems and develop and implement effective solutions to long-term homelessness. However, a 
persistent problem that may require solutions beyond integration of the CoC and municipal 
government are protections of minority group and policy target populations in homeless policy 
debates. Across all cases in the research, homeless policy decision-making typically excludes 
persons who are at-risk of, currently, or formerly homeless. This bias in policy decision-making 
may promote implementation challenges by skewing processes in favor of elite preferences who 
generally oppose permanent supportive housing and may lead to policy adoption that does not 
successfully address the causes of chronic homelessness. This chapter reviews the primary 
findings from the results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis, and subsequently provide 
recommendations for policy makers to improve homeless policy governance systems to design 
and deliver policies that successfully ameliorate chronic homelessness.  
2. Findings from the Three City-Cases 
The three city cases were selected using a deductive technique with FsQCA software to 
identify municipalities that were most representative of the common combinations of variables 
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(from the national dataset of city homeless policy outcomes) across the outcomes of interest.lxxxv 
I identified cases most representative of each outcome type – municipalities with a municipal 
level homeless policy, or not – based on the cases in each outcome set within the sample. The 
most representative city cases were then further stratified by independent variables of interest in 
order to control for factors across cities within an outcome set but also select upon independent 
variables of interest. One case – Shreveport Louisiana – was selected for municipalities without a 
municipal supportive housing policy, as there was less heterogeneity in this outcome set. 
Shreveport, Louisiana, also represented the most common grouping of independent variables 
across cities in that outcome set. Two cases – Atlanta Georgia and San Francisco California – 
were selected for municipalities with, a supportive housing policy, in order to select to examine 
the effects of this heterogeneity on policy decision-making and implementation in municipalities 
with the same outcome (see Table 7).  
 
Findings from Atlanta 
The case of Atlanta represents large, liberal cities with a majority racial/ethnic minority 
population, high rates of chronic homelessness, located in conservative states that have not 
expanded Medicaid, that have a municipal level supportive housing policy. The lessons from 
Atlanta may translate into other major metropolitan areas in the southern U.S. working to address 
an urban homeless epidemic.  
What explains Atlanta’s adoption of this municipal level supportive housing policy? Atlanta 
ended up with a municipal homeless policy as a result of 1) institutional centralization and 2) 
 
lxxxv Set membership to select most representative cases, is determined by minimums. Determining membership 
across two variables takes the minimum of the two scores. Consistency is the sum of the minimum of the 
membership scores for x and y, over the sum of the minimum membership scores for x. Coverage is determined by 
the sum of the minimum of the membership scores for x and y, over the sum of the membership scores for y. 
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strong policy capacity and political mobilization around homelessness. Atlanta, as a city, 
experienced a decade of political mobilization and subsequent municipal investment in policy 
capacity – resources and staffing – to address the chronic homelessness crisis in the city of 
Atlanta. Following these years of direct investment in homelessness policy by the city of Atlanta, 
the former Atlanta metropolitan area Tri-jurisdictional Continuum of Care (CoC) decided to 
separate into individual entities within their respective municipal jurisdiction or centralize 
towards these jurisdictional arrangements. This meant that the city of Atlanta would now have its 
own, individual CoC rather than a shared regional entity of non-profits. This institutional 
restructuring, independent from city of Atlanta homeless policy decision-making, led the city of 
Atlanta to a new policy choice: how to organize this new, Atlanta based CoC. As a result of the 
strong degree of investment in both policy capacity and political mobilization around 
homelessness that Atlanta had experienced for the last decade, the city of Atlanta decided to 
strategically develop the new Atlanta CoC as a part of the Atlanta municipal bureaucracy, rather 
than a separate non-governmental entity, in order to improve the coordination of services.  
Almost immediately following the institutional restructuring bringing the CoC into Atlanta 
city government, in 2017 the new Atlanta CoC established their municipal level supportive 
housing policy as a primary part of the city of Atlanta’s plan to address chronic homelessness. 
Yet, Atlanta took this opportunity to move a step further, working to not only address 
homelessness through supportive housing policy efforts but also integrating formal, 
criminalization reform to address the cyclical relationship between chronic homelessness and 
incarceration and thus improve supportive housing service coordination (Pre-Arrest Diversion 
Design Team 2017; Torres and Garland 2018). In 2017, Atlanta established a Pre-Arrest 
Diversion pilot project to reduce quality of life arrests (QOL), by diverting any arrest for quality 
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of life reasons (e.g. sleeping outside, eating outside, urinating in public) out of jail, and into 
social services (as the primary group affected by QOL arrests are people experiencing chronic 
homelessness) (Robinson 2019; Roy et al. 2016).  
Yet, though the city of Atlanta has many lessons to share about processes and factors that 
may shape the development of and investment in municipal supportive housing policy efforts, 
there are many concurrent challenges facing Atlanta that also translate into important lessons for 
comparable cities. Atlanta still faces significant challenges in both policy implementation and 
decision-making related to supportive housing and punitive responses to homelessness. These 
challenges primarily include: 1. Jurisdictional boundaries affecting service delivery and 
responsibility; 2. Economic elites and policing; and 3. Funding, and ongoing relationships 
between state and federal entities. These ongoing challenges threaten effective policy 
implementation and may have the unintended effect of policy feedbacks that prevent supportive 
housing policy of working effectively to its intended goals.  
The structural organization of the jurisdictional boundaries of the Atlanta metropolitan area, 
as a product of the segregated south, has a direct and negative influence on the ability of 
overlapping jurisdictions to coordinate and organize over an overlapping problem and the same 
target population. In addition, despite strategic efforts by the City to move away from 
ineffective, punitive responses (Pre-Arrest Diversion Design Team 2017; Torres and Garland 
2018), there still exists strong, separate policy processes mobilizing police services to coordinate 
an indirect and informal policy response to homelessness in the form of moving groups of 
persons experiencing homelessness to other jurisdictions or away from desirable areas based on 
the desires of economic elites. Finally, Atlanta faces ongoing funding challenges related to the 
jurisdictional organizations, the CoC history and restructuring, and generally limited 
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involvement from the state of Georgia. The state efforts and economic elites’ policy responses 
remain separate from the local government/CoC policy initiatives. Overall, this separation and 
the concurrent, conflicting policy responses from elites results in constraints on local supportive 
housing decision-making and policy implementation. Atlanta’s metropolitan, jurisdictional 
arrangements have direct, negative effects on all policy efforts, and any policy coordination 
overall. 
Findings from San Francisco 
The case of San Francisco represents large, liberal cities with a minority racial/ethnic 
minority population, high rates of chronic homelessness, located in liberal states that have 
expanded Medicaid, as cities that have a municipal level supportive housing policy. The lessons 
from San Francisco may translate into other major metropolitan areas in the coastal U.S. working 
to address the homeless epidemic and housing crisis.  
The lessons from San Francisco tell us the importance of the role of stakeholder 
compositions, the political economy, and recognizing and addressing implementation problems 
in developing municipal responses to chronic homelessness. San Francisco stands as a case 
where the unified City and County have done a lot to try and address chronic homelessness in 
San Francisco. San Francisco’s Continuum of Care (CoC), is integrated into municipal 
government, and the city had a housing first policy since the mid-1990s (Department of 
Homelessness and Supportive Housing and City and County of San Francisco 2019). San 
Francisco has an impressive amount of policy capacity expertise, municipal fiscal resources and 
intergovernmental support to address homelessness that should have positioned the city at the 
forefront of the supportive housing movement in the United States.  
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However, substantial changes to San Francisco’s political economy paired with the policy 
histories of delegation of homelessness policy and programming to non-governmental actors in 
the United States created the perfect storm of implementation problems. As a city, San Francisco 
relies heavily (San Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016) on municipal 
funding for homelessness programming with limited state level support. San Francisco also 
exists in a political economy where economic elites dominate decision-making and stagnate 
municipal programming efforts on the front of both supportive housing implementation and 
homelessness de-criminalization efforts. As a result, San Francisco now known for its 
devastating and very public, homelessness crisis. 
Today, San Francisco’s homelessness rate and chronic homelessness rate are increasing (City 
and County of San Francisco Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing 2017). The 
city faces serious shortages of any affordable housing let alone supportive housing (Rahaim et al. 
2018). The lessons from San Francisco demonstrate the importance of political participation and 
policy implementation for cities seeking to address chronic homelessness and develop supportive 
housing responses. In the case of San Francisco’s, the lack of coordination and continued 
separation of the state and economic elite policy responses to homelessness has generated 
perpetual policy conflict between the policies pursued by, the processes by which these policies 
are pursued, and the goals of the policies pursued by the state of California, economic elites in 
San Francisco, and the city/county of San Francisco (here the governmental CoC). This 
persistent policy conflict has contributed to deep implementation challenges San Francisco faces 
and has yet to overcome, including an inability to build new housing infrastructure, a 
continuation of punitive responses to chronic homelessness, and misaligned state and local 
policy efforts from Medicaid to supportive housing funding. 
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Findings from Shreveport 
Unlike San Francisco and Atlanta, Shreveport, Louisiana serves as the representative case for 
municipalities without a municipal, governmental supportive housing policy. Thirty percent of 
the cities in the national dataset without a supportive housing policy matched the same criteria 
(variables) as Shreveport. The lessons from Shreveport may translate most to smaller, 
conservative cities, with a majority racial/ethnic minority population, low rates of chronic 
homelessness, in states that have expanded Medicaid.  
Shreveport is a case where the Continuum of Care (CoC) and the local government remain 
very separate in homeless policy decision-making and in practice. This separation is very 
apparent when compared to the integration seen in Atlanta and San Francisco. The independence 
of these two structures, in policy design and practice, was the most prominent theme among 
interviewees. Despite the overall lack of support from local government, Shreveport’s CoC has 
made substantial strides in establishing policy capacity and reducing homelessness. Whereas 
Shreveport may deliver positive lessons for CoCs with very limited support from local 
governments, this lack of governmental support still translates into persistent challenges for 
supportive housing policy design and implementation for the CoC. These barriers arise by 
inherently limiting the CoC’s authority and the resources available to pursue and execute 
homeless policy, as a result of being non-governmental actors.  
Beyond the challenges stemming from the relative absence of municipal government from 
homeless policy decision-making and implementation in Shreveport, Shreveport as a case faces 
additional barriers to supportive housing policy design and implementation as a result of the 
strong, separately coordinated response from economic elites. Organized economic elites work 
through informal policy mechanisms outside of local government decision-making and CoC 
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activity to unofficially govern behaviors associated with homelessness. Economic elites do so 
through direct requests to the police department to manage homelessness. Most of this police 
activity is punitive – including repeated incarceration, fines and removal of persons experiencing 
homelessness from desirable areas – and contradicts CoC efforts and evidence-based 
homelessness policy (Greenberg and Rosenheck 2008; Hawthorne et al. 2012; McNiel, Binder, 
and Robinson 2005). Shreveport’s CoC has taken steps to reduce such police activity. However, 
due to the limited participatory ability of the CoC as nongovernmental actors these efforts are not 
formal policy and have not been widely effective. 
Similar to the actions by economic elites, the state of Louisiana also remains separate from 
local homeless policy decision-making. Interviewees described some direct state level policies 
offering to provide tangential support for homelessness policy and programming, especially 
chronic homelessness. However, most interviewees were concerned with Louisiana’s economic 
fragility overall, negatively affecting many state level efforts. Shreveport as a case demonstrated 
the delicate relationship between state and local policies, where Louisiana’s current economic 
climate may indirectly perpetuate misalignment between state and local policies as a result of the 
limited capacity of Louisiana to provide resources or support to local policy efforts.  
The case of Shreveport is a case of a strong delegated state with limited incentives for 
municipal governmental participation. The lack of incentives for involvement by municipal 
governmental actors is exacerbated by no external pressures for centralization of the CoC; the 
strong organization by economic elites promoting continued delegation and decentralization of 
homeless policy activity through opposition to supportive housing and decriminalization policy 
efforts; and absent state resources that might otherwise act as an intergovernmental resource to 
incentivize formal, municipal supportive housing policy efforts.  
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Findings Across Cases 
 The results of the process tracing analyses in each city case can be compared across each 
other to draw lessons between the cities and understand factors affecting municipal homeless 
policy decision-making across the cases. The findings from the cases produce comparable trends 
across all cases, and between the outcome sets (municipalities with a local governmental 
supportive housing policy and those without). The main findings comparable across cases 
include the role of centralizing force(s) and policy capacity in developing municipal level 
supportive housing policy; the role of Medicaid expansion in supportive housing policy decision-
making and implementation; and finally, the role of policing and elites.  
 The main outcome of interest for this research is municipal homeless policy decision-
making – why municipalities respond to homelessness in different ways, and specifically, what 
factors may influence or explain municipal choices to establish a local, governmental supportive 
housing policy. A striking theme across all three cases is the presence or absence of two factors: 
first, the role of institutional restructuring as a centralizing force in the political, institutional 
organization of supportive housing policy actors; and second, the role of policy capacity 
existence or development and political mobilization around issues of homelessness in building or 
shaping local responses to homelessness. These two factors work together. Based on the case 
analysis, it seems both developing sufficient policy capacity to respond to or address chronic 
homelessness (typically through or concurrent to political mobilization around homelessness) 
and institutional restructuring incentivizing centralization of local supportive housing policy 
programming/actors in their political/institutional organization; may be necessary conditions for 
developing and establishing a municipal level supportive housing policy.  
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As discussed above, both Atlanta and San Francisco experienced years of policy capacity 
development concurrent to and partially driven by political mobilization around homelessness. 
This substantial growth in policy capacity to respond to chronic homelessness in both cities 
preceded the adoption of a municipal level supportive housing policy. For this reason, it may 
seem that political mobilization and policy capacity development was the tipping point to push 
both cities towards adopting a municipal supportive housing policy. Yet, the process tracing 
results demonstrate that policy discussions surrounding homeless governance in both cases, after 
significant policy capacity growth, remained relegated to continued municipal investment in 
policy capacity and resources to support delegated homeless governance systems, or non-
governmental organizations. In both cases the process tracing results demonstrate that the second 
factor, institutional restructuring, was also a necessary condition which may be required to 
incentivize direct, municipal participation in local homeless policy promulgation.  
In both San Francisco and Atlanta, the long investment (nearly a decade in both cases) in 
local policy capacity to address homelessness was proceeded by an external, institutional 
restructuring of political institutions tangential to municipal governmental entities yet directly 
involved in local homeless policy efforts. The restructuring took the form of centralizing 
historically decentralized, non-governmental structures involved in homeless policy governance 
either closer to or within the organizing structures of municipal government. In Atlanta, as 
described above, the governing structure for homelessness in the regional, metropolitan area was 
a regional, non-profit entity that split to reorganize within each separate municipal jurisdiction, 
one of which being the city of Atlanta. In San Francisco, the state of California promulgated a 
new rule re-centralizing behavioral healthcare from municipally organized non-profit entities, to 
county jurisdiction.  
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This restructuring, in both cases, shortly preceded the development of a municipal level 
supportive housing policy. In Atlanta, the strong push to grow policy capacity had already 
developed interest in streamlining coordination between the city of Atlanta and the regional CoC. 
The restructuring now offered a choice to the city of Atlanta – how to organize the new Atlanta 
based CoC? As a result of the lingering interest in improving policy coordination stemming from 
decades of political mobilization and policy capacity development, Atlanta opted to formally 
centralize the CoC, structuring the new CoC within the municipal bureaucracy. Atlanta 
subsequently established a municipal level supportive housing policy as a result of the policy 
capacity development and the CoC’s organization within the city of Atlanta bureaucracy, where 
they were able to directly lobby for the development of a city-wide, housing first approach to 
chronic homelessness. In San Francisco, the city had already been investing heavily in responses 
to homelessness and behavioral health primarily as a result of responses to the AIDS epidemic in 
the 1980’s. When behavioral health was restructured under municipal jurisdiction, transitioning 
homeless policy and programming to the San Francisco city and county Department of Public 
Health was a natural choice in order to continue improving the coordination and delivery of 
services affecting persons experiencing homelessness. Shortly after, San Francisco began a city-
wide effort in housing first, both as a municipal wide policy approach and in building new 
permanent supportive housing units.  
The important role of both policy capacity development and investment in Atlanta and 
San Francisco, followed by an institutional restructuring posits that formal municipal level 
involvement in homeless policy may require institutional changes in addition to with policy 
capacity investment as a result of the historic delegation to non-governmental entities in 
homeless policy governance overall. The case of Shreveport is an important comparison, here. 
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Shreveport’s CoC experienced much growth in policy capacity, as a result of CoC leadership and 
CoC partnership with the federal United States Interagency Council on Homelessness. Yet, 
political mobilization around evidence-based approaches to chronic homelessness in Shreveport 
has been very limited. Additionally, Shreveport has not experienced any external institutional 
restructuring related to any entities providing homeless governance services. The lack of political 
mobilization around responses to homelessness in Shreveport posit that even if institutional 
restructuring occurred, there may not be enough political interest or local governmental capacity 
to take on a formal municipal role in homelessness governance. Alternatively, even if Shreveport 
did experience greater political mobilization around homelessness and subsequently grew local 
governmental policy capacity to response to homelessness, the absence of formal institutional 
restructuring may continue Shreveport on the path of delegating and providing resources to non-
governmental actors as opposed to creating an entirely new governance system in the absence of 
direct incentives to do so.  
The role of Medicaid expansion as an important factor in both supportive housing policy 
decision-making and implementation was a surprising and salient theme across San Francisco 
and Shreveport – cases with divergent municipal policy outcomes or responses to chronic 
homelessness. Medicaid expansion has long been championed as a great opportunity to improve 
access to medical services for indigent individuals. In this case, Medicaid expansion was sought 
after for persons experiencing chronic homelessness, who are primarily single men (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2018) and were previously ineligible for 
Medicaid (Dipietro, Artiga, and Gates 2014). Yet, the results of the process tracing analysis 
suggest that while Medicaid expansion has certainly provided benefits and has increased 
eligibility and therefore access to medical services for this population, it is not without 
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significant implementation challenges. The main themes that arose from the analysis in the cases 
with Medicaid expansion – San Francisco and Shreveport – were that Medicaid expansion 
implementation has proved challenging as a result of 1) administrative burdens for persons 
experiencing homelessness due to policy misalignment between local implementation and state 
policy (including frequent disenrollment and re-enrollment as a result of homeless individuals 
moving between counties and states, or in and out of jail); and 2) challenges for local supportive 
housing policy decision-making due to policy misalignment in Medicaid’s limited ability to 
finance supportive housing efforts.  
3. City lessons to National Dataset Findings 
The results from the quantitative analysis of a national sample of cities receiving federal 
funding to address homelessness demonstrate that most municipalities facing homelessness 
challenges do not have municipal-level supportive housing policies. Only forty-one percent of 
the municipalities in the dataset had a municipal-level policy. The results of the logit and FsQCA 
analyses demonstrate that municipalities with supportive housing policies tend to be more 
liberal, have fewer but better funded nonprofit health organizations, lower rates of municipal 
governmental fragmentation, and are located in states without Medicaid Expansion. The results 
of this analysis demonstrate overall limited involvement by municipal governments in supportive 
housing policy efforts. Limited coordination by municipal involvements in supportive housing 
policy, as demonstrated in the case analysis, matters because limited coordination between 
municipalities and the CoC may perpetuate service gaps and may lead to ineffective policy 
design and implementation (Jarpe, Mosley, and Smith 2018). 
These results from the quantitative analyses provide a foundation for the case analyses, 
where the findings from the city cases not only reflect the findings from the quantitative 
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analyses, but the city-cases help offer possible explanations behind the findings from the 
quantitative analysis, as is intended in an explanatory sequential research design. The current 
data limitations restricted causal quantitative analysis. However, leveraging comparative case 
studies selected from the national sample of cities receiving federal funding for homeless policy 
let me look into factors identified in the quantitative analysis as associated with municipal 
supportive housing development, and analyze the processes involved and the temporality of the 
relationships between the factors (different political institutional arrangements, social 
construction, and policy capacity measures) and the outcome of interest, municipal supportive 
housing policy decision-making. I recommend these lessons be explored in future research, by 
further leveraging the explanatory sequential design and testing these translational findings from 
the case study analyses against a national sample of municipalities in order to effectively test the 
generalizability of the findings and further examine the validity of the mechanisms in a broader 
context. 
There are three main lessons that can be extrapolated from the city cases to help explain 
or begin identifying mechanisms involved in municipal homeless policy decision-making. These 
three main lessons are: 1) limited involvement by municipal governments in supportive housing 
policy; 2) the role of state governments in shaping municipal homeless policy decision-making 
(including Medicaid expansion); and 3) the role of stakeholder groups, in particular non-profit 
health organizations, as sources of policy capacity to influence municipal homeless policy 
decision-making and implementation. This section discusses the integration of the findings from 
both the quantitative and qualitative analyses to examine the findings across the methods and 
illustrate the lessons.  
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The main finding from the quantitative analysis, as stated above, is the overall limited 
participation in homeless policy governance (as measured by the presence of municipal level 
supportive housing policy(s)) by municipal governments (cities and or counties). Forty-one 
percent of municipalities in the dataset with a supportive housing policy may seem like a 
substantial amount of municipal level participation. Yet, compared to the key role local 
government public health departments play in most other aspects of population health and health 
prevention efforts, the fact that less than half of municipalities (representing 60% of the national 
system for governing efforts to address homelessness) in this analysis have a municipal level 
supportive housing policy is very surprising, and runs counter to assumptions made by public 
health practitioners about local government’s role in the majority of aspects related to health 
prevention and promotion. The results of the city case studies find great variation in the amount 
of participation by local governments in municipal homeless policy decision-making. These 
results enhance this main finding from the quantitative analysis and offer possible explanations 
for why municipalities may not be involved in homeless policy decision-making, as well as the 
influence of limited participation by local governments on homeless policy implementation.  
Across the cases, this research finds that there is great variation in the degree to which 
municipal governments participate in homeless policy decision-making, including the types of 
municipal government that participate. The most consistent finding across the cases is that while 
city and county governments may often be absent from homeless policy decision-making, in the 
form of elected officials or the bureaucracy, policing and corrections is persistently involved, 
regardless of formal policy participation by the local governments overseeing police activity. For 
example, in Shreveport, the city government is not and has historically not been involved in 
homeless policy decision-making or implementation. The county (here, parish) government was 
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not discussed by any interviewees as an actor in the homeless governance systems. Yet, policing 
by the city of Shreveport is constantly involved in responses to homelessness in an informal 
capacity that nonetheless influences the ways that homeless policy decision-makers in 
Shreveport – the CoC – design and deliver policy and programming affecting persons 
experiencing chronic homelessness. For example, clients experiencing chronic homelessness 
consistently police regarding behaviors associated with homelessness, and are subsequently 
removed from areas, issued citations, or jailed, all of which interrupts service delivery.  
In Atlanta, police have long been informally involved in responses to chronic 
homelessness, before the city of Atlanta was formally involved in homeless policy decision-
making. A frequently cited example discussed by interviewees was strategic use of the city of 
Atlanta jail as a location to house persons experiencing chronic homelessness before the 1996 
Olympics (Smothers 1996). Police conducted systematic sweeps of the city, in addition to busing 
efforts, in order to remove chronically homeless persons from downtown Atlanta (Gustafson 
2013). Interviewees stated that many persons who were displaced during this effort were never 
located, displacing them from homeless services systems altogether. Today, the city of Atlanta is 
formally involved in homeless governance efforts, and is also taking strides to reduce punitive 
policing responses to chronic homelessness (Pre-Arrest Diversion Design Team 2017). However, 
implementation is a work in progress, and the case study results demonstrate the persistent of 
informal, punitive police responses to chronic homelessness even with the presence of formal, 
city government involvement in supportive housing policy governance.  
Finally, the same trends regarding policing and chronic homelessness are see in the city 
of San Francisco. San Francisco city and county government has been formally involved in local 
homeless policy governance longer than both Atlanta and Shreveport. However, policing and 
 
 219 
corrections within the city and county of San Francisco have also been informally involved in 
responding to chronic homelessness for at least as long. Interviewees discussed that despite 
efforts by San Francisco government to reduce punitive responses to homelessness , persons 
experiencing chronic homelessness are consistently moving in and out of jail, receive citations 
for behaviors associated with chronic homelessness, and are frequently relocated by police to 
different parts of the city. Across all three cases, police activity was driven by requests by 
economic elites – corporations, the movie industry, downtown development associations, and 
wealthy homeowners – to remove persons experiencing chronic homelessness from desirable 
areas of the cities.  
Policing and corrections are the only part of municipal government that were found to be 
consistently – across cases and historically – involved in responses to chronic homelessness. The 
city cases demonstrate much more heterogeneity in the types of other levels of municipal 
governmental organization and institutions that participate in homeless policy governance or 
supportive housing policy decision-making. When I say levels of municipal governmental 
organization, I am referring to jurisdictional components – cities versus counties. Institutions 
refers to intragovernmental organizations, such as city level bureaucrats compared to elected 
officialslxxxvi.  
Regarding municipal governmental organization, there is a lot of variation across the 
cases in which level of local government may be involved in homeless policy governance, if 
local government is participating. For example, in Atlanta, the city of Atlanta has now 
 
lxxxvi It could be argued that elected officials are also a persistent part of municipal governmental involvement in 
responses to chronic homelessness, because of the relationship between requests by economic elites and policing, 
which often goes through elected officials. However, this is not categorized as such because of the heterogeneity in 
the mechanisms by which police are delegated to respond to chronic homelessness. Sometimes elected officials 
make requests in response to elite preferences, other times economic elites make requests directly through policing.  
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incorporated the CoC into the municipal bureaucracy and is therefore directly participating in 
local homeless policy governance. However, interviewees described far less participation by 
Fulton County, the main county that the city of Atlanta resides in, in homeless policy and 
programming efforts within the Atlanta metropolitan area or regionally. By contrast, San 
Francisco has unified city and county government. The unified local government is heavily 
involved in homeless policy governance and supportive housing policy design and 
implementation and has been since the mid 1990s. Other, surrounding counties such as Oakland, 
were not discussed at all as a part of local homeless policy and planning efforts. In Shreveport, 
although local government actors do not directly participate in homeless policy decision-making 
or governance, the actors governing homeless policy efforts – the CoC – only discussed the city 
of Shreveport’s role as a potential actor or as an actor, governing police responses to 
homelessness. The surrounding county Shreveport resides in, Bossier Parish, was not discussed 
at all as a potential actor. Only the city of Bossier was mentioned in a couple of instances 
regarding police responses to homelessness in the metropolitan area. This heterogeneity in the 
levels of municipal government organization that may or may not participate in local homeless or 
supportive housing policy efforts does not align with public health policy and practice 
understandings of the organization and delivery of health and social services, suggesting that 
public health and health policy as a discipline should re-consider conceptualizations of the ways 
in which health promotion and population health efforts are thought to be designed and 
delivered.  
One finding that does align with current notions of public health delivery systems is the 
intragovernmental, institutional participation in the city cases. In the city cases, when local 
government does participate, in the greatest amount of participation is by local bureaucrats 
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mainly in the public health delivery system. In San Francisco this includes the San Francisco 
City and County Department of Public Health, and now also the San Francisco City and County 
Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing. In Atlanta, this includes the city of 
Atlanta Office of Human Services. Interviewees in San Francisco and Atlanta discussed how 
coordination by the local governments through these agencies enhanced the ability to coordinate 
local supportive housing policy and programming, while also improving the policy capacity 
(staffing and resources) available to design and delivery effective policy.  
The second main lesson extending the findings from the quantitative analysis through the 
qualitative case studies is the role of state governments in shaping municipal homeless policy 
decision-making. In the regression analysis, Medicaid expansion was negatively associated with 
the presence of municipal level supportive housing policy. In FsQCA analysis, state level 
supportive housing policy was not associated with municipal supportive housing policy presence. 
In sensitivity analyses conducted in logit examining this relationship, there was also no 
association.  
The case study results reflect and exemplify this perhaps surprising relationship between 
two state level policies that would seem to be associated with municipal level supportive housing 
policies. Overall, these findings do not suggest that state policies do not play a role. Rather, the 
findings from the qualitative analysis, extending from the quantitative findings, suggest that the 
relationship is complicated, and there may be tradeoffs and or negative consequences with such 
state level policies that are presumed to directly benefit local supportive housing policy efforts.  
Regarding Medicaid expansion, the cases of Atlanta and Shreveport offer potential 
explanations for the negative association with Medicaid expansion and municipal level 
supportive housing policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the negative relationship between 
 
 222 
municipal level supportive housing policy and Medicaid expansion may be a product of the 
geographic concentration of homelessness and chronic homelessness in the United States. The 
majority of homelessness in the U.S. is concentrated in the southern united states and the coasts, 
including many conservative states like Texas, Georgia, and Florida that have not expanded 
Medicaid. Thus, liberal, major metropolitan areas in conservative states seeking solutions to 
chronic homelessness may move forward with supportive housing policy in lieu of available 
state level resources. Atlanta as a case demonstrated this tradeoff that local policy makers faced. 
The majority of interviewees discussed how beneficial Medicaid expansion would be, but that 
they had little to no hope that Georgia would move forward with Medicaid expansion, leaving 
policymakers in Atlanta to move forward with supportive housing policy by seeking out other 
resources.  
By contrast, Shreveport exemplifies a potential, alternative explanation, or alternative 
case to explain the strong, negative association between Medicaid expansion and municipal 
supportive housing policy. Smaller, conservative cities, like Shreveport, may face a different 
calculus. While interviewees described that Medicaid expansion in Louisiana did offer many 
supports to practitioners by expanding eligibility to single adults (the primary demographic of 
persons experiencing chronic homelessness), the overall nature of homeless policy governance in 
Shreveport – defined by no participation from local government and strong opposition to 
homelessness in general and with non-punitive policy options – made any incentives or resources 
stemming from Medicaid expansion insufficient to sway local policy decision-making in any 
substantial way. Future research examining the use of Medicaid waivers may provide more 
insight into the degree to which Medicaid programming may prove to be a valuable tool in policy 
decision-making that may specifically incentivize municipal supportive housing policy 
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development. In particular, Medicaid waivers targeting specific municipalities may prove to be a 
more successful policy tool.  
Finally, the last primary lesson extending the findings from the quantitative analysis 
through the qualitative case studies is the role of stakeholder groups, in particular non-profit 
health organizations, as sources of policy capacity to influence municipal homeless policy 
decision-making and implementation. The results across the regression and FsQCA analyses 
demonstrate positive relationships between measures of centralization (or a smaller CoC 
nonprofit base) and municipal supportive housing policy. In the logistic regression, 
municipalities with a higher concentration of nonprofit health organizations are nearly 30 percent 
less likely to have a municipal supportive housing policy. This suggests support for the notion 
that when municipalities participate in supportive housing policy, there is less decentralization of 
policy capacity in nongovernmental systems, or possibly that there is a greater centralization of 
policy capacity within municipal government, as opposed to the nongovernmental organizations.  
The case study results expand on this notion. San Francisco and Atlanta both experienced 
very substantial municipal governmental investments in policy capacity to address chronic 
homelessness in the lead up to establishing a municipal level supportive housing policy. Thus, 
the trends seen in the quantitative analysis may be a snapshot measure of the divergence or 
tradeoff between municipal level resources compared to delegation and decentralization of 
policy capacity and homeless policy governance. This is an opportunity where the results from 
the case study analysis could be further explored in quantitative analyses through alternative 
measures of municipal policy capacity in order to more concisely pin down the divergence 
between municipal investment and delegation. For example, future analyses could include other, 
alternative measures of policy capacity at the municipal level, such as bureaucratic staffing, and 
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staff education. Similar measures could also be included for the nonprofit sector, in order to gain 
a more complete picture of the shifts in policy capacity between municipal governance of 
homeless policy compared to delegation to nongovernmental entities. 
4. Theoretical and Policy Contributions 
Overall, three main themes arise from this research. 1) The implications of delegating a 
public health policy space to the submerged state and how it works in practice; 2) the growth of 
policy capacity as an important step in building a municipal, governmental response to 
homelessness beyond solely delegated state actors; and finally 3) Medicaid expansions complex 
reality and implementation challenges in supportive housing policy.  This section discusses the 
theoretical and policy implications of the three main findings.  
First, this research is a case study of the functioning of the delegated state as a main public 
health policy delivery system. Previous research on the delegated state has focused on defining 
and describing the submerged state, how it has changed over time, and its development. There 
are few studies of the implications of the submerged state as a policy mechanism in practice. 
This research helps to fill that gap. The literature that does exist on the functioning and 
consequences of the submerged or delegated state discusses the implications of delegation for 
democracy (Mettler 2011). The findings in my research illustrate a similar, overall relationship. 
In the case studies, delegated state actors who are not integrated into formal municipal decision-
making processes, face participatory challenges (such as not being invited to municipal 
governmental meetings), relegating them to their own, very separate, decision-making apparatus 
relying on inconsistent funding structures (grants and donations) and limited authority to 
implement policies they have designed (no authority over other governmental institutions that 
may be crucial to supportive housing policy implementation such as policing and zoning). The 
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delegated state was strategically designed to reduce the influence of the activist state (Soss, 
Fording, and Schram 2011). Theoretically, these findings suggest that this may be true. In cases 
of complete delegation of social or healthcare services governance to nongovernmental actors, as 
shown in the case of Shreveport, nongovernmental actors face constrained decision-making and 
implementation processes that limit the overall success of these policies.  
The second main finding is the important role of policy capacity as a step in establishing a 
formal, municipal supportive housing policy. If the delegated state faces substantial constraints 
in policy decision-making and implementation as a result of their institutional organization, how 
do we move towards formal, municipal involvement in supportive housing policy? Atlanta and 
San Francisco suggest that municipal level investment in policy capacity – systems and/or 
resources sufficient to respond to chronic homelessness and associated problems – may be a 
crucial part of the process moving of establishing a formal municipal governmental supportive 
housing policy by generating capacity of municipal governments to be able to respond to and 
effectively participate in supportive housing policy. Historically, and in contemporary cases such 
as Shreveport relying on complete delegation, policy capacity to address chronic homelessness 
and homelessness overall resided with the CoCs, or this system of nongovernmental actors, 
primarily nonprofit organizations. If the entire system is decentralized and authority is delegated 
to this decentralized system, it may be unlikely that cities or counties may have sufficient 
resources to be able to adequately participate in homeless policy governance without establishing 
some kind of policy capacity of their own.  
Atlanta and San Francisco both document a very long build-up over years of municipal 
investment in resources – staffing and funding – to address chronic homelessness and problems 
related to chronic homelessness (e.g. HIV/AIDS and behavioral health) prior to discussions 
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about a formal, municipal governmental role in addressing homelessness and chronic 
homelessness. As discussed, the city of Shreveport did not make similar investments of any kind. 
Theoretically, it makes sense that recentralization of homelessness governance would possibly 
necessitate this resource investment, otherwise municipalities face a tradeoff between 
insufficient means to govern homelessness and continued delegation to the existing systems 
where policy capacity lies – the delegated state, or the CoC. It is also important to note, though, 
that, as discussed above, political mobilization and institutional restructuring are two other 
aspects surrounding policy capacity that may also be required to fully incentivize municipal 
participation in homeless policy. Atlanta and San Francisco’s municipal policy capacity 
investments stemmed from strong political mobilization around the issue. Atlanta and San 
Francisco also experienced institutional restructuring that repositioned key components of 
homeless services into municipal jurisdiction – after years of heavy policy capacity development. 
Further research is needed to understand the relationships between these factors, and their 
temporality, as incentives towards municipal homeless policy governance.  
Lastly, is the theme of Medicaid expansion and its complex relationship to supportive 
housing policy. Health policy has often championed Medicaid expansion as a silver bullet policy, 
solving problems of access to healthcare for low-income persons. And this research does show 
that Medicaid expansion has certainly benefited persons experiencing chronic homelessness by 
expanding eligibility levels to include single adults. However, this research demonstrates the 
practical realities of Medicaid expansion implementation for this at-risk population. Shreveport 
and San Francisco both illustrate enrollment challenges associated with Medicaid administrative 
procedures. As a border city in Louisiana, Shreveport receives many persons experiencing 
homelessness from Texas. When persons arrive from Texas in Louisiana, they must be re-
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enrolled in Louisiana Medicaid before they can receive care. In California, county level 
administration of Medicaid has caused challenges for enrollment and care access in San 
Francisco. Individuals experiencing chronic homelessness move within municipal jurisdictions in 
the Bay area. When individuals move between counties, such as Oakland and San Francisco, 
providers have to identify county residence, and often re-enroll persons based on the county they 
are currently seeking care in. Medicaid administration does not align with the reality of the 
transient nature of chronic homelessness and creates challenges for care access and care 
coordination. Similar problems arise related to the strong relationship between incarceration and 
chronic homelessness. In both Shreveport and San Francisco, providers face continual 
disenrollment challenges as a result of incarceration. Often times, persons are not reconnected 
with services or re-enrolled in Medicaid after re-entry. This is another example of how the 
practical application of Medicaid expansion is more complex and may not work well for certain, 
highly vulnerable populations. Greater alignment between Medicaid administration and local, 
population specific needs may help alleviate some of these implementation challenges. 
 American federalism as a field has been historically and theoretically separate from urban 
politics and intergovernmental relations. In the field of health policy in particular, there is an 
emphasis on state and federal relations as the primary players involved in health services 
governance. Yet, direct local-federal relations have played a key role in the development and 
delivery of today’s welfare state, from the New Deal, to the McKinney Act, to the Family 
Smoking and Tobacco Control Act. This research demonstrates the importance of expanding 
traditional notions of health systems governance and to encompass a broader definition of 
intergovernmental relations, acknowledging the important role local governments play – with or 
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without support from states – in carrying out federal legislation and designing and delivering 
public health policy.  
 Urban politics, as a field, tends to focus on the study of local government institutions. Yet 
the field of urban politics may be incomplete without acknowledging and defining the crucial 
role of non-governmental actors, in particular ‘delegated’ or ‘submerged’ state actors as an entire 
apparatus directly involved in the design and delivery of local policy and programming. 
Certainly, the delegated state is not involved in all areas of local policy. Yet, the significant role 
that delegated actors play in many areas of health and social services as demonstrated by this 
research posits that the influence of delegated state actors on local policy decision-making and 
implementation – beyond the role of interest group or stakeholder coalition influence – may 
translate to other aspects of local policymaking and delivery. Local government, in terms of who 
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APPENDIX A: Codebook FSQCA Conversion Process for Quantitative Variables 
 
Table 8: FSQCA Conversion Process for Dependent Variable 
Dependent Variable FSQCA Conversion Data Source 
Local Governmental 
Level of Supportive 
Housing Policy 
(1/0 for SH policy Yes/No) Municipal supportive housing policies were collected from a search of city and 
county government websites, and Municode. A municipal policy was coded as 
‘supportive housing’ if a locality has one or more of the following: municipal 
plan(s), guidelines, regulations and or statutes establishing supportive housing, 
permanent supportive housing, and or Housing-First as a main component of the 
local government’s homelessness response. 
 
Table 9: FSQCA Conversion Process for Independent Variables 
Independent Variable FSQCA Conversion (0-1) Data Source 
CoC Type (Municipal 
Organization) 
Major City COC (1) Smaller 
City, Counties (0) 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2017. “PIT and 
HIC Data Since 2007.” HUD Exchange. 
https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/ 
(December 30, 2017). 
State or Regional CoC Statewide COC Y/N ; 
Regional (.5) 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2017. “PIT and 
HIC Data Since 2007.” HUD Exchange. 
https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/ 
(December 30, 2017). 
Total Homeless (1=10,000+, .8=5,000-10k, 
.6=1k-5k, .4=500-1k, 
.2=500>) 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2017. “PIT and 
HIC Data Since 2007.” HUD Exchange. 
https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/ 





United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2017. “PIT and 
HIC Data Since 2007.” HUD Exchange. 
https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/ 
(December 30, 2017). 
Total UnSheltered 
Chronically Homeless 
% (decimal notation) United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2017. “PIT and 
HIC Data Since 2007.” HUD Exchange. 
https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/3031/pit-and-hic-data-since-2007/ 
(December 30, 2017). 
MSA Population 1M+=1, 250k-1M=.75, 
100k-250k=.5, 100k or 
less=.25) (Census 
Designation) 
United States Census Bureau. 2017. “Population Estimates.” U.S. Census Quick 
Facts. 
GDP (In Current 
Dollars) by MSA 
(50k>=.25, 50-100k=.5, 
100-200k=.75, 200k+=1) 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2017. “Regional Data GDP and Personal Income.” 




1&7001=2200&7002=2&7090=70&7007=2015&7093=levels (August 17, 2018). 
Warm Winter 
Temperature 
Used NOAA four color 
categories of cold-warm; 
.25=least warm winter 
temperature; 1.0=warmest 
winter temperature 
National Centers for Environmental Information, and National Oceanographic 
and Atmospheric Administration. 2017. “Climate at a Glance.” Statewide 
Temperature Mapping. 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/statewide/mapping/110/tavg/201701/1/value 




Population (Public) - 
All 
denominations/groups 
(0-1, 1 = High); (Rates of 
Adherence per 1000 
persons: 200-300 = .25; 
300-400=.35…; 800 + = 1) 
2010; Rates of adherence per 1,000 population; Association of Religion Data 
Archives. 2010. “Download | U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and 
Membership Study, 2010 (Metro Area File) | Data Archive | The Association of 
Religion Data Archives.” U.S. Church Membership Data - County Level. 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Downloads/RCMSMT10_DL2.asp (May 
8, 2017). 
Southern Region of the 
United States 
(0/1, No/Yes) U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration. 2010. 
“Census Regions and Divisions of the United States.” 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf 
Former Confederacy ((0/1) No/Yes) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2019. “Confederate States of America.” 
Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Confederate-States-of-America 
(August 1, 2019). 
Sanctuary City Federal 
ICE Definition 
(Declined Detainer) (0/1) 
No/Yes 
U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. 2017. Enforcement and Removal 
Operations: Weekly Declined Detainer Outcome Report For Recorded Declined 
Detainer Outcome Report. https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ddor/ddor2017_02-11to02-
17.pdf (March 19, 2019). 
% White (decimal notation) United States Census Bureau. 2017. “Population Estimates.” U.S. Census Quick 
Facts. 
% African American (decimal notation) United States Census Bureau. 2017. “Population Estimates.” U.S. Census Quick 
Facts. 




(0-5 = .2, 6-15, 15-30…46+ 
= 1) 
The total number of local governments in a county area; 2012b. “Local 
Governments in Individual County-Type Areas.” American FactFinder . 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src
=bkmk (August 21, 2018). 
State Medicaid 
Expansion 
(1= Expand, 0=No) National Conference of State Legislatures. 2018. “Affordable Care Act Medicaid 
Expansion.” Medicaid. http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/affordable-care-act-
expansion.aspx (August 21, 2018). 
State Level Supportive 
Housing Law or 
Regulation 
1 = Y, 0 = N State-level supportive housing policies were collected from a review of state 
government websites and Lexis-Nexis. States were coded using a binary measure 
of having a supportive housing policy or not, 1/0, coded as having a supportive-
housing policy if the state had either a state plan, guideline, regulation or statute 
establishing permanent supportive housing or Housing-First as a main component 
of the state government’s response to homelessness 
Municipal Instiutional 
Structure 
(ICMA Municipal Form of 
Government, 2011 Data and 
Definitions); (Plurality; 
1=most pluralistic form of 
government, 0=least 
pluralistic; Mayor Council = 
.2 (least pluralistic); 
Council-Manager = .4; 
Commission = .6; Town 
Meeting = .8; 
Representative Town 
Meeting = .1)) 
International City/County Management Association. 2011. Municipal Form of 
Government, 2011 Trends in Structure, Responsibility, and Composition. 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/errwpc/umauthen/1/4/1/14197405.2011.survey_instr
ument.pdf 
MRP City Policy 
Conservatism 
(Municipal Ideology) - 
(-1 to -.4=.25, -.4 to 0=.5, 0-
.2=.75, .2+=1) 1=most 
conservative 
(UCLA), Warshaw, Chris (MIT); Tausanovitch, Chris. 2015. “Replication Data 
for: Representation in Municipal Government.” 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/AXV





(0-1= low (.1), 1-2 (.2), 2-4 
(.35), 4-6 (.55), 6-7 (.75), 7 
and above=1 (high)) 
per 10,000 ppl; National Center for Charitable Statistics. 2018. “US Nonprofit 
Sector Publications, Reports and Statistics.” Urban Institute. 
https://nccs.urban.org/data-statistics/us-nonprofit-sector-publications-reports-and-




Maximum = 142,963.00, 




National Center for Charitable Statistics. 2018. “US Nonprofit Sector 
Publications, Reports and Statistics.” Urban Institute. https://nccs.urban.org/data-




Private Prisons % 
Prisoners in Private 
Prisons 
(>10% =.25, 10%<=.75, 0 = 
0, 20%<=1) 
United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. 2011. “Bureau 
of Justice Statistics: National Prisoner Statistics, 1978-2011.” Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34540.v1. 




(Millions of Dollars (Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food 
services), by FIPS MSA); Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2017. “Regional Data 













APPENDIX B: FSQCA Deduction Procedure 
 
A. Baseline Assumptions and Hypotheses for Pathways in Each Outcome: 
 
 I describe here the baseline assumptions and theoretically informed hypotheses for each outcome, stratified 
by the three main research questions. I outline my assumptions here in detail because they inform my approach to 
running the FSQCA analysis by determining my starting pathways from which I implement the minimization 
procedure.   
 
A.1. Institutional Resources: 
For cities that do not have a municipal level supportive housing policy, I assumed that limited institutional 
resources could constrain ability to adopt supportive housing policies. Institutional resources include level of 
existing infrastructure and financial resources. For example, if a city has low financial resources to support 
supportive housing sites and services – e.g. not expanded Medicaid, low GDP, no state level supportive housing law 
– the city may not have the fiscal ability to move forward on a supportive housing policy and may default to no 
action.(Grob 1994) Municipalities may perceive start-up costs to supportive housing as prohibitively expensive or 
may perceive inaction on supportive housing and other acute alternatives such as punitive responses as more cost-
effective when considering other municipal goals (Nacgourney 2016), adding to perceived cost-effectiveness 
compared to supportive housing.  
 
Assumptions informing FsQCA procedure:  
1. Non-supportive housing municipalities are less likely to reside in Medicaid Expansion states and states 
with a Supportive Housing policy. 
2. Non-supportive housing municipalities is associated with lower GDP compared to municipalities with 
supportive housing policies. 
 
 A.2. Political Institutions:  
In non-supportive housing municipalities, I assumed that governmental fragmentation may impede 
supportive housing policy adoption. For example, if a city is highly decentralized, or very fragmented – with 
multiple competing municipal jurisdictions – it may be more difficult for actors to engage in local policy processes, 
and to coordinate action. Fragmentation may act as an impediment in this way to adopting supportive housing 
initiatives. Further, supportive housing actions may be curbed within government itself, if offices and service 
delivery is decentralized to the degree that it affects intragovernmental coordination. In the same vein, the plurality 
of municipal governments also affects the ability of constituents to participate in processes.(R. Mickey 2015) 
Municipal government design interacts with ideology, thus in more conservative municipal governments, more 
unilateral systems may close out minority voices arguing for supportive housing policies. Therefore, I assume that 
municipalities without a supportive housing policy, which are comparatively more conservative, are more likely to 
have less pluralistic municipal governmental structures. Finally, consistent with the institutional resources 
assumption, I assumed that municipalities without a supportive housing policy may have fewer delegated state 
actors providing services, and subsequently lobbying for supportive housing policies as interest group members, as 
another challenge for adopting supportive housing policies.  
 
Assumptions informing FsQCA procedure: 
1. Municipalities without a supportive housing policy are associated with higher levels of municipal 
governmental fragmentation compared to cities adopting supportive housing. 
2. Supportive-housing is associated with higher levels of non-profit healthcare providers compared to 
cities adopting criminalization only.  
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3. Municipalities without a supportive housing policy are associated with more unilateral municipal 
government design in conjunction with more conservative ideology.lxxxvii 
 
A.3. Social Construction: 
Lastly, the way that policy beneficiaries are perceived affects political deliberations over the policies in 
question.(Schneider and Ingram 1993b) As proxies for social construction, I assume that more-conservative cities 
with higher percentages of minority groups – Latino and black – are more likely to not have a municipal level 
supportive housing policy. The assumption I base this on is the historical literature on vagrancy, deviance, race and 
mental illness.(Grob 1994; Schlesinger 2012) Chronically homeless persons are primarily single men of color. 
Therefore, municipalities may opt-away from welfare policies targeting this population in favor of inaction or other 
competing policies (such as punitive responses to homelessness). The long history of criminalization of single men 
of color in the United States, particularly in former confederate states, gives evidence for this assumption. Following 
from this, I also assume that criminalization-only cities are not likely to be Sanctuary cities, as a proxy for 
immigration sentiment.  
 
Assumptions informing FsQCA procedure: 
1. Municipalities without a supportive housing policy are less-likely to be sanctuary cities, compared to 
cities adopting supportive housing policies.  
2. Cities with higher city-policy conservatism, that are not Sanctuary cities, and have a higher percentage 
of minority populations are more likely to be municipalities without a local supportive housing policy. 
  
     B.    Selecting Pathways: 
 
Grappling with inherent heterogeneity across cases means that researchers have a tradeoff to make. FSQCA 
measures pathways based on coverage, and consistency. Coverage is proportion of the sample in the outcome set 
that adheres to the tested pathway. When evaluating the value of a pathway, coverage matters. Coverage matters 
because a pathway could exist in five percent of cases, or in fifty percent of cases. The lower the coverage means 
that the pathway is more of an outlier, reducing the generalizability. The ideal pathway is one that holds predictive 
value across many or most cases. However, this is where the tradeoff arises. Consistency, as opposed to coverage, 
measures the degree to which a causal combination leads to an outcome. Within the sample, this means the 
proportion of cases with the given predictive combination that are also in the outcome set.lxxxviii Due to heterogeneity 
across individual cases, the greater coverage of a pathway, the lower the consistency and vice versa – the higher the 
consistency, the lower the coverage.  Having high consistency is a necessity, because we are assuming that the 
combination leads to the outcome in question. Low consistency violates that assumption and reduces or removes any 
explanatory power from the pathway. Therefore, depending on the number of variables input into the pathway, and 
the inherent heterogeneity of the sample, researchers must weigh varying degrees of consistency and coverage to 
reach a predictive and generalizable pathway. 
 
To begin the analysis, you must input combinations of independent variables to test their collective 
association with the outcome of interest. With a high number of independent variables, it is impossible to test all 
possible combinations of conditions. To overcome this limitation, the initial combinations are selected based on the 
theoretical and empirical literature regarding municipal politics, health policy decision-making, and current 
municipal homeless policy choices.   
 
For each outcome, I begin with the combination of independent variables most supported by the literature 
[as stated above in my baseline assumptions]. Based on the results, I systematically add or subtract variables from 
the baseline pathway, to improve consistency and coverage. Adding or removing individual variables can notably 
affect the consistency and coverage of a pathway. Therefore, when initially testing a pathway embedded in the 
 
lxxxvii I am currently unable to test municipal government design due to an incomplete dataset. This will be further 
tested going forward after completing the dataset.  
lxxxviii Set membership is determined by minimums. Determining membership across two variables takes the 
minimum of the two scores. Consistency is the sum of the minimum of the membership scores for x and y, over the 
sum of the minimum membership scores for x. Coverage is determined by the sum of the minimum of the 
membership scores for x and y, over the sum of the membership scores for y. 
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literature, I add or remove single variables at a time, to test the overall effect on the pathway. I continue until I reach 








APPENDIX C: Interviewee Demographics by Case 
 
Table 10: Interviewee Demographics by Cases 
San Francisco Shreveport Atlanta 
Interviewee 
ID 












3.1 Municipal Service Provider/ 
Public Safety 
1.2 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
2.2 CoC Actor 3.2 City of Atlanta 
Bureaucrat/CoC Actor 
1.3 CBO Actor/ 
Homeless Services 
2.3 Local Elected 
Official 
3.3 CBO Actor Homeless 
Services 
1.4 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/ 
Government Services  
2.4 CBO Actor/ 
Healthcare Services 
3.4 City of Atlanta Bureaucrat/ 
Government Operations 
1.5 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
2.5 CBO Actor/ 
Homeless Services 
3.5 CBO Actor Homeless 
Services 
1.6 CBO Actor/ 
Homeless Services 
2.6 CBO Actor/ 
Healthcare and 
Homeless Services 
3.6 Academic Expert/CBO 
Actor Homeless Services 




3.7 Academic Expert/CBO 
Actor Homeless Services 
1.8 Academic Expert/ 





3.8 Academic Expert/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 




3.9 Academic Expert/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
1.10 Academic Expert/ 
Healthcare Practitioner/ 
CBO Actor 
2.10 Service Provider/ 
Homeless Veterans 
Services 
3.10 CBO Actor Homeless 
Services 




3.11 City of Atlanta Bureaucrat/ 
Government Operations 
1.12 City of San Francisco Bureaucrat/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
2.12 Federal Actor/ 
Inter-government 
Support 
3.12 Academic Expert/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
1.13 Municipal Service Provider/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
2.13 CBO Actor 3.13 Municipal Service Provider 
/Public Safety 
1.14 State of California 




3.14 Healthcare Practitioner 
1.15 Municipal Service Provider/Public 
Safety 
  
3.15 Healthcare Practitioner 
1.16 Municipal Service Provider/ 
Healthcare Practitioner 
  
3.16 Academic Expert/City of 
Atlanta Bureaucrat 
1.17 Business Sector San Francisco 
  




























Qualitative Interview Consent Protocol 
 
Hello, I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan’s School of Public Health, in the Department of 
Health Management and Policy. I am working on my dissertation looking at variation in homeless policy decision-
making across the U.S.  
 
Thank you for taking time to speak with me. 
 
Before we begin, I wat to let you know that this interview is anonymous. All of your identifiable, information will 
be kept anonymous – for example your name, the names of your department/organization. Only a generic, broad 
descriptor of your role will be included to identify the sector that you represent – for example, “healthcare 
practitioner” or “municipal bureaucracy”. Only myself and my academic advisors will have access to your 
identifiable information. This research has been approved by the University Health Sciences Institutional Review 
Board, and my academic advisors are on the IRB approval along with myself. This interview is not recorded, but I 
will be taking typed notes. Finally, the interview should take about thirty minutes, but may be shorter or longer 

















Qualitative Interview Questionnaire 
 
 
1. Could you give me an overview of your role? 
 
2. Please describe the city’s current approach to chronic homelessness: 
 
 
3. Why has the city decided to take this approach? 
 
A. When was this approach first considered? 
 
B. Who was involved? 
 
4. From your role, can you provide an overview of how this approach came to be adopted by the city? 
 
A. What was your role [your department/organization]? 
 
B. Were there any challenges? 
 
C. Was there opposition to this policy? 
 




5. Could you speak to the Federal government’s position on [city’s policy approach]? 
 
A. Could you discuss the Federal government’s role in homelessness/criminalization policy? [e.g. HUD federal 








II. Was this approach and position considered when deciding the city’s approach? Could you describe the federal 
government’s role (if not already discussed)? 
 
























Codebook for Qualitative Interviews and Archival Documents 
 
1. Actor [I may need to add more categories as we go along]: 
a. Municipal bureaucrat  
b. Law enforcement 
c. CBO (Community Based Organization/nonprofit) staff 
d. Elected Official 
e. Healthcare Professional 
f. Place of Worship 
g. Private/for Profit Organization 
h. Tech Company 
2. City's Approach 
a. Defined Approach [perceived as having] 
b. Not defined [city perceived to not have a defined approach] 
c. Evidence-based/Helpful Approached [city perceived to have this] 
d. Non-evidence-based/Harmful/less helpful Approach [city perceived to have this] 
e. Why Approach Selected [may be overlap with Process codes, actor's perception of why city 
adopted x policy]  
f. Homelessness Prioritized [yes/if not don’t apply code] 
3. Process 
a. Year Started 
i. Day/Month [for archival documents] 
b. Political Will [towards or against supportive housing/addressing homelessness] 
i. Positive [mobilization towards] 
c. Initiating Actor 
d. Actors involved overall 
i. Actors not involved [purposefully, or due to institutional barriers/other barriers] 
ii. Participation challenges [inability to participate, limited participation in debates, 
decision-making]  
e. Process ongoing  
i. Still trying to initiate policy change 
ii. Implementation ongoing (I’m not measuring implementation, but people talk about it, so 
including here just in case!) 





iii. Federal  
iv. CBO 
v. Tech/Private Money 
4. Challenges 
a. Coordination Challenges 
b. Limited Funding 
c. Political pressure on bureaucracy [elected officials pressuring regulators] 
d. Authority/Responsibility [This changed, or there is uncertainty about who is responsible] 
e. Stigma 
f. Racial Issues 
g. Administrative Burden [shift to making it more burdensome for individual to receive government 
benefits]  
h. Different Approaches [different ideas about best approach] 
i. Conflicting approaches/conflicting policies  
ii. Pace [conflicts about pace/timing of policies; conflicting notions of how quick an issue 
can and should be managed]  
iii. Addressing causes of homelessness vs. Homeless behaviors [conflict described between 
these approaches] 
i. Omitted/Under-addressed Problems 
i. Food Insecurity 
ii. Mental Health 




i. NIMBY  
ii. Gentrification Policing 
b. Police/Law Enforcement 
c. Business/Private interests 
d. Other 
e. Elected Officials [different ideas/conflicting ideas between elected officials and other groups; 
pressure, if not direct opposition]  




iii. Future Concerns 
b. No 
c. Future Concerns [Funding/Programming/Partisanship] 
7. Criminalization [law enforcement involvement]  
a. Federal Gov and Local Crim Approach 
b. Local Law Enforcement Response 
c. Law Enforcement as Service Providers 
8. State Involvement 
a. State Involved 
b. State Not Involved 
c. State Funding 
i. Medicaid Expansion Funding 
d. Medicaid Expansion Involved 
e. Medicaid Expansion Not Involved 
f. Challenges with Medicaid Expansion Implementation 
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g. Implementation challenges with State laws [new] 
 
 
 
 
 
